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Abstract 
Indonesia is predominantly a Muslim society in Southeast Asia where more than 80 
per cent of its population folbws the Islamic teachings. Various other faiths like 
Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism as well as local animism are also very much 
available. It represents one of Ae unique examples in global history. Geographically, 
Indonesia is situated between two continents, the Asian and the Australian continents. Its 
current borders were founded by the Dutch, notwithstanding Indonesia clauns for 
continuity with pre-colonial Sriwijaya and Majapahit civilizations. Indonesia has 17,508 
islands spreading fit)m Sabang in the west to Merauke in the east 6,044 islands have been 
inhabited while 7,623 islands are empty. This is the landmark of Indonesia, the biggest 
archipelago country in the world. Irian Jaya (also known as Papua, the western part of the 
New Guinea island), Kalimantan (two-thirds of the island of Borneo), Sumatera, Sulawesi 
(Celebes) and Java are the five main islands in Indonesia. These islands, spreading 5,110 
kilometres fix)m Sabang in the west to Merauke in the east and 1,888 kilometres from 
Talaud in the north to East Nusa Tenggara in the south, create a 1,904.569 square 
kilometres that is Indonesia. The name "Indonesia" itself has been derived fi-om the Greek 
words 'Indos' and 'nesos', meaning "the Indian Islands" and gained popular usage amongst 
the nationalists for its non-colonial etymology. By sheer size, both area and population, 
Indonesia is the primus inter pares for Southeast Asia. Among its more than 200 different 
ethnic groups, with more than 500 languages and dialects, the main components are the 
Javanese (45 per cent), the Sundanese (14 per cent), the Madurese (7.5 per cent), and the 
coastal Malays (7.5 per cent). Java Island, the smallest among the five main islands, is the 
most fertile and densely populated island in Indonesia and has been the centre of power 
since the colonial period. The present Indonesian c^qsital, Jakarta, formerly known as 
Batavia during the Dutch rule, is located in the western part of this island thus asserting the 
importance of Java. 
More particularly after the Second Worid War when most of the de-colonized 
societies preferred to adopt a model suited to the dominant group of their respective 
societies, the founding fathers of Indonesia, who unilaterally declared the Indonesian 
independence on 17 August 1945 v^ich received international recognition on 27 December 
1949, instead of adopting an Islamic socio-political system, preferred a unique kind of 
secular model based on the principles oiPancasila (Five Principles). It stipulates the five 
principles of Indonesia: Belief in God, Humanitarian ism. National Unity. Democracy, and 
Social Justice. These principles are in accordance with the spirit of the Sumpah Pemuda 
(Youth Pledge) declared in Jakarta on 28 October 1928. This Youth Pledge has proclaimed 
the unity of Indonesia as "satu nusa, satu bangsa dan satu bahasa " (one land, one nation 
and one language). As such, the main focus of Pancasila is humanity and concern for 
humanitarianism. In due course of time, the concept of Pancasila gradually percolated 
down to the masses and acquired socio-political legitimacy. The political parties that have 
sprouted in this context, by and large, adopted the secular path of democratic progress and 
change. This has been proven by many hardcore Islamic groups which have come to adopt 
themselves to the general consensus that have emei^ed in favour of the Pancasila, thereby, 
giving it a greater legitimacy in the Indonesian society. Although there are political parties 
in Indonesia professing extreme religious ideologies and other -ism, but vdien they go to 
the masses for articulating their programs, the general focus is on the broad features of the 
Pancasila. In this context, it is interesting to note diat Indonesia represents a unique 
example of party politics. 
The Development of Party System in Indonesia: A Study of Political Stability and 
Legitimacy has been chosen as the title of this study in which it focuses at the study of the 
process of achieving political stability and legitimacy in Indonesian polity through suitable 
party system. The study covers the development of party system in Indonesia since its 
independence in 1945 until the second amendment of the Constitution in 2002. Thus, 
realizing the length of the study it was decided that the study was divided into several 
periods from 1945 until the post-Suharto period. These divisions are: (i) the Revolutionary 
Period; (ii) the Parliamentary Democracy Period; (iii) the Old Order or Guided Democracy 
Period; (iv) the New Order or Pancasila Democracy Period; and (v) the Post-Suharto 
Period. 
A stable government comes when a legitimate government installed receives full 
support from the people and effectively functioning through its actual performance to 
satisfy the basic functions of goverrmient. A balance between economic development, 
political institutionalization and political participation is another important factor to keep 
the equilibrium of political stability m the polity intact. Together with political legitimacy, 
they constitute die basic ingredients for a stable government. 
Legitimacy of the government in a democratic polity is achieved when it receives 
the consent of the people through legal-constitutional means. The ability of the government 
to guarantee the basic rights of the people, to actually perform the basic functions of 
government and not to resort to repressive policies towards its subject guarantee the 
continuance of its legitimacy. The failure of the government to perform these functions 
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erodes its moral authority that amounts to legitimacy crisis. Legitimacy crisis also occurs 
when legitimate government faces severe stress on the authority it claims or frequent 
disruptions and transformation or change in the leadership of the government. The crisis 
might also take the form of a change in the fundamental structure or character of a 
government, a change in the source from which it claims to derive its ultimate authority, or 
a change in the ideals it professes to represent. Legitimacy crisis erodes the moral authority 
of the government to rule the people, which, sometimes leads to the problem of political 
instability. This is the framework on the basis of which the question of political stability 
and legitimacy in Indonesian society is analyzed in this study. 
Different party systems adopted by the Indonesian government throughout its 
history suggested that a continuous process to provide political participation to arrive at 
political stability and legitimacy in the polity became the concern of the Indonesian leaders 
and its populace. However, the adoption of these different party systems failed to provide 
the answer to the question of political stability and legitimacy. It is on the basis of this 
assumption of the problem of political stability and legitimacy in a democratic Indonesia 
that this research was undertaken. A hypothesis has been proposed in this research that a 
moderate pluralism will give an answer to the problem of political stability and 
legitimacy in Indonesia. A moderate pluralism is a party system in which limited political 
parties interact in the polity where ideological adversary is in its minimum to provide the 
greater possibility of arriving at a stable and legitimate government in a heterogeneous 
society. And the fact that Indonesia is a heterogeneous society in which various interests 
surface in the society, this type of party system provides the most possible channel for a 
wider political participation in a representative democratic polity. 
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The Japanese defeat to the Allies in the second Great War opened up the new 
beginning for the Indonesian Republic. The abrupt transfer of power during this period 
meant that there was an absence of any political apparatus in Indonesian government in 
which the new Republic would be run. The absence of any political organizations due to 
their disbandment by the Japanese government meant the lack of the agent of democracy. 
The eventual power struggle within the Indonesian leadership contributed to the internal 
factor to the problem of political stability and legitimacy. The continuing pressure from the 
Dutch who still wanted to re-assert themselves as the colonial master in Indonesia was the 
external factor to the problem. It was in this complex revolutionary period that the decision 
to open up the chaimel for political participation was taken. A multi party system in a 
presidential system of government was the result of this decision. Soon, the old and new 
political organizations emerged and started to play important role in the subsequent 
political process in the Republic. 
The continuing struggle for political domination and the moimting pressure from the 
Dutch government had forced the Indonesian government to convert the presidential system 
into a parliamentary system with a multi party system as the basis of political process in the 
hope of achieving the support from the international community. However, the absence of 
any elections during this period to give meaning to the new adopted system deepened the 
political instability and legitimacy crisis. Frequent changes of governments occurred during 
this period and with the police actions from the Dutch forces and the Communist revolt in 
1948, the crisis deepened even fijrther. It was in this complicated situation that finally the 
Dutch government gave in to the international pressure and agreed to restart the negotiation 
process with the Indonesian leadership that resulted in the formal recognition of the 
independence of the Indonesian Republic. 
The lack of a constitutional basis to support the functioning of the parliamentary 
system during the four years of the revolutionary period was another factor contributed to 
the ambiguity in the decision making process. To avoid the mistake, a Provisional 
Constitution was introduced in 1950 designed specifically for a parliamentary system, 
replacing the 1945 Constitution, which was specifically designed for a Presidential 
government. However, ideological rivalry between different political organizations in this 
multi party system Indonesia dominated this second period of Indonesian party politics. 
The first five years of the formal parliamentary system of government witnessed the 
absence of any elections and the firequent changes of parliamentary cabinets. When finally 
the general elections was held in 1955, the resuh was a fi-agmented party politics in which 
no political party emerged as a major power in the House thus forcing the continuation of 
coalition politics. But the two year long period of election campaign took its toll in which 
no working coalition cabinet could be form by the ideologically contrasting parties. The 
adoption of a multi party system to provide adequate channels of political participation 
backfired in which the high degree of political participation was lacking of adequate 
political institutionalization. The imbalance between political participation and political 
institutionalisation in this period resulted in the weak government and weak opposition 
thereby the contmuation of the problem of political instability fi-om the previous period 
occurred. Secessionist movements emerged as the result of this instability crisis at the 
Center. The declaration of the state emergency in 1957 and the subsequent declaration of a 
Presidential Decree in July 1959 brought a new chapter of party politics in Indonesia. The 
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parliamentary system of government was discharged and the presidential system of 
government was re-introduced through the re-promulgation of the 1945 Constitution. 
The end of the parliamentary system in Indonesia in the late 1950s also meant the 
diminishing role of political party in the decision-making process. The Guided Democracy 
introduced by President Sukarno restricted the movement of political parties as agent of 
democracy. This short period of Guided Democracy was a blessing in guise for the 
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) in which having succeeded in achieving the 
President's favour they dominated the decision making process in this period. At the same 
time, the Army emerged as the counter force for the dominating role of the PKI. The 
balance between the two opposite forces through the charismatic legitimacy in the form of 
President Sukarno contributed to some degree of political stability in this period. However, 
the continuing struggle for political control between the PKI and the Army finally ended 
with a failed coup by some section in the military associated with the PKI. The failure of 
President Sukarno to keep the balance between the two opposite forces led into another 
crisis of political stability and legitimacy of government. 
The defeat of the PKI at the hands of the Army and the deteriorating legitimacy of 
President Sukarno opened up a new chapter of party politics in Indonesia. With the Army 
claiming to be the saviour of the Republic in the wake of the bloody coup in September 
1965, the Army under the leadership of General Suharto dominated the face of the Republic 
in the next three decades. The New Order regime under General Suharto further limited the 
role of political parties in the decision-making process. The regime installed the GOLKAR 
as the civilian hand of the Army to control the functioning of the government thus crippling 
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the role of political parties. With the GOLKAR winning every election administered by the 
New Order to provide the legal source of legitimacy, the improving economic development 
became the practical source of political legitimacy to the regime. This situation contributed 
to the political stability in Indonesia for more than three decades. However, with the 
increasing number of the tniddle class questioned the limited political institutionalization 
and participation and the deteriorating source of political legitimacy in the form of severe 
economic crisis in late 1990s contributed to the fall of the New Order regime. Besides, 
corruption, political nomination, cronyism as well as abuses of power by the regime further 
contributed to the crisis. 
The departure of President Suharto in 1998 under massive popular pressure for the 
failure of his government to deliver economic improvement after the monetary crisis that 
hit Southeast Asian nations including Indonesia in 1997 and the continuing limitation of 
political participation among the growing number of enlightened middle class throughout 
its three decades of authoritarianism sparked the debate on the model of party system in the 
new Indonesia. The historical experience has provided ample sources of inspiration for the 
most possible type of party system. The extreme pluralism in the early period of Indonesian 
independence posed to be the most approved choice of party politics to provide wider 
chances of political participation. The 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections were the 
result of the approval of the adoption of a multi party system in Indonesia. However, the 
departure of the democratically elected President Wahid from his office in the post 1999 
general elections after less than two years from his election proved the inability of an 
extreme pluralism to provide strong government and strong opposition due the fractured 
mandate from the elections. It failed to sustain a stable government. The condition mirrored 
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the political situation during the Parliamentary Democracy Period in the 1950s where 
similar party system was adopted. The Parliamentary Democracy Period witnessed the 
frequent changes in the government. Weak government and weak opposition as the result of 
the fractured mandate became the phenomena of this period. The governments in this 
period of parliamentary democracy stayed for about eight months to one year in office thus 
contributing to the crisis of political instability. 
The introduction of a direct presidential election in the 2004 general elections was 
expected to provide the answer to the problem of political legitimacy. A directly elected 
executive possesses greater political legitimacy as compared to the indirectly elected 
executive, a practice of electing the executive followed throughout in Indonesia before 
2004. The legitimacy achieved by the directly elected executive is hoped to enable the 
realization of some degree of political stability. Because legitimacy maintains stability in 
which it establishes a regime's right to rule and so it underpins the regime's authority over 
its people. However, with a big number of political parties competing in the elections, 
coalition politics still looms large to haunt the impracticability of a stable and legitimate 
polity. And even though it would nevertheless be a mistake to suggest that coalition politics 
are always associated with instability, but the fact that any absence of majority power in the 
House and the lack of national consensus among the party leaders will contribute to the 
problem of political stability. 
The proposal of a moderate pluralism for the new democratic Indonesia is based on 
the fact that throughout the history of Indonesian party politics, there are only four to five 
political parties out of the tens or the hundreds of political parties available that have 
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always been dominating the political processes. The domination of the Nationalist-Secular 
party, the Religious-Nationalist party and the Communist party during the 1955 elections 
and the Nationalist-Secular party, Development-Oriented-Secular party and Religious-
Nationalist party in the post-Suharto party politics fits to the idea of a moderate pluralism. 
A moderate pluralism has the strength of internal checks and balances within goverrmient 
and exhibits a bias in favour of debate, conciliation and compromise. The possibility of a 
moderate pluralism to limit the ideological differences between major parties, a general 
inclination to form coalitions and move towards the middle ground is greater than an 
extreme pluralism. Thus, in a moderate pluralism where limited number of political parties 
operating, the possibility of creating a stable and legitimate government is more apparent 
than in an extreme pluralism where national consensus due to the fractured mandate 
becomes the most difficult thing to achieve. Moreover, in a heterogeneous society like 
Indonesia where various political aspirations emerge, party system of this kind can perform 
a cohesive and integrative function as opposed to the extreme pluralism. The fact that 
several ideologies dominated the national politics in Indonesia a party system in the form of 
a moderate pluralism can necessitate the eventual political processes in post-Suharto 
Indonesia. The high level of political legitimacy achieved by a directly elected executive 
and a possible domination of his/her party or coalition partners in the parliament do not rule 
out the possibility of authoritarianism in the absence of a strong opposition party. The 
history of dominating role of President Sukarno and General Suharto in Indonesian politics 
mirrored this possibility. The failure of an extreme pluralism to provide the balance 
between a strong, legitimate government and a strong opposition as has been shown in the 
history of Indonesian party politics can be avoided through a moderate pluralism. At the 
same time, fractured mandate can be avoided through a moderate pluralism thereby the 
possibility of establishing a strong opposition that acts as the checks and balance to the 
strong, legitimate executive can be achieved as well. 
The proposition of a moderate pluralism as the solution to the process of creating a 
stable polity in hidonesia is possible to be evolved when there is a national consensus 
among the party elites in the necessity of creating stability in the Indonesian polity. A 
natural process of party coalitions in the form of pre-poU or post-poll alliances on the basis 
of common minimum programs as well as their ideological affiliations will further 
accommodate the political processes. The heterogeneity of interests in Indonesia will be 
effectively accommodated through this moderate pluralism and at the same time there is 
greater possibility of creating strong government as well as strong opposition thus creating 
a balance of equilibrium in a democratic polity. Thus even though a two-party system can 
provide a more equitable balance between social forces and political parties in a democratic 
polity as compared to other types of party systems but the heterogenic nature of interests 
that prevails in the Indonesian society will be more effectively and successfully 
accommodated through a moderate pluralism. 
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Glossary 
Asas Tunggal Sole guiding principle, the Pancasila was given this status for all mass 
organizations in 1978, though it was not enforced until 1985 
Denas Dewan Nasional (National Council): a council established by 
President Sukarno to accommodate the dynamic powers in the society 
which did not have representation in the representative body like the 
DPR 
Dwijungsi Dual function: right and duty of the military to oversee the state; 
military involvement in politics and government 
Front An organization established in December 1959 to accommodate 
Nasional people's movement and headed by President Sukarno 
G/30/S/PKI Gerakan 30 September/Partai Komunis Indonesia: a failed coup in 
1965 by sections in the military associated to PKI 
GOLKAR Initially a federation of army-sponsored associations and trade unions, 
with the name Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya (Joint Secretariat 
of Functional Groups); later the main electoral vehicle of the 
government under the New Order; eventually became a political party 
in the post-New Order era 
Kabupaten District, regency, county 
Konsepsi Concept: used by President Sukarno to foreshadow the ideas 
underlying Guided Democracy 
Malari Riots in January 15, 1975 in Jakarta, ostensibly against the visiting 
Japanese PM Kakuei Tanaka but prompted by concern over 
corruption, abuse of power and imeven development in Indonesia 
Marhaen Ordinary poor but property-owning Indonesian 
Marhaenism Doctrine of social responsibility to poor Indonesians 
Mufakat Decision-making by consensus 
Murba Small Marxist party hostile to the PKI 
Musyawarah Deliberation and discussion involving all parties to an issue 
NASAKOM Nasionalisme, Agama dan Komunisme (Nationalism, Religion and 
Communism): Indonesia's national ideology as formulated by 
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President Sukarno under Guided Democracy 
New Order The military political order established by General Suharto that 
controlled Indonesian politics from 1966 to 1998 
Old Order The Communist-dominated political order established by President 
Sukarno throiigh a Presidential Decree issued on 5* July 1959 that 
lasted untill 965 
Pancasila Five principles: Belief in One, Supreme God, National Unity, 
Himianitarianism, People's Sovereignty, Social Justice and Prosperity. 
They were devised by Sukarno in July 1945 shortly before the 
declaration of independence to identify the basic beliefs which imited 
all Indonesians despite their other cultural and ideological difTerences. 
Under Suharto's New Order, the Pancasila became for a time the 
ideological vehicle for a corporatist state 
Parmusi Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party): short-lived 
successor party to Masyumi 
Persatuan A nationalist group which opposed the re-occupation efforts by the 
Perdjuangan Dutch over Indonesia that gathered around the popularity of a veteran 
Trotskyite leader Tan Malaka in the early Revolutionary period to 
vu 
challenge the leadership of PM Sjahrir 
PETA Army of the Defenders of the Homeland: Indonesian auxiliary army 
units established by the Japanese in Java 
Poros Tengah Central Axis: a stategic political coalition of the Muslim parties and 
the GOLKAR party in the post-1999 general elections 
Priyayi Traditional elites in the Javanese society 
Reformasi Reform movement started in 1998 as a response to the failure of the 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Indonesia is predominantly a Muslim society in Southeast Asia where more than 80 
per cent of its population follows the Islamic teachings. Various other faiths like 
Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism as well as local animism are also very much 
available. It represents one of the unique examples in global history. Geographically, 
Indonesia is situated between two continents, the Asian and the Australian continents. Its 
current borders were founded by the Dutch, notwithstanding Indonesia claims for its 
continuity with the pre-colonial Sriwijaya and Majq)ahit civilizations.' Indonesia has 
17,508 islands spreading from Sabang in the west to Merauke in the east. 6,044 islands 
have been inhabited while 7,623 islands are empty. This is the landmark of Indonesia, the 
biggest archipelago country in the world. Irian Jaya (also known as Papua, the western part 
of the New Guinea island), Kalimantan (two-thirds of the island of Borneo), Sumatera, 
Sulawesi (Celebes) and Java are five main islands in Indonesian archipelago while the 
remaining islands are smaller in size. These islands, spreading 5,110 kilometres from 
Sabang in the west to Merauke in the east and 1,888 kilometres from Talaud in the north to 
East Nusa Tenggara in the south, created a 1,904.569 square kilometres that is Indonesia.^ 
The name "Indonesia" itself has been derived from the Greek words 'Indos' and 'nesos', 
meaning "the Indian Islands" and gained popular usage amongst the nationalists for its non-
colonial etymology.^ By sheer size, both area and population, Indonesia is the primus inter 
pares for Southeast Asia. Among its more than 200 different ethnic groups, with more than 
500 languages and dialects, the main components are the Javanese (45 per cent), the 
Sundanese (14 per cent), the Madurese (7.5 per cent), and the coastal Malays (7.5 per 
cent). Java, the smallest among the five main islands, is the most fertile and densely 
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populated island in Indonesia and has been the centre of power since the colonial poiod. 
The present Indonesian capital, Jakarta, formerly known as Batavia during the Dutch rule, 
is located in the western part of this island thus asserting the importance of Java. 
More particularly after the Second World War when most of the de-colonized 
societies preferred to adopt a model suited to the dominant group of their respective 
societies, the founding fathers of Indonesia, who declared the Indonesian independence 
unilaterally on 17 August 1945 which received international recognition on 27 E>ecanber 
1949,^  instead of adopting an Islamic socio-political system, preferred a unique kind of 
secular model based on the principles of the Pancasila (Five Principles). It stipulates the 
five principles of Indonesia: Belief in God, Humanitarianism, National Unity, Democracy, 
and Social Justice. These principles were in accordance with the spirit of Sumpah Pemuda 
(Youth Pledge) which was declared in Jakarta on 28 October 1928. This Youth Pledge has 
proclaimed the unity of Indonesia as "satu nusa, satu bangsa dan satu bahasa " (one land, 
one nation and one language).^ As such, the mjun focus of Pancasila is humanity and 
concern for humanitarianism. In due course of time, the concept of Pancasila gradually 
percolated down to the masses and acquired socio-political legitimacy.' The political parties 
that have sprouted in this context, by and large, adopted the secular path of democratic 
progress and change. This has been proven by many hardcore Islamic groups which have 
come to adopt themselves to the general consensus that have emerged in favour of 
Pancasila, thereby, giving it a greater legitimacy in the Indonesian society. Although there 
are political parties in Indonesia professing extreme religious ideologies and other -ism, but 
when they go to the masses for articulating their programs, the general focus is on the broad 
11 
features of Pancasila. In this context, it is interesting to note that Indonesia represents a 
unique example of party politics. 
1.1.1 The Revolutionary Period (1945 -1949) 
The abrupt surrender of the Japanese to the Allied Forces on 15 August 1945 
became a very important moment for Indonesia. The Japanese defeat meant the end of its 
short period of occupation in Indonesia, 1942 - 1945. It also signalled a power vacuum in 
the Japanese occupied territory like Indonesia. The Indonesian leaders, Sukarno and 
Muhammad Hatta, ignoring the Allies' order to maintain the status quo until the arrival of 
the Allied forces and under the inunense pressure from the impatient youth, declared the 
independence of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945 in Jakarta. This declaration 
of independence was a unilateral declaration and contrary to the promise of independence 
given by the Japanese government to the Indonesian people. Thus, the drafting of the 
Constitution for an independent Indonesia as promised by the Japanese which was 
underway at the end of the Japanese rule in Indonesia in 1945 was rushed to completion 
and amendments were adopted to fit the new situation. The decision to quicken the 
completion of the Indonesian Constitution resulted in the promulgation of the 1945 
Constitution on 18 August 1945. The 1945 Constitution featured a Republic with a 
presidential system of government while adopting a unitary rather than a federal system of 
government for Indonesia. 
Having declared the independence and promulgated the Indonesian Constitution, the 
Indonesian leaders in the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory 
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Committee for Indonesian Independence, PPKI) decided to take an emergency measure by 
appointing Sukarno as the Indonesian President and Muhammad Hatta as his Vice-
President. It also established a Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central National 
Committee of Indonesia, KNIP), which was later empowered with a legislative power due 
to the absence of a legislative body. Soon after his appointment, Sukarno established his 
Presidential cabinet on August 31, 1945. At the same time, in the absence of any political 
parties a unified national organization was to be established as an initial step in building a 
Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party), a State party.* The proposed 
national party would act as an umbrella for the various national forces in Indonesia. It was a 
popular belief that the fragmentation of these forces into different political parties and 
organizations might disrupt the nation-building process. Besides, the decision was taken as 
a necessary measure in the face of a revolutionary situation at the time. However, realizing 
the negative consequence of the choice of a single party system and as a measure taken to 
show to the international community that the newly independent republic was a democratic 
state, the idea of a single party was withheld on 1 September 1945.' Then, it was on 3 
Nbvember 1945 that the Government issued a Government Act in order to maintain the 
basic rights of the people and to keep the country in the track of democracy.'" Through this 
Act, the Indonesian Government decided to let the people to form and create any political 
organizations on the basis of their beliefs, philosophies and ideologies. This Government 
Act resulted in the emergence of different new political organizations as well as the re-
emergence of the old political parties established during the colonial period. At the same 
time, this Government Act made the realization of the idea of the Partai Nasional 
Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) in this period impracticable. In general, this 
Government Act consists of: 
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1. In respect to democratic principles, it is a mistake to form only a single party; 
2. The Government is willing to let the people to participate in the political process 
through the formation of political parties as an effort to understand the various 
sources of political power in the society; and, 
3. The existence of political parties and political organizations would help the 
Government in counting for the responsibility of the leaders of the freedom 
struggle." 
This Government Act was in accordance with the principles of democracy as well as the 
1945 Indonesian Constitution that guaranteed all citizens the freedoms of expression and 
assembly.'^ It also gave the people a chance to crystallize their political ideologies that have 
appeared during the national struggle period in the form of political parties. The birth of 
political parties during this period resulted in the formation of the first Parliamentary 
cabinet of Sjahrir and the dismissal of the Presidential cabinet of Sukarno because soon 
after the issuance of the Government Act on the freedom of establishing political parties 
another Government Act was issued on 14 November 1945 in which a decision was taken 
to transform the system of government from a presidential system into a parliamentary 
system. Thus, Sjahrir became the first prime minister of Indonesia and his cabinet was 
answerable to the KNIP. However, the parliamentary system practiced during this period 
was lack of a constitutional basis because of the continuance of the 1945 Constitution that 
was designed for a Presidential system as the Indonesian Constitution.'^ 
1.1.2 The Parliamentary Democracy Period (1950 -1959) 
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The freedom of establishing political organizations in the Revolutionary Period was 
the culmination of the freedom struggle movements. As Syamsuddin Haris has stated in his 
book, Demokrasi di Indonesia (Democracy in Indonesia), that the foremost issue appeared 
in the early period of independence was the issue of the freedom of making alliances and 
organizations and the issue of the freedom of speech and representation.'* The Government 
Act issued on 3 November 1945 guaranteed the freedom of the people to form any political 
alliances or political organizations on the basis of any ideologies (Communism, Radical 
Nationalism, Democratic Socialism, Religion as well as Javanese Traditionalism) during 
the 1945 to 1959 period.'^ But the low level of political institutionalisation with the 
increasing level of political participation during this period contributed to the imbalance of 
stability equilibrium in the polity. The various political parties established during this 
period tended to polarize thereby resulting in the difficulty of arriving at a national 
consensus.'^ The political polarization was so extreme that during the first half of the 1950s 
several governments had come and gone in a quick succession. However, even though this 
period was severely criticized for the persistent political instability the situation in the 
1950s is regarded as the real democracy enjoyed by the Indonesian people ever. The 
political climate in this period has always been the reference for any discussion on 
democracy in Indonesia." The general elections held in late 1955 was the first democratic 
and free election ever administered in the Indonesian history. The results of the elections 
depicted the plurality of Indonesian society. The foUowings are political parties of all sizes 
existed at the time of the first parliamentary elections in Indonesia in 1955:'* 
a. Major Parties 
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Partai Nasional Indonesia (National Party of Indonesia) 
Masyumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) 
Nahdatul Ulama (Association of Ulama) 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia) 
b. Medium-sized Parties 
PSII (Islamic Association Party) 
Partcindo (Christian Party) 
Partai Katholik (Catholic Party) 
Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Socialist Party of Indonesia) 
Perti (Islamic Education Party) 
IPKI (League for Upholding Indonesian Independence) 
c. Small Parties of Nation-wide Significance 
PRN (National People's Party) 
Partai Buruh (Labour Party) 
GPPS (Movement to Defend Panca Sila) 
PRI (People's Party) 
PPPRI (Police Employee's Association) 
Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) 
Baperici (Consultative Body on Indonesian Citizenship) 
PIR-Wongsonegoro (Greater Indonesian Union-Wongsonegoro) 
Permai (Proletarian People's Union) 
PIR-Hazairin (Greater Indonesian Union-Hazairin) 
PPTI (Tharikah Unity Party) 
Acoma (Young Generation Communists) 
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d. Small Parties of Regional Significance 
Gerinda - Yogyakarta 
Partai Persatuan Dayak (Dayak Unity Party) - West Kalimantan 
PRD (Village People's Party) - West Java 
AKUI-Madura 
Gerakan Pilihan Sunda (Sundanese Election Movement) - West Java 
Partai Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants' Party) - West Java 
Gerakan Banteng (Buffalo Movement) - West Java 
PIR-Nusatenggara Barat - Lombok 
The Indonesian people heavily expected that the 1955 parliamentary elections 
would result in the formation of a strong, stable and performing government, the bases on 
which they themselves had chosen to cast their vote was inevitably to bring about the 
contrary, disappointing outcome. The non-working coalition government and weak 
opposition as the result of this democratically administered elections gave a very 
disadvantageous result to the development of Indonesia as a modernizing nation. Even 
though there were four major parties that were successful in gaining the majority supports 
in the elections: the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, PNI), with 
22.3% of the votes and 57 seats; the Masyumi, a modernist Muslim party, with 20.9% of 
the votes and 57 seats; the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), a more conservative Islamic party, with 
18.4% and 45 seats; the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party, PKI), 
with 16.4% and 39 seats'^ but no single party secured a majority or a near-majority seats in 
the 257 Parliamentary seats thereby making it difficult for developing a stable political 
order. The coalition governments formed before and after the 1955 Parliamentary elections 
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enjoyed a very short span of life. Most of these governments stayed in power for a period 
between eight months to one year?° Hence they were strongly preoccupied with their 
survival in power leaving out their responsibility to deliver social and economic progress 
necessary to sustain and strengthen a liberal democratic framework. The elections failed to 
create condition for the emergence of a strong and stable government as well as a strong 
opposition, a necessary requirement for the effective functioning of a liberal democracy. 
Weak, unstable and non-performing governments continued to rule Indonesia during this 
period. At the same time, the party system remained extremely fragmented and 
factionalised and Indonesian politics continued to retain its excessively dysfunctional and 
divisive character.^ The coalition governments emerged after the parliamentary elections in 
1955 failed to deliver the actual functions of a government. Some intense and irreconcil^le 
differences between the coalition pmtners, especially between the PNI and the Masyumi for 
their contrasting ideologies,^ ^ within the short-lived government made the possibility of an 
effective government impracticable. The mass-based political parties in a largely illiterate 
population made it even more difRcult for Indonesia to develop a stable political order. The 
weak economy began to decline due to lack of proper attention and management. The 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in its economic survey of 1961 had 
reported: 
The most obvious symptom of Indonesia's economic weakness is the trend in its per 
capita income. Although the estimates are not altogether reliable, they suggest that 
national product increased at an average rate of 4 per cent during 1951-1957, 
declined by 3.2 per cent in 1958 and recovered in the following year by only 1.3 per 
cent The relatively h i ^ average rate of growth, higher than India or Pakistan, 
reflects little more than the restoratim of pre-war production capacity, which makes 
relatively small investments appear to give significant increases in output The 
process seems to have ended, because the high returns of the fifties could not be 
sustained without stepping up the rate of investment... It is significant that during 
1954 - 1959 per capita incomes remained virtually stagnant at approximately Rp. 
1,500 per annum (except in 1957). In real terms, this level of per capita income is 
probably not far from pre-war level, as also seems to be the case in Burma. Growth 
during post-indep^dence period thus represents largely a process of economic 
rehabilitation and an advance just sufficient to keep up with population.^ * 
The record of democratically elected government during the liberal democracy period in 
producing economic progress was disappointing, vety contrary to the hope and expectation 
of the Indonesian people. They failed to convert the supports of the votCTs into political as 
well as economic policies. In addition, there was widespread and extreme dissatisfaction 
among the political elites themselves with the management of economy by various coalition 
governments throughout the period. The late 1950s witnessed the increase in the 
antagonisms among the parties, regional dissatisfactions, armed forces discontent, and the 
ambitions of President Sukarno combined with a shallow elite commitment to liberal 
democratic procedures, and eventually, to bring down the parliamentary system. 
1.1.3 The Old Order or Guided Democracy Period (1960 -1965) 
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Indonesian experience with liberal democracy was entirely an unh^^y one. Even 
though the period bore witness to the practice of democratic principles where political 
participation was hig|i, but the acute political instability and ethnic and political 
confrontations contradicted the success of this mass participation in the decision-making 
process.^^ It was noted that even as early as the late 1952, President Sukarno had insisted 
that Indonesia was feeing a political crisis 'because of our unsettled political views and the 
parties' jockeying for power - with the result that the situation is seen as a failure of 
democracy and that the people want a dictatorship.' It was in this situation that he wanted 
to create a 'real Indonesian Democracy' and not on the basis of the notion that '50 per cent 
plus one are always right which constituted a central principle of majority rule. ^ ^ By the 
late 1950s, the disenchantment with liberal democracy became so extreme and widespread 
that even the legally constituted governments in office were not seen as having the moral 
right to govern and few among the Indonesian party leaders, who operated the system since 
independence, had the courage to defend them in public. This conflicting political 
environment was a ready-made for President Sukarno to push for his own special notion of 
a 'real Indonesian democracy' in the form of a Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided 
Democracy).^^ 
The new system introduced by the President was conceived and presented to the 
Indonesian people as a solution for the immense problems faced by the nation through a 
thorough restructuring of the political and economic institutions in conformity with the 
Indonesian tradition and values. But on the contrary, the system was to function differently 
under the massive personal influence of President Sukarno who had pioneered the idea. 
With the re-promulgation of the 1945 Constitution, a Constitution that was designed for a 
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presidential system of government with a heavy executive powers rest in the hands of the 
president as the chief of executive, through a military-backed Presidential Decree in July 5, 
1959, the centre of power was shifted from the Parliament into the hands of the President. 
The Presidential Decree automatically discharged the previous system of Parliamentary 
government. The Guided Democracy was to provide the President the sort of constitutional 
framework which could eventually be manipulated by the President to establish himself as 
the master of Indonesia.^' By 1961-62, the concept had been turned into a vehicle for a 
chaotic, authoritarian, and adventurist regime presided over by Sukarno. 
This period of Guided Democracy was characterized by attempts to involve all the 
major parties in the government and to reduce the significance of political parties in the 
decision-making process by providing the representation of so-called functional groups: 
youth, women, trade unions and, in particular, the armed forces, in the govemment.^^ The 
establishment of a National Front was another important feature of the system. The Front 
was filled with the representatives of all political groupings with a task of assisting the 
government in preparing the list of the candidates to sit in the parliament in which half of 
the list would be the reiM^sentatives of political parties and the other half would come from 
the functional groups'". Guided Democracy scripted by President Sukarno successfully 
replaced the Parliamentary Democracy. 
With power in his hands, President Sukarno dissolved the Parliament elected in late 
1955 and installed a new Parliament called a Gotong Royong Parliament. The new 
parliament consisted of the representatives of the political parties as well as the different 
functional groups and the armed forces, with a clear majority of them representing the 
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latter. He further restricted the role of the political parties by issuing a Presidential 
Legislation No. 7/1959 on party simplification, followed by another Presidential 
Legislation No. 13/1960 on the recognition, control and dissolution of political party, thus 
revoking the Government Act issued on 3 November 1945.^ ^ Having banned the Masyumi 
and the PSI through Presidential Decisions No. 200 and 201 on the basis of an alleged 
involvement of some of their leadership in the Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik 
Indonesia/Piagam Perjuangan Ral^at Semesta Alam (Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia/Charter of Universal Struggle, PRRI/Permesta) rebellion in Sumatra 
in 1958, he dissolved all political parties existed leaving only 10 p)olitical parties which had 
successfully passed the tight screening test by the Govemment.^^ These parties were the 
PKI, the PNI, the NU, the Partai Katholik, the Parkindo, the Partindo, the Murba, the PSII, 
the IPKI and the Perti.^ In a short period. President Sukarno and the Army succeeded in 
virtually sidelining the political parties. The only political party that was capable of 
influencing the President's policies during this period was the PKI thereby acting as the 
possible rival for the Army. And it did not take President Sukarno a longer time to extend 
his control over the government and the polity to a degree that he could establish and 
administer the Guided Democracy while at the same time neglecting the basic purposes for 
which he had pioneered the system and the philosophy upon which he had based the new 
concept. Soon, for all practical purposes, under the guise of the so-called 'real Indonesian 
Democracy', an adventurist authoritarian regime, presided over by the increasingly more 
erratic and megalomaniac President Sukarno, had been imposed over Indonesia. Thus, the 
institution of Guided Democracy did not 'reduce instability' in the sense of lengthening the 
life of cabinets or reducing ministerial turnover instead transforming the democratic polity 
into an autoritarianism.^^ Similarly, the economy was more massively mismanaged than 
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ever before, bringing the country to virtual bankruptcy. Indonesia suffered utter eccmomic 
cliaos and decline. A vast majority of Indonesian people faced extreme hardship brought by 
massive unemploymrat, acute food shortages and a raging inflation. The regime had little 
time of inclination to worry about these problems. The Guided Democracy did no better 
than the governments in the liberal democracy and failed to create the requisite socio-
economic foundations of a democracy and to give the Indonesian people the wherewitfial to 
act efTectively as citizens of a democratic polity.^ ^ The situation during this period can be 
summed up by the conclusion of John Legge's biography of Sukarno in which he states that 
in the period of Guided Democracy: 
Indonesia's problem was not that an authoritarian regime had emerged but rather that 
the new regime, like the old one, was unable to mobilize the power that was needed 
if government was to be effective and if the gigantic problems of the economy were 
to be tackled seriously.^ ^ 
1.1.4 Tile New Order or PancasUa Democracy t*eriod (1966 -1998) 
The Indonesian leaders had wasted fifteen years of independent nationhood. They 
could not effectively use that precious period to adapt the democratic polity to the 
Indbnesian reality and failed to create the necessary changes and progress in the socio-
economic framework so as to build the requisite foundations of a democratic polity. Their 
inability to deliver had resulted in the failed coup by the Partai Komunis Indonesia 
(Indonesian Communist Party, PKI) on 30 September 1965 in which several military 
generals were assasinated.^' The coup ended the reign of President Sukarno and the Old 
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Order, the Guided Demoaacy/' General Suharto, head of the Komando Strategis Angfuitan 
Darat (Army Strategic Reserve Command, KOSTRAD), and the most senior officer left in 
command, crushed tfie coup attempt Having assumed fiiU governmental control on 11 
March 1966, he reorganized the economy as well as the political system leading to the 
establishment of the New Order, to distance his regime fix>m the failed economic and super 
nationalist policies of President Suicamo's Old Order thus gradually eased Sukarno aside.'*® 
Indonesia under the New Order had to begin the journey once again, to achieve the 
necessary socio-economic revolution leading eventually, in the long run, to a fiilly 
democratic Indonesia. The transition to the formal establishment of the New Order 
consisted of three distinct stages, covering the period from 1 October 1965 to 27 March 
1%8 when finally General Suharto came to assume full control over government following 
his appointment by the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (People's 
Consultative Assembly - Interim, MPR(S)) as the second President of the Republic of 
Indonesia. The stages are:^ * 
1. From 1 October 1965 to 11 March 1966: General Suharto functioning as 
Commander of KOPKAMTIB {Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan 
Ketertiban) appointed by President Sukarno; 
2. 11 March 1966 to 12 March 1967: General Suharto, acting as the 'Chief 
Executive' of government based upon President Sukarno's 'Executive Orda- of 
11 March 1966 to General Suharto' (Supersemar - Sural Perintah Sehelas 
Maret)f^ took all necessary steps to guarantee security, peace and stability in the 
governance of Indonesia; 
24 
3. 12 March 1967 to 27 March 1968: Under the Decree No. 33 of the Special 
Session of the MPR(S), Genaal Suharto was made as the Acting President of 
Indonesia. 
The military, one of the key political players during the Sukarno's Old Order with the 
already banned PKI, became the most dominant power in the New Order. Holding the 
notion oi dwifungsi (dual fimctions), the military argued that it must play two important 
roles in Indonesia: the security and the socio-political role.^ ^ Dwifimgsi efiTectively gave the 
army the rationale for a role in domestic affairs. This notion of dual functions by the 
military was not a good signal for a democratic life in a relatively young nation like 
Indonesia. 
The New Order was hoped to deliver fi^edoms and expectations of the people that 
long had be«i taken and held for granted by President Sukarno with his Guided 
Democracy. The hope of reviving the political parties and party politics as practiced in the 
early days of the Republic was great among the masses. Nevertheless, the leaders of the 
New Order had proposed a differ^it blue print for the Republic. At the same time, the 
economic problem fiiced during this period was too ^vere and needed immediate attention 
from the new regime. Harold Crouch reported that: 
In 1965 prices rose by more than 500 per cent; in fact the rice soared by more than 
900 per cent. Unless swift and correct steps are taken, it may sl^ rocket by more than 
1,000 per cent in 1966. In the 1950s the state budget sustained deficits of 10 to 30 
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per cent of receipts and the 1960s it soared to more than 100 per cent In 1965 it even 
reached 300 per cent. Within the first quarter of this year, it amounted to almost the 
whole government expenditure in 1965. 
Realizing the acute situation in the Republic, the new regime decided to create a new 
political structure that: 
1. Could supports the economic transformation programs; and 
2. Could control the side effects of die programs, especially to tame the oppositions 
and to restrict them from disturbing the government's economic programs.^^ 
Thus, the government had decided to create a new political party system based on: 
1. The creation of political environment based on political consensus that would be 
free from ideological conflicts. Thus, the government decided to limit the party 
politics and to limit the movement of political parties and ret)resentative bodies. 
2. The limitation of pluralistic political participation among the masses. Mass political 
participations would be meant for helping the success of the economic progratns 
carved out by the political elites.^ 
The government's decisions to limit the movement of political parties and the creation of a 
limited political party system were totally out of the expectations of the masses, especially 
the party elites that long had been in the periphery during the Old Order. This New Order 
regime under the leadership of General Suharto, with Developmentalism as its ideology, 
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further weakened, abused and misused the democratic tools for its own benefits and 
survival. 
The introduction of the GOLKAR (Golongan Karya, the Service Group) as the 
'civilian hands of the Army'^ ^ and as a political vehicle for the new regime, further 
entrenched the control of the military over the Indonesian politics. In 1969, the Ministerial 
Regulation Number 12/1969 issued by the then Minister of Internal Affairs, General Amir 
Machmud, made the government civil servants out of party politics and forced them to be 
loyal to the government** This Government policy was not meant for liberating nor 
neutralizing the bureaucracy fix)m the influence of political parties. On the contrary, it was 
meant for mobilizing the bureaucracy to be the loyal supporters of the GOLKAR, a 
political party on the guise of a service group, as a show of loyalty to the Government. This 
policy proved to be effective when the GOLKAR, with the full support fix)m the military 
and the bureaucracy, and nine political parties, the Partai Katholik, the PSII, the NU, the 
Parmusi, the Paricindo, the IPKI, the PNI, the Perti and the Murba, contested the long 
delayed election held in 1971. GOLKAR, the new comer in the Indonesian party politics, 
woh 62.80 % of the total votes in the election, leaving out the 'big parties' during 
Parliamentary £)emocracy period like the NU and the PNI as the big losers securing only 
18.68 % and 6.93 % respectively.*^ This defeat was a strong indication to the end of an era 
of t)arty politics in Indonesia. 
The political legitimacy achieved through this election further cemented the aims of 
the New Order regime to create a new political structure for Indonesia. They wanted to 
create a functioning democracy in Indonesia, a Pancasila Democracy, under the guidance 
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of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In 1973, the Government decided to fiiither 
limit the number of political parties, from ten parties into two and one service group, the 
GOLKAR. This process was the culmination of the limited party system first introduced by 
President Sukarno during the Guided Democracy period. On the pretext of avoiding clashes 
of ideologies between the political parties and to achieve stability, the Government forced 
the political parties having similar aims and ideologies to merge into a single political body. 
Out of nine political parties left during this period, four Islamic parties (the NU, the 
Parmusi, the PSII and the Perti) were merged into a single party, the Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (Unity Development Party, PPP). At the same time, the non-Islamic parties 
and the nationalist parties (the PNI, the Partai Katholik, the Parkindo, the IPKI and the 
Murba) were forced to merge into a political party called the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia 
(Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI). The Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of 
Indonesia, PKI), the single most successful party during the Old Order, had been dissolved 
and banned by the Government due to their alleged involvement in the failed coup of 30 
September 1965.^ One year after the successfiil process of forced party fusion, in August 
1975 the Government introduced a new law on Political Party and Gt)LKAR known as 
Political Law Number 3/1975.^' The general characteristic of this law can described as 
follow:" 
Issues 
Name 
Number of Party 
Formulas 
Law for Political Parties 
and GOLKAR 
Three, PPP, GOLKAR, PDI 
Re^aits 
GOLKAR is not a 
political Jjarty and the 
relation between them is 
asymmetrical. 
Impossibility for the 
creation of any new 
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Aims of Party 
Party organization 
Dissolution of party 
Party membership 
among government civil 
servants 
Too normative, such as "to 
create a just and welfare 
society"; "to develop 
Pancasila Democracy" 
Party workers are up to the 
county (kabupaten) level 
only 
President has the power to 
dissolve any political party 
To be a member of any 
political party "with the 
q)proval of a super 
ordinate"; to hold any post 
in any political party "with 
a written consent of a super 
ordinate" 
political party 
It does not show the 
function of political 
party as a mean for the 
creation of civil society 
and democratisation 
Floating mass 
Blurred mechanism, the 
role of the President is 
too much 
No clear-cut explanation 
on the political affiliation 
of the government civil 
servants. 
The floating mass, the excessive power of the President aver political parties, the different 
status given to GOLKAR vis-ji-vis the PPP and the PDI, the limitation on the ri^ts of 
individuals to join political parties and the impossibility of party formation in the future 
became subject of concern among the academicians and the party elites. These restrictions 
and manipulations of power by the Government were certainly in contradiction with the 
principles of democracy. However, this was what the New Order's founder wanted, a 
democracy that worics. This political law clearly discriminated the political parties fh)m the 
GOLKAR, a political party on the guise of a service group. 
kavihg succeeded in the party simplification program, thus limiting a pluralistic 
participation, the government further tried to implement their Other objectives: an 
ideological conflict free political environment that would deliver political stability and 
economic progress. Because, as Herbert Feith described, immaturity of the politicians and 
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the ideological conflicts among the c<mtesting political parties had caused political and 
economic regression in Indonesia's parliamentary democracy.^^ Not to repeat the same 
mistake, the New Order regime introduced a new political law on political parties and 
GOLKAR in 1985, the Political Law number 3/1985. The only difference between this new 
law and the Political Law number 3/1975 on political parties and GOLKAR was the 
reference on the Pancasila in which according to the new law, all political parties must 
adopt the Pancasila as their sole political ideology.^ This was contrary to Sukarno's 
statement in his oration on 1 June 1945 that the Pancasila was desired as the "philosophical 
foundation of Indonesia" whereby any groups or factions were free to express their 
aspirations on the basis of different ideologies in the independent Indonesia/^ The previous 
Political Law number 3/1975 still guaranteed die freedom of political parties to adopt 
various ideologies except Communism. But witii the introduction of the new political law 
ended the ideological pluralism in Indonesian politics, a political plurality that had been 
shown in the 1955 parliamentary election. The Pancasila would then remain as the sole 
ideological foundation of any political organizations in Indonesia and thus would reduce 
the jiersistent ideological conflicts among factions and parties. The refusal of the Pancasila 
as the sole ideology meant the dissolution of the organization. Furthermore, the 
implementation of the single ideology in a plural society like Indonesia tended to create a 
single party system.^ The proceeding political processes witnessed this transformation in 
which where formally there were three political parties, but implicitly there was only one 
single party, the GOLKAR party. TTie elections administered by the New Order proved this 
proposition in which the GOLKAR, the ruler's party, always won the majority votes. 
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The legal political legitimacy achieved by the New Order through the first general 
election in 1971 followed by a simplified party system that contributed to a relatively stable 
government fiirther strengthoied its hold on Indonesia thus allowing it to reconstruct the 
broken economy through the first five year plan under the "Development Cabinet" in the 
hope of strengthening the legitimacy through practical achievements. Economic growth and 
development became the other legitimising sources of the New Order.^ ' Relying on many 
academically trained economists and other professionals, Suharto succeeded in the 
reconstruction process. Soon, the new regime succeeded in bringing inflation under control, 
deregulating and 'de-bureaucratising' the economy, balancing the budget, rescheduling 
debts incurred by the Old Order, beginning of a fiee exchange system, introducing new 
banking laws to oisure proper functioning of banks and importing enough rice to ensure 
adequate supplies.^ * The implementation of the new economic policies during the 
subsequent period represented a revolutionary change from the extreme nationalism, 
economic as well as political, and the guided economy of the Old Order to one in which 
market forces were permitted to play an increasingly more significant role, thou^ still 
under the government's guidance and within limits imposed by iL The success of the 
economic reconstruction continued to be part of the New Order's achievement during its 
three decades in Indonesia. 
The success of party simplification in the formative years of the New Order and the 
subsequent introduction of the single ideology, the Pancasila, for all political organizations 
became the political foundations of a new limited democracy, 'a democracy that works.'^  
Many dysfunctional characteristics of the Indonesian politics during the period of the Old 
Order became a deep concern of the New Order. These included the following:^ 
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1. Intense political intolerance, aggressiveness and polarization; 
2. Persecution and hounding of political opponents; 
3. Personality cult and virtual one-man rule; 
4. President Sukarno's obsession with performing on the world scene as a 
leader of liberation movements; 
5. Utter neglect of the economy; 
6. Breakdown of government, administration and law; 
7. Overindulgence in mass mobilization and action; 
8. Over dependence on demagoguery and exploitation of popular emotions. 
Based on a national consensus that had developed among the Indonesian people that if 
Indonesia was to progress, prosper, and maintain its national unity, its politics and political 
institutions and processes had to be subsequently revamped to create a democracy that 
worked and produced the well being of the lai:gest number. The new limited democracy 
based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution became the formula of a political system 
of the New Order. It aimed at: 
.. .a more realistic and pragmatic way of thinking without sacrificing the ideals of the 
national struggle, serious efforts to realize the ideals of economic democracy and the 
creation of a social, political, economic and cultural life imbued with the morals of 
Pancasila, in particular with the principle of 'Belief in the One and Only God.'^' 
32 
The successful efforts by the New Order regime in sustaining their political legitimate 
through sustained economic progress in market-oriented policies as well as through regular 
parliamentary elections in every five years, contributed to its successful control over 
Indonesian politics for more than three decades, 1966-1998. During this period, Indonesia 
experienced a democracy called the Pancasila Democracy, a political structure desired, 
created and nurtured by the New Order regime on the basis of the Pancasila, the 1945 
Constitution and the Stpersemar. However, the 1990s became the turning point of the 
regime's control over Indonesia. It bore witness of the regime fatigue in which any policies 
introduced by the government were regarded to be wrong and inappropriate. The biggest 
mistake done by the regime was, as Anthony L. Smith reported in his Indonesia: 
Transforming the Leviathan, that: 
The government became increasingly intolerant of opposition voices. In 1996 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno, was overthrown as leader of the 
PDI in a rigged selection process. This sparked domestic unrest and was the 
beginning of sustained public opposition, which dramatically escalated after the 
Indonesian economy crashed in E>ecember 1997. Many blamed corruption, collusion 
and nepotism (known by its Indonesian acronym - KKN, or Korupsi, Kolusi, 
Nepotisme), largely centered on the Suharto family, for the economic collapse. By 
May 1998 dononstrations had broken out all over Indonesia. Student-led 
demonstrations demanded greater democracy, while urban poor rioted against the 
removal of subsidies on basic commodities (mandated by the International Monetary 
Fund) and soaring prices. Elements of the military organized chaos and violence 
against the Chinese community, seemingly in a bid to provoke martial law and thus 
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save Suharto's teetering regime." 
All efforts by President Suharto and the military leadership to preserve the regime were to 
no avail. Economic development as the basis of the regime's legitimacy started to erode. 
Supports from the elites were winding out. General Suharto's three political resources: 
coercion, persuasion and material realization,^ ^ had finally failed to perform. The 
government was in no position to force its coercive policies to the people, no persuasive 
efforts succeeded and there was no materialization of the programs and policies benefited 
to the people. Finally, General Wiranto, the head of the Indonesian military, refused to act 
agunst the continuous waves of demonstrations thereby removing General Suharto's last 
hope of retaining the power. This situation finally forced General Suharto to submit his 
resignation to the MPR on the morning of 21 May 1998 thus ending the 32 years of the 
New Order regime. He made a brief speech telling the Indonesian people that under the 
present situation, it was "very difRcult to perform the government's tasks and [to promote] 
development of the country anymore." He therefore decided to berhenti (resign) from the 
presidency.^ 
1.1.5 The Post-Sufaiarto Period (1999 - Present) 
According to the Indonesian Constitution, the resignation, or in any case the failure 
of the President to continue his position in office, paves the way for the Vice-President to 
take over the full responsibility as the Chief of Executive. The resignation of General 
Suharto as the Indonesian President in 1998 automatically made B.J. Habibie, the then 
Vice-President, the third President of Indonesia amidst a period of high public demand for 
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reformasi (political and economic reform). Habibie faced a situation which required him to 
be more responsive towards the opposition groups. Four eminent reformist leaders, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Amien Rais (Chairman of Partai Amanat 
National and former Chairman of Midtammadiyah, the second largest Muslim organization 
in Indonesia) and Sultan Hameng^buwono X (Governor of Yogyakarta) gathered in 
Wahid's residence in Ciganjur to discuss the nation's future and issued an eight-point 
declaration - later known as "Ciganjur Declaration" - demanding a clean and democratic 
government based on the 1945 Constitution in order to preserve unity and to realize a 
prosperous society." 
The proceeding political processes gave a new scenario to the Indonesian political 
structure. The most important process was the dramatic re-politicisation of Indonesia 
through the imposition of greater freedom of speech and assembly for the people. 
Government legislation was issued to allow the creation of new political parties, the 
proposal of an early general election as well as the alterations to the composition of the 
members of the parliament. Thus, hundreds of political prisoners were released, free 
elections were held in June 1999, the first since 1955, and the Parliament assumed its 
original role as a check on the executive power, a role that has been specified in the 1945 
Constitution.^ Nonetheless, the changes that have been made by the B.J. Habibie's 
government failed to erase President B J. Habibie's reputation as the continuation of the 
New Order regime. The June 1999 general elections became the turning point of Indonesian 
political structure where the GOLKAR came a distant second to Megawati's Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, PDI-P), a break 
away party of the original PDI (the PDI-P won 34% of the vote with 153 seats in 
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Parliament as compared to the GOLKAR'S 22% votes and 120 seats in the Parliamait).*^ 
The results of the 1999 general elections dononstrated the broad continuity of the 
Indonesian party politics with the party politics of the parliamentary democracy in the 
1950s.^ The following is the list of 48 political parties competed in the 1999 general 
election:^' 
1. Partai Indonesia Baru (New Indonesia Party) 
2. Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Christian National Party) 
3. Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) 
4. Partai Aliansi Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian E>emocratic Alliance Party) 
5. Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Awakening Party) 
6. Partai Umat Islam (Muslim Party) 
7. Partai Kebangkitan Umat (People's Awakening Party) 
8. Partai Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi Party) 
9. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) 
10. Partai Syarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party) 
11. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Strtiggle) 
12. Partai Abid Yatama (Abul Yatama Party) 
13. Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (National Independent Party) 
14. Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Love Nation Democratic Party) 
15. Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) 
16. Partai Rakyat Demokratik (People's Democratic Party) 
17. Partai Syarekat Islam Indonesia 1905 (Indonesian Islamic Union Party 1905) 
18. Partai Katholik Demokrat (Catholic Democratic Party) 
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19. Partai Pilihan Rakyat (People's Choice Party) 
20. Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People Party) 
21. Partai Politik Mam Indonesia Masyumi (Indonesian Islamic Masyumi Political 
Party) 
22. Partai Bulan Bintang (Star Crescent Party) 
23. Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (Workers Solidarity Party) 
24. Partai Keadilan (Justice Party) 
25. Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (Nahdlatul Ulama Party) 
26. Partai Nasional Indonesia Front Marhaenis (Indonesian National Maiiiaenist Front 
Party) 
27. Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Association of Supporters of 
Indonesian Independence Party) 
28. Partai Republik (Republic Party) 
29. Partai Islam Demokrat (Islamic Democratic Party) 
30. Partai Nasional Indonesia Massa Marhaen (Indonesian National Party for Maiiiaen 
Masses) 
31. Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (All People's Deliberation Party) 
32. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (National Democratic Party) 
33. Partai GOLKAR (GOLKAR Party) 
34. Partai Persatuan (Unity Party) 
35. Partai Kehangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) 
36. Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (Uni Democratic Indonesia Party) 
37. Partai Buruh Nasional (National Labours Party) 
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38. Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (Family Deliberation Mutual 
Help Party) 
39. Partai Daulat Rakyat (People's Independent Party) 
40. Partai Cinta Damai (Love Peace Party) 
41. Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Justice and Unity Party) 
42. Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (Solidarity of All Indonesian Workers 
Party) 
43. Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) 
44. Partai Bhineka Tunggal Ika {Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Party) 
45. Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Uni National Solidarity 
Party) 
46. Partai Nasional Demokrat (National E)emocratic Party) 
47. Partai Umat Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party) 
48. Partai Pekerja Indonesia (Indonesian Workers Party) 
The Parliament's rejection of President BJ. Habibie's accountability speech on 20 
October 1999 signalled the end of his hope to retain his presidency, thus finally ending the 
New Order. As a result, through a series of negotiations, promises and double crosses, 
AtklUrrahmdrt Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur), A charismatic trdditionalist Muslim 
cleric whosfc party, the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakeriing Party, PKB), 
stoUred only 12% and SI seats in the Parliament, came from behind to gather the support of 
the Poros Tengah (the Central Axis of the Muslim Parties) and the GOLKAR, to capture 
the presidency, defeating the favourite Megawati Sukarnoputri of the PDI-P. President 
Abdurrahman Wahid presided over further democratisation and economic reform, but a 
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high degree of political instability and socio-political violence continued during this period. 
As R. William Liddle described in the conclusion of his essay, Indonesia in 2000: A Shaky 
Start for Democracy. 
The high hopes of many Indonesians and others for the Gus Dur presidency, which 
began in October 1999, were largely disappointed in 2000. Even his well wishers 
believe that he has not mastered the politics of translating into reality the vision of 
democracy, religious tolerance, and egalitarian development that, as a leading Jakarta 
intellectual and NGO activist, he expounded for a quarter century. 
.. .Throughout the year, the president seemed both distracted from important matters 
of national concern, as indicated by his several policy missteps and fi^uent foreign 
jaunts, and narrowly, pertiaps even corruptly, focused on building his personal power 
base and that of his party, the PKB.™ 
Twelve months after his f^pointment as the fourth president of Indonesia, Abdurrahman 
Wahid was widely regarded as a failed president. His personal legitimacy continued to 
decline. It was on the fateful 23 July 2001, slightly less than two years after his election, 
that he was removed fh)m his presidency by the MPR and was replaced by his Vice-
President, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Legislators accused Abdurrahman Wahid of engaging in 
corruption, allowing economic reforms to languish, exacerbating regional political and 
social conflicts, and generally providing weak and incompetent leadership. Above all, 
legislators resented his refusal to acknowledge the DPR as his constitutional equal." 
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Megawatis's ascendancy undoubtedly reflected the desire among national political 
leaders to re-establish a modicum of stability after three years of rapid, often violent, 
political change. Moreover, constructing a stable national government is certainly a 
prerequisite to achieving the stability of Indonesia as a whole. In the absence of a stable 
government in Jakarta, economic and regional challenges have mounted. Megawati was 
better positioned to achieve these goals than her predecessor did. The legislative branch 
was certainly stron^r than ever and the assembly had cautiously but continually amended 
the constitution, building broad consensus for each change. Both the legislative bodies 
demonstrated a willingness to accommodate demands by altering basic political 
institutions. Unfortunately, reasons for pessimism abound. Michael S. Malley reported that: 
...offers of special autonomy to Aceh and Papua, [two most volatile regions in 
Indonesia], might be too little, too late... E)ecentralization has proceeded too far for 
the national government even to protect its economic interests, let alone reverse the 
process, and the fractious legislature seems an unlikely partner for a president who 
needs to make difficult tradeoffs in order to achieve economic reform, all the while 
preparing for an election in 2004.^ 
Political instability remained to be the phenomenon in the post-Suharto Indonesia. The 
multiparty system introduced by President B.J. Habibie's government in 1999 resulted in 
the breation of different political parties with different ideological affiliations. However, the 
system brought little change to the polity. From almost 200 political parties created, 141 
parties were recognized by the Department of Justice and only 48 parties out of that 
fantastic number were eligible to contest the 1999 election. 21 parties won at least one of 
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the 462 contested seats in the Parliament while at the national level, there were five most 
popular parties:^^ 
1. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, 
PDI-P) with 34% of the total votes and 153 seats in the Parliament; 
2. Partai GOLKAR, with 22% of the total votes and 120 seats; 
3. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, PKB), with 12% and 51 
seats; 
4. Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Unity Development Party, PPP), with 10% and 58 
seats; 
5. Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN), with 7% and 34 seats. 
Thus, the result of this fipee and democratic parliamentary election produced a fractious 
legislature that seemed as an unlikely partner of a president. In this quasi-parliamentary 
structure, the president is required to maintain broad support in the legislature. Indonesia's 
current electoral system of proportional system almost guarantees that no single party is 
capable to secure a majority votes. With just 31% of the seats in the House of 
Representatives, and 27% in the Assembly, Megawati's party cannot govern alone. It 
needed coalition partners. However, the personal differences among party leaders, and 
ideological ones among the parties, inhibited the formation of stable coalitions. An example 
had been shown in the case of President Wahid who had been impeached from his office 
due to his weak leadership and the lack of majority supports in the parliament. As such, 
Megawati found it complicated to translate her more stable political position as compared 
to her predecessor into more effective policies. At the same time, the status of her 
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government as the continuation of President Wahid's term in office added to the difficulty 
of transforming the supports into good decisions and policies in a short time. 
1.2 Statements of problems 
The question of political stability and legitimacy in the heterogenic Indonesian 
polity since its independence in 1945 remains an unanswered question to this day. The 
experimentation of a muhi-party system in a parliamentary system of government in the 
19S0s failed to provide the expected answer of a stable, legitimate and performing 
government. The political legitimacy achieved by the elected governments during this 
period of liberal democracy failed to be transformed into a stable and performing 
government. The fractured mandate as a result of this extreme pluralism failed to create a 
strong government and strong opposition. Instead tfie practice of a multiparty system made 
Indonesia to witiiess the frequent changes of governments. 
Fearing the breakdown of the nation due to the unending crisis of political 
instability in the 1960s as a result of an authoritarian rule of President Sukarno, the military 
took over and established a presidential government, a system of government which was 
contrary to the previous practice of parliamentary politics. However, realizing the lack of 
moral and legal legitimacy of the new government and as an effort to achieve political 
stability in the polity, limited party politics was established and orchestrated elections were 
held to achieve legitimacy. Economic development was also taken into consideration in 
building up the legitimacy for the government. The strategy proved to be fruitful in which a 
stable government was performing during the course of more than three decades. But the 
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inability of the regime to provide a wider channel for the increasing interest of political 
participation among the masses, and more so, the failure of the system to absorb it, led to 
the failure of this regime to stay in power. The failure of the economy, the practical basis of 
the regime's political legitimacy, to perform in the late 1990s contributed further to its final 
departure. This situation had resulted in the instability and legitimacy crisis in Indonesia in 
which the regime was finally voted out of power by the popular pressure in 1998. 
The failure of the government to accommodate people's participation in the 
decision-making process during the course of more than three decades opened the way for 
the reconstruction process of the Indonesian political system. The democratic practice in 
the early days of the Republic was an important experience for reformulating the polity. 
The liberal party politics that d(»ninated the parliamentary democracy in the 1950s 
witnessed popular participation of the people in the decision-making process. However, the 
instability crisis due to the lack of national consensus in an extreme pluralism in which 
various governments rose and fell also dominated the period. 
The brief period of an authoritarian rule of President Sukarno was a painful 
experience of instability crisis for the Indonesian polity. And even though the subsequent 
military rule had provided some sort of political stability, but the lack of legitimacy of the 
government and the imbalance between political participation and political 
institutionalisation was not an answer to the question either. A maximum political 
participation of the masses and an adequate political institutionalisation are necessary to 
create political stability and legitimacy in a democratic polity. The ability of the polity to 
keep the balance between these two will give an answer to the question of political stability 
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and legitimacy. Party politics as an impwtant aspect of democracy needs to be redefmed in 
Indonesia. Party system, in which political parties interact, needs to be reformulated in 
order to achieve this balance. But a refonnulation of party system alone will not guarantee 
the answer to the crisis. Checks and balances between various oi^ans of government 
become another aspect of importance in establishing a stable and legitimate government. 
In an effort to answer the question of instability and legitimacy crisis in Indonesian 
polity, a hypothesis is proposed in this study. Under the framework of Pancasila and the 
1945 Constitution, which guarantee the freedom of democratic principles, and while 
keeping in mind the various aspects of democracy, the process of party politics as an 
important aspect of democratic polity will become the core emphasis in this study. Thus, 
realizing the different political groupings and political currents in the history of Indonesian 
party politics since its independence, a moderate pluralism will provide an answer to the 
problem of political stability and legitimacy in Indonesia. In a moderate pluralism where 
three - four parties operate'*, the possibility of creating a stable and legitimate government 
is more apparent than in an extreme pluralism where national consensus becomes the most 
difficult thing to achieve. Moreover, in a heterogeneous society like Indonesia where there 
are several political aspirations, party system of this kind can perform a cohesive and 
integrative function as opposed to the extreme pluralism. 
13 Aims of Research 
With this background in mind, this study tries to understand the factors leading into 
the development of party system in Indonesia and political model wedded to the 
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humanitarian principles of Pancasila and 1945 Constitution that eventually might bring 
political stability and legitimacy. Iliete are two related books on the subject matter that 
have been written by different scholars which, however, could not provide a clear-cut study 
to the relationship between party syston and political stability and legitimacy. One book 
written by Mutfaiah Alag^pa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral 
Authority, dealt extensively on the problem of political legitimacy but lacking of discussion 
on the relation between party system and political stability and legitimacy while anoAer 
book written by Arbi Sanit, Politik Perwakilan didalam Order Bam (Representative 
Politics in the New Order) discussed about the party system under the New Order, the 
problems it faced and the prospect it mi^ t have in the future. Each of the two studies 
concentrated oa the subject matter separately. Other studies undertaken by different 
scholars put the subject matter separately or if it h£ )^pens to be any discussion on the 
subject, it is lacking in any specifity. Hence it is very necessary here to undertake a study 
that focuses on the process of development of party system and political stability and 
legitimacy in Indonesia. And in this study, th&e are three points, which become the main 
focus. These are: 
1. liie analysis of the party politics and the political processes in Indonesian polity; 
2. The reconstruction of a suitable Indonesian party system that will bring political 
stability and legitimacy to the Indonesian polity; and, 
3. As a contribution to the study of party system in relation to political stability and 
legitimacy in modernizing nations, especially Indonesia, that would be useful as a 
complementary guide to the study of Indonesian politics. 
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1.4 Methodol(^ 
To answer the questions posed in this research, it is necessary to formulate a 
suitable methodology. Besides, identification of variables involve in the researdi in order to 
formulate a framework of analysis to probe the hypothesis posed cannot be ignored either. 
Certain aspects like the method of study, units of analysis, limitations of the study as well 
as data collection and data analysis techniques will be discussed in the following. 
1.4.1 Methods of Analysis 
This research is descriptive in nature. A descriptive analysis is a fact-fmding study 
with an accurate interpretation aiming at the creation of a systematic description or 
depiction, factual and accurate about facts, tendencies and relation between phenomena 
under study.'^ As such, this study is hoped to provide a clearer picture on the development 
of party system in Indonesia that eventually bring about political stability and legitimacy. 
Thus the hypothesis posed in the beginning of this research will either to be supported or 
rejected. 
1.4.2 Units of Analysis 
llie unit of analysis in this research is Indonesia as a political system where 
superstructure and infrastructure components such as the party system, the political parties, 
the military, the executive, the judiciary as well as the legislature are present. Tlie 
interactions of these components are hoped to bring about political stability and legitimacy 
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in Indonesia. Political parties and the party system as the principal institutional means for 
organizing the expansion of political participation in a democratic polity will be the main 
focus of study. Other components like the militaiy and other governmental bodies will 
support the study. 
1.43 Limitations of the Study 
This research is limited to the study of the development of party system and the 
political processes in Indonesia since independence until the fourth amendment of the 1945 
Constitution. This will be broadly divided into five different periods: the Revolutionary 
Period, the Parliamentary Democracy Period, the Guided E>emocracy Period or the Old 
Order, the Pancasila Democracy Period or the New Order and the Post-Suharto Period. 
1.4.4 tHita Collection Procedures 
Recogilizing the importance of the study, it would be more accurate when primary 
data are used. These primary sources would give a better foundation for constructing the 
fhimewbrk in the study. However, relying on primary data is not enough to construct a 
thesis of this kind. A great deal of secondary data is very necessary for the completion of 
the study. As such, library research is conducted to complete the data collection process. 
Related materials from books, journals, governmental documents and records, articles and 
news in the media are collected, selected and analyzed. 
1.4.5 Data Analysis Technique 
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The data analysis process in this study is descriptive-qualitative in nature. Bodgan 
and Taylor argue that qualitative research as a research procedure will result in descriptive 
data in the form of written words or might be in the form of people and their behaviour as 
an object of study.'^ Recognizing the scope of study, which is in a national level, the 
analysis in the study will follow the chronological political processes occurred. It means 
that in all of the analysis, data interpretation is needed. Through this process, a clear picture 
of the phenomoia will be available with analysis and interpretation. 
1.4.6 Chapter Arrangement of the Thesis 
This thesis contains of five chapters as follow: 
Chapter I It consists of preliminary discussion of the research, dealing with the 
importance of the topic, the statements of problems, the aims of 
research, and also the chosen methodology being used in the research 
Chapter II Hie chapter discusses the theoretical background of the study and the 
frameworic of analysis of the study 
Chapter III The development of party systems in the history of Indonesian politics 
is discussed in this chapter 
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Chapter IV The chapter focuses on the relation between party system and political 
stability and legitimacy as well as the analysis and discussions on the 
data found in the research 
Conclusions This contains the conclusions of the thesis 
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CHAPTER II 
POLITICAL PARTY, PARTY SYSTEM, 
POLITICAL STABILITY AND LEGITIMACY: 
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
In modernizing society, "building the state" means in part the creation of an 
effective bureaucracy, but, more importantly, the establishment of an effective party system 
capable of structuring the participation of new groups in politics.' Because, "the principal 
institutional means for organizing the expansion of political participation are political 
parties and the party system."^ In a democratic country, the life of political parties is very 
important to show how the system is working. Political parties represent the general will of 
the people and become the medium of communication between the system and the people. 
They become necessary to organize and to structure the expanded participation. A strong 
political party system has the capability, "first, to expand participation throu^ the system 
and thus to preempt or to divert anomic or revolutionary political activity, and, second, to 
moderate and channel the participation of newly mobilized groups in such a manner as not 
to disrupt the systwn."' The development of party system in a country depends on the 
ability of the political system to adjust itself to the need and fimction it plays. It is the 
political party, "a group of citizens more or less organized, who act as a political unit who, 
by the use of their voting, aim to control the government and carry out their general 
policies,"^ that makes representative democracy works. Political parties are social 
organizations that attempt to influence the selection and tenure of the personnel of 
government by putting forward candidates for elective office and the policies of 
government according to some general principles or proclivities upon which most of their 
members agree. It exhibits a structure or organization which links leaders at the center of 
government to a significant popular following in the political arena and its local enclaves, 
and generates in-group perspectives or at least symbols of identification and loyalty. 
Political parties are not necessarily organized to fight elections. The idea of revolutionary 
party is an obvious example. Power and its pursuit, for some common purpose, is the 
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hallmark of a political party. Organizations diat push for one single interest or represent 
opinion on a single issue are not parties if they do not seek power for general purposes. 
Political parties are the main intermediate and intermediary structures between society and 
government. They are central to both in the soise that they connect bridges to create two-
way communication process between them. Being the 'primary lubricants' and 'moving 
forces' of the governmental process, they are central also to modem political systems. In 
one way or the other, all forms of governments in all modem and modemizing societies 
have turned to political parties and have maintained them as an essential institution of the 
political system. The stability of a modemizing political system depends on the strength of 
its political parties. A legitimate govemment will be installed to create stability in a 
political system. It is the party system capable of assimilating the new social forces 
produced through modemization that becomes the precondition of political stability.^ 
Polities which have a stable balance between participation and institutionalization at 
low levels of both face the prospect of future instability unless the development of political 
institutions keeps pace with the expansion of political participation.^ This is the 
responsibility of political parties to provide the channel for participation. Because political 
parties as well as the party system are the principal means for organizing the expansion of 
political participation. A stable govemment that is legitimate will bring the political system 
to work accordingly for the benefits of the people. As Huntington states in his work 
Political Order in Changing Societies, 
...societies which have created a large-scale of modem political institutions with the 
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capability of handling much more extensive political participation than exist at 
present are presumptively stable. Societies where political participation exceeds 
institutionalisation are, clearly, unstable, while societies with a balance between the 
two at high rates of both may be said to have validated stability.* 
Political stability implies the security of a regime fix)m the threat of subversion, revolution, 
rebellion and eventual overthrow. Such security may be obtained through strong military or 
economic power but at the end, legitimacy and popular support are required to sustain it. As 
Rustow states, "political stability functions as the legitimacy of institutions and rulers."' He 
expresses this relationship in the following equation: 
Political Stability = Legitimacy of Institutions + Personal Legitimacy of Rulers 
He further suggests that for stability to exist, the masses must accept and support both 
political institutions and the actors in them. Conventionally speaking, ideology, language, 
religion and culture are considered contributory factors to social cohesion and eventually to 
stability. Countries undergoing rapid social and economic changes particularly require 
viable political institutions and processes to regulate and channel the pressures of change 
and prevent anomic effects and outbreak of violence. Because political stability is achieved 
when the political system has the ability to absorb changes.'° At the same time, 
disturbances are generated both inside and outside of the system causing the system to 
move. The system must then be able to accommodate or adjust to these changes in order for 
equilibrium to persist. In Easton's behavioral model of input-output type of political 
system, a diagram is proposed as below: 
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The citizens' demands and supports constitute the 'input' variables, and decisions as well as 
actions constitute the 'output' variables. 
Legitimacy, in the words of Rustow, is the precondition for political stability in 
democratic states. Legitimacy relates to the acceptance of power by the people and the 
process whereby power gains acceptance by the people which essentially includes the 
process of mobilization of support through ideology, institution building, system of rewards 
and punishment, performance or manipulation. It involves "the capacity of the system to 
engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate ones for the society."'' It is the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its 
authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or 
self-interest, but because they are believed to have moral authority, because subjects 
believe that they ought to obey'^ that bring about political legitimacy in a political system. 
The relationship between stability and legitimacy is thus very significant. A stable 
government comes when a legitimate government installed receives full support from the 
people and effectively functioning through its actual performance to satisfy the basic 
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functions of government. The effectiveness and the legitimacy of its political system affect 
political stability. Furthermore, political legitimacy is very significant as it is: 
1. the core of political organization and affects all political activities; 
2. it shapes the effectiveness of governance, the scope, pace and method of political 
change, and the intemational conduct of the state; 
3. as a moral support for the ruler to rule the subjects.'^  
Thus legitimacy maintains political stability in a polity because it establishes a regime's 
right to rule, and so underpins the regime's authority over its people. Legal-rational 
authority is the most common basis of legitimacy in modem societies, being linked to the 
establishment of rule-governed behavior through constitutionalism and electoral 
democracy.'^ 
2.1 Political Party: Origin and Development 
So fundamental are political parties to the qjeration of modem politics that their 
role and significance are oflen taken for granted. It is forgotten, for instance, that parties are 
a relatively recent invention. As political machines org^ized to win elections and wield 
government power, parties came into existence in the early nineteenth century. In colonial 
days, they became an important tool of freedom movements. The leaders of the colonized 
societies realized that political party could become an effective tool to challenge the 
colonial govemment. As a consequence, ]3olitical parties became important feature in their 
development as independent states. Moreover, the representative politics and the increasing 
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participation of the people in political process contributed much to their rapid acceptability 
and development. As a result, today political parties exist in all societies and wherever they 
do not that is because of their suppression. 
The rise of political parties is indubitably one of the important distinguishing marks 
of modem government. The parties, in fact, have played a major role as makers of 
governments; more especially they have been the makers of democratic government.'^ And 
whether they are the tools of democracy or sources of tyranny and repression, political 
parties are the vital link between the state and civil society, between the institutions of 
government and the groups and interests that operate within society. Three different 
theories have been suggested on the origin and development of political party: ' 
1. Institutional theories focusing on the interrelationship between early parliaments 
and the emergence of parties; 
2. Historical-situation theories that focus on the historical crises or tasks which 
systems have encountered at the moment in time when parties developed; and, 
3. Developmental theories that relate parties to the broader processes of 
modernization. 
The first theory describes that political party emerges gradually from the activities 
of the legislators to make contact with the masses and to gather supports from them. The 
second theory explains that historical situational crises occur in political systems that 
experience transition from traditional to more modem and complex stmcture. It has been 
suggested that the way in which political elites cope with such crises may determine the 
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kind of political system that develops. Such historical crises not only often provide the 
context in which political parties first emerge but also tend to be a critical factor in 
determining what pattern of evolution parties later take. The last theory suggests that 
modernization in the socio-economic aspects results in the emergence of political 
organization capable of aggregating and articulating various aspirations emerge in the 
society. Thus, political parties emerge as a logical product of socio-economic 
modernization process in the society. There is similarity between the second and the third 
theory where political parties emerge in relation with changes in the society because of 
modernization process. The difference is in the formation process where the second theory 
suggested that the changes in the polity resulting in the emergence of three different crises: 
legitimacy, integration and participation crises, and political parties emerge to solve them, 
while the third theory suggested that the changes in the polity necessitate the emergence of 
political parties. 
In a democratic polity, political parties play a significant role that they become the 
backbone of the polity. The quality of democratic political system depends on the ability of 
the political parties to absorb demands and aspirations of the people and deliver them back 
as a product of political process. J. LaPalombara and Myron Weiner gave four distinct 
characteristics of political parties. They said that political parties should: 
1. Have continuity in organization, that is an organization whose expected life span is 
not dependent on the life span of current leaders; 
2. Manifest and presumably permanent organization at the local level, with regularized 
communications and other relationships between local and national units; 
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3. Self-conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture 
and hold decision-making power alone or in coalition with others, simply to 
influence the exercise of power; and 
4. Concern on the part of the organization for seeking followers at the polls or in some 
manner striving for popular support.'^ 
Thus, in democratic polity, political party is an organization that is locally articulated, that 
interacts with and seeks to attract the electoral support of the general public, that plays a 
direct and substantive role in (>olitical recruitment, and that is committed to the capture or 
maintenance of power, either alone or in coalition with others.'^ It becomes the vehicle for 
mass political participation based on political culture and ideology. 
As a group that is involved wholly in politics, the foremost function of political 
party is to seek and maintain political power in order to materialize the party programs 
based on certain ideology." Its primary purpose is to be represented formally in the policy-
making institutions of govemment.^° Besides, it also performs some other functions like 
political communication, political socialization, political recruitment, conflict management 
agency, and as a political control.^' In general, the common functions of political parties 
are: 
1. It is exf)ected to organize public opinion and to communicate demands to the centre 
of governmental power; 
2. To articulate to its followers the concept and meaning of the broader community; 
3. To be intimately involved in political recruitment. ^^  
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Thus, it is understood that political parties become an important device to organize political 
power, influence government policies, connecting the people and the political process 
effectively, formulate the demands and aspirations of the people to be included in the 
process of decision making process. 
As a political unit, there are stages in which political party develops. Samuel P. 
Huntington has described four different stages of party development in his book Political 
Order in Changing Societies. The stages are: 
Factionalism is the first stage in the party development. When politics involves a 
small number of people competing with each other in a large number of weak, 
transitory alliances and groupings, these groupings have little durability and no 
structure. They are typically the projections of individual ambitions in the context of 
personal and family rivalries and affiliations. These political groupings may be 
called parties, but they lack of the continuing organization and social support which 
are the essence of party. A faction appeared as a portion of an electorate, political 
elite, or legislature whose adherents were engaged in parallel action or coordination 
of some consistency but limited durability in conflict with other portions. Second is 
Polarization. This stage is the cmcial process in the evolution of a political system 
when politics bredks out of the closed circle of revolutionary or legislative 
factionalism, political participation broadens, new social forces appear on the 
political scene, and the organized linking of political faction to social force forms 
political parties. A multiplicity of groups and of cleavages lead the actors to devise 
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strategies for the redistribution of power within the system rather than for the 
expansion of the power of the system. They promote the extension of political 
participation and the establishment of links between the political factions and rising 
social forces. In one form or the other, the polarization of opinion is a requisite for 
the shift from factional politics to party politics. The third stage is Expansion. It is a 
process when a strong party appeals to large masses of the population and binds 
those masses to it through an effective organization. The expansion of participation 
and the organizing of that participation in parties is thus the product of the intense 
political struggle. It involves the efforts of political leaders either to overthrow the 
existing system, to control the existing system, or to enter the existing system. The 
final stage of party development is the Institutionalisation. The way in which 
political participation is expanded obviously shapes the party system which 
subsequently develops. The anti-system revolutionary or nationalist process 
eventually results in the displacement of the former political system and the 
establishment of a new one with typically a one-party or dominant-party system. The 
intersystem process most often leads to the early institutionalisation of a two-party 
system, while the into-system process is likely to eventuate in the emergence of a 
multiparty system. Once these patterns are established in the early phases of party 
development, they tend to become institutionalized.' 
In their development, political parties interact with each other. They form such a 
behavioural pattern in which these political units function effectively in a political system. 
The complex inter-relationships between and among parties are crucial in structuring the 
way political systems work in practice. This behavioural pattern and interaction among the 
political parties in a political system is called party system."'* The interaction between 
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parties influences each unit as separate individuals and the inner structure of a political 
party depends on the interaction pattern among the parties. Party systems shape the broader 
political process in various ways. They influence the range and nature of choice available to 
the electorate, and affect the cohesion and stability of government. They structure the 
relationship between the executive and the assembly, establish a bias in favour of either 
conflict or consensus, and shape the general character of the political culture. However, 
party and party system are two different entities that separate discussion is necessary to 
understand them. In this study, we will focus and discuss political party in its interaction 
with other units in a political system, which eventually bring about political stability and 
legitimacy to the polity. In other words, we will discuss the party system, and not political 
party as a political unit, in a democratic polity. 
2.2 Party System and Its Typology 
In its most traditional deflnition, party system is studied on the basis its numerical 
typology. The party system is distinguished by reference of the number of parties 
competing for power. On this basis, Maurice Duverger divides it into three: multiparty 
system, biparty system and single party system. He explains that: 
... a multiparty system comes when more than two political parties compete for 
power in the general election. It comes as a common phenomenon in heterogeneous 
societies, culturally as well as socio-economically. Each of the entities in the society 
tries to maintain its distinctive characteristics and creates different political forums to 
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articulate their political aspirations. Coalition governments are the common 
phenomenon in a multiparty system. Biparty system is a party system where two 
dominant political parties compete with each other for power in the general election 
to seek the most popular support from the masses. The winning party will control the 
government while the losing party fills the opposition bench loyally. This party 
system usually works effectively with three conditions: a relatively homogeneous 
society, national consensus and institutionalisation of conflict mechanism agency. ... 
a single party system occurs when there is only one single party in the polity. It has 
three variations: the single party totalitarian where a single party emerges to control 
the military, the government as well as controlling all aspects of life in the society 
with a single ideology and the total use of power for the restructuring the society's 
social and economic system; the single party authoritarian where more than one 
political party lives in a polity but only one big party used by the government to 
mobilize the masses and to seek political legitimacy through it while other parties 
have limited functions and the government strictly controls their activities. This type 
of party system usually appears in the developing nations facing the problem of 
national integration and economic problem. It is meant for national unification and a 
tool to mobilize the masses in supporting government policies. If it is the party that 
controls the military and the state in a single party totalitarian, it is the government 
and the military which control the party in an authoritarian party system; and the 
single party dominant where there are many political parties in a political system but 
one dominant party emerges to dominate the political activities and attract political 
supports from the masses. No parties in the polity are capable of challenging its 
domination even though they are having the same chance to gain popular votes in the 
general election. The system is democratic in which there is competition among the 
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factions in the party, 25 
Although such a typology is commonly used, party systems cannot simply be 
reduced to a number game. Because, as important as the number of parties competing for 
power, their relative size, as reflected in their electoral and legislative strength, are also 
very much important. Thus, Giovanni Sartori pointed out that what is vital is to establish 
the relevance of parties in relation to the formation of governments, and in particular 
whether their size gives them the prospect of winning, or at least sharing, government 
power. He even suggested further that contrary to this traditional division of party system, 
there is another different viewpoint on the types of party system. According to him, the 
division of party system is based on the ideological polarization between the parties and not 
on the number of parties in the polity, as it is generally perceived.^^ It is the ideological 
polarization, the distance between the poles and the direction of the political behaviour that 
counts and not the number of parties. Thus, Sartori classifies party system into three types: 
simple two-party pluralism, moderate pluralism, and extreme pluralism. This can be shown 
in the table below?^ 
GIOVANNI SARTORI'S MODELS OF PARTY SYSTEM 
Party Systems 
Simple pluralism 
Moderate pluralism 
Extreme pluralism 
Poles 
Bipolar 
Bipolar 
Multipolar 
Polarity 
None 
Small 
Polarized 
Drives 
Centripetal 
Centripetal 
Centrifugal 
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The actual working of the party system pivots around two poles is bipolar, no 
matter whether the parties are two, three, or four; for in this case the party system has no 
"centre," no centre pole. While the party system pivots upon more than two poles, for in the 
case the system has a "centre," is multipolar}^ The distance between the poles, and not the 
number of poles, creates the system. He gave an example that when the spectrum of 
political opinion is extremized, when the Right and Left poles of a political system are 
literally "two poles apart," then the system has polarity, a polarized party system. 
"Polarized" indicates the distance, a situation of lack of basic consensus, the congruence of 
basic orientations - especially values and attitudes - at the level of regime and/or of the 
political community,^' in which the distribution of opinions covers the maximum 
conceivable distance. 
Besides the polarity that appears in the system, the drives of the polity is another 
important aspect in the creation of party system. Sartori says that: 
Centripetal is the drive that occurs in the bipolar systems where the existing poles 
tend to converge toward the centre; the multipolar systems tend to be centrifugal: 
they have a centre, but no centrality, no centripetal drive. And when the drive of a 
political system is centripetal, it will create a moderate politics, while immoderate or 
extremist politics reflects the prevalence of centrifugal drives in the polity.'" 
Thus, according to Sartori, party system is created on the basis of the number of poles, the 
distance between them, and the centripetal or centrifugal drives of the polity resulting in 
their interaction. Bipolar and multipolar indicate how many are the pivotal points of the 
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system; polarity and polarized are used as indicators of strong distance; and polarization 
and depolarisation are defined to mean a centrifugal process toward disruption of basic 
consensus, and vice versa, a centripetal process toward reunification of basic consensus.^' 
Sartori concluded that simple pluralism is bipolar, and not polarized two-party system, in 
which ideological differences markedly separate major parties, some of which adopt an 
anti-system stance; moderate pluralism, the systems that operate on a three-four party basis, 
is bipolar and centripetal in which ideological differences between major parties are slight 
and where there is a general inclination to form coalitions and move towards middle 
ground; whereas extreme pluralism is multipolar, polarized, and also likely to be 
centrifugal. Through his model of party systems, Sartori suggested that the traditional 
distinction between two-party and multiparty systems could be replaced by a model-
oriented distinction between bipolar and multipolar party systems. Two reasons have been 
suggested that, first, this model accounts for the positioning and pattern of interaction of the 
parties, regardless of their number, and, second, it breaks down the undifferentiated 
category of the multiparty systems.^ ^ 
In the context of developing nations, Sartori suggested another models of party 
system: extreme pluralism and hegemonic party system. He describes that: 
... the extreme pluralism usually appears in a complex and heterogeneous society 
where different groups in the society affiliate themselves into different political 
forums based on different ideologies that consensus among them is a minimum 
probability. ... the hegemonic party system is a party system where a superior 
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political party, a hegemonic party, dominates the polity with certain number of 
parties to play secondary role. ^^  
Due to the various groupings in an extreme pluralism, coalition governments are the 
common phenomenon in this type of party system. And since consensus is minimum 
among the parties, instability of governments is the tendency that appears in the polity. But 
nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suggest that coalitions are always associated with 
instability as the record of stable and effective coalition government in Germany and 
Sweden clearly demonstrates. 
The failure of extreme pluralism in creating political stability leads to the 
introduction of the second model of party system. As in many cases of the developing 
societies, the failure of the civilian government to provide stability and economic progress 
made the military to come forward as the saviour of the nation by introducing a reduced 
party politics and the creation of a hegemonic party. There are two types of hegemonic 
party: ideological and pragmatic hegemonic party system. Sartori explains that: 
... ideological hegemonic party system gives the secondary parties a representation 
in the parliament with a limited role that they cannot fully participate in the policy 
making process. On the other hand, the pragmatic hegemonic party system allows 
full participation of the secondary parties in the policy making process."^ 
However, even though in the hegemonic party system all political aspirations from different 
political parties are accepted, the policy making process is dominated by the hegemonic 
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party. In the developing nations, the failure of an extreme pluralism is replaced by 
hegemonic party system. 
From the two types of classification of party system discussed above, one based on 
numerical typology and the other on ideological distance, a question arises that which one 
of the two is more capable of explaining the political stability and legitimacy phenomenon 
in democratic polities, especially in a heterogeneous society like Indonesia? The first 
classification, party system based on numbers of parties, is seen to be more capable in 
terms of its flexibility to be applied on any political system. But its weakness is in its 
inability to give clear-cut explanation on the instability situation of political system. On the 
other hand, the second classification of party system, given by Giovanni Sartori, has more 
capability in explaining the stability and instability phenomenon in political system as 
compared to the first classification as has been clearly explained in Sartori's explanation of 
Italian party system.^ ^ Thus to explain the stability and legitimacy process in Indonesia, the 
second classification model of party system proposed by Sartori is used. 
2.3 Political Stability and Legitimacy 
Political stability and legitimacy is very important to keep the polity works. Moral 
acceptance of the subjects to the authority of the rUlers is very important for the 
justification of their right to rule. Legitimacy brings about stability and possibility to create 
changes in the society as well. It also expands the authority of the ruler as well as limiting 
it. Legitimate government will bring about political stability and eventually deliver what 
the voters expect. Thus in order to create political stability and changes in the society. 
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rulers or regimes need to have legitimacy, moral right to rule, failing of which crisis of 
legitimacy and stability is the consequence. 
2.3.1 Political Stability 
The term 'Political Stability' is familiar to most people. In its simplest definition, 
political stability is "the satisfaction of popular demands, and the fiilfilment of the 
ambitions of newly emerging generations."^^ Ethnic violence, riots, frequent changes in 
governments, government in exile, social uprising and revolution are all consequences of 
political instability. When there is political instability, a government and its system cannot 
function effectively. Economic development is hampered. Thus, every country aspires to 
maintain or promote political stability. In general, political stability is the existence of 
working political system for a long time and of stable government, or ruler, that rules for 
quite long period of time.^ ^ 
Jeffrey G. Kittingan suggested three difierent hypotheses for the causes of political 
instability: 
a. The Political Gap Hypothesis 
b. The Economic Gap Hypothesis 
c. Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis^^ 
In the first hypothesis, the widening political gap results in political instability. Huntington 
writes. 
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The rates of social mobilization and expansion of political i)art)^ pi(tiQn are high; 
the rates of political organization and institutionalization are low.^-ii&ttjjj^ 
primaiy problem of politics is the lag in the development of institutions behind 
social and economic change.^ ' 
Therefore, in large part, violence and instability are the product of rqiid social change and 
rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of 
political institutions.'*" The inability of institutions or the system to keep up with social 
demands is the source of political instability. 
On the other hand, the second hypothesis proposed that the economic factors are 
responsible for political instability. Chalmers Johnson argues that the main cause of most 
political violence is inequality in the distribution of power and wealth among members of 
society.'*' He postulates that because of underdevelopment, the structure of the economy 
favout^ the more progressive hiembers of society dnd operates to widen the economic gap 
between the rich and the poor. However, sonle political scientists oppose this view. 
Huntington, for instance, argues that. 
The seemingly clear deductions from the correlation between modernity atid 
stability are invalid. If these relationships are accepted, then the promotion of 
economic growth should produce greater political stability. In fact, modernity 
breeds stability, but modemization breeds instability.""^  
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Rapid economic growth is in fact a destabilizing factor because it disrupts traditional social 
groupings, produces economic inequalities, and increases geographical mobility and social 
demands on the system which the government is unable to satisfy/^ While the economists 
and political scientists disagree, sociologists and psychologists have provided a different 
alternative of observation in the third hypothesis. 
Many psychologists believe that political disorders are rooted in the minds of men 
and women. Feierabend and Gurr write. 
There are seeds of violence in every man and woman, and in society. ...the 
precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors' 
perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and the environment's 
apparent value capabilities.^ 
People will become angry wheh they do not get what they want, are prevented ftom getting 
what they want, are deprived of what they have or of tlie otj|)ortunity of getting it. In other 
words, relative deprivatlbn Weeds discontent which gives rise to anger, and this anger in 
turn is expressed through political violence.'*^ 
All three hypotheses above share a common element: each points to the gap 
between demand and satisfaction as a key factor in the stability equation."^ The ability of 
the political system to absorb changes and the satisfaction of popular demands contribute to 
political stability. It is the tendency of the political system to return to a dynamic 
equilibrium between social expectations and social fulfilment which is called political 
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stability. Arbi Sanit has proposed three strongly related variables for political stability to 
exist in a democratic polity: 
a. Strong economic development; 
b. Good political institutionalisation; and 
47 C. Political participation. 
The following diagram shows how political stability is created:'*^ 
Economic Development 
Political 
Institutionalization 
Political Participation 
A balance between economic development, political institutionalisation and political 
participation will bring political stability to the system. Because polities which have a 
stable balance between participation and institutionalisation at low levels of both face the 
prospect of future instability unless the development of political institutions keeps pace 
with the expansion of political participation.^' These three variables constitute equilibrium 
between social expectation and fulfilment thus creating political stability. Besides, there is 
one more important variable to create political stability. Political legitimacy as moral 
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acceptance of the subjects to the right of the ruler to rule is unexceptional aspect to create 
political stability. 
2.3.2 Political Legitimacy 
Political legitimacy, or the right to rule, may be defined as the belief in the 
rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed 
not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed to have moral 
authority, because the subjects believe that they ought to obey/° In the modem state, the 
right to rule is fundamental that it constitutes the core of political organization and affects 
all political activities. It seeks to regulate the vital interests and actions of its citizens 
through binding commands, rules, and laws backed by force. The basis on which legitimacy 
is claimed will influence the structure of domination. Weber argues that the type of 
obedience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, the mode of 
exercising authority, all depend on the kind of legitimacy claimed.^' Legitimacy also shapes 
the effectiveness of governance, the scope, pace, and method of political change, and the 
international conduct of the state.^ ^ Thus, legitimacy is so important that if the government 
is perceived as legitimate, the social, political, and economic cost of governance will be 
low and the government's capacity to promote its political and socio-economic goals will 
be enhanced.^ ^ 
Weber's formulation of legitimacy that the basis of every system of authority, and 
correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtues of 
which persons exercising authority are lent prestige,^ "* is best noted in the discussion of 
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political legitimacy. Because, authority can exist only when the ruler possesses an 
acknowledged right to command and the ruled have an acknowledged obligation to obey. 
Thus, the belief and the notion of acknowledgement by the governed are the two important 
key elements in Weber's formulation of legitimacy. They underpin the ruler's claim to 
authority and validate the structure of domination. 
2.3.2.1 Functions of Legitimacy 
Weber's definition of legitimacy is one important contribution to the study of 
legitimacy in the persjjective of political sociology. The specific concept of legitimacy 
points to attempts of regimes and claimants to political power to justify their claims and to 
attain or maintain support fiom critical groups in a population. Legitimacy is thus 
minimally based on formal acceptance and implementation of a state's or ruler's claims, 
promises, and justifications. Joseph Bensman proposed three other different functions of 
legitimacy:^^ 
1. To the extent that a regime can establish some degree of acceptance by belief or 
expediency, legitimacy can minimize the cost of repression, surveillance, and police 
work; 
2. It can motivate its populace to work and to increased productivity. Legitimacy 
produces moral, willing obedience, work, and productivity; 
3. It helps the regime to trade off its internal power for international recognition and to 
use its international recognition as justification for its power within its domestic 
society. 
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Besides, legitimacy, according to Ramlan Surbakti is very important in order to: 
1. Create political stability and possible changes in the society; and, 
2. Open the chances for the government to expand the social welfare in the society and 
to increase its quality as well.^ ^ 
2.3.2.2 Types of Legitimacy 
When political leaders try to justify their right to rule, a question comes: "How the 
subject people accept the justification to be ruled?" This question is related to the types of 
legitimacy. Charles F. Andrain explains that there are several types of legitimacy. These are 
the traditional legitimacy, the ideological legitimacy, the personal legitimacy, the 
procedural legitimacy, and the instrumental legitimacy. He further explains that: 
Traditional legitimacy comes when the subject people give their acceptance and 
acknowledgment to leaders based on blood line^e. traditional monarchy is best 
example of this traditional legitimacy. Ideological legitimacy appears in a society 
that gives supports to their leaders for their ability to interpret and implement 
certain ideology in the society. When the subject people accept and support their 
leaders due to the personal qualities in them in the form of charisma or other 
personal qualities such as great achievement in certain field, the legitimacy of 
these leaders is called personal legitimacy. In a society where law is supreme and 
the political leaders accept their rightfulness to rule the subject based on these 
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laws and procedures, the legitimacy on their hands is known as procedural 
legitimacy. The last type of legitimacy relates to the acceptance and supports 
given to political leaders capable of delivering to the people promises and material 
welfare. When this process occurs, the legitimacy in the leaders is called 
instrumental legitimacy." 
In the diagram below, we will see the further details of the different types of legitimacy: 
TYPES OF LEGITIMACY 
Type of 
Legitimacy 
Traditional 
Ideological 
Personal 
Procedural 
Instrumental 
Sources of 
legitimacy 
Primordial values 
Final aims/goals 
Personal values 
Law, regulation 
Skill, achievement 
Relations between 
the ruler and the 
ruled 
Master/slave 
Creator/follower of 
the ideology 
Prophet/follower 
Higher/equal before 
the law 
Expert/amateur 
Objects of 
legitimacy 
Tradition and 
person 
Ideological 
mysticism 
Person who has 
special quality 
Non-personal 
principles (law) 
Knowledge, skill 
and successful 
works 
In its development, however, political leaders do not use a single type of legitimacy to stay 
in power but they use the combination of two or more types of legitimacy in accordance 
with the structure and level of development in the society. There are three different ways to 
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acquire and defend these different types of legitimacy. These are symbolic, procedural and 
material. Andrain explains that, 
... through symbolic manipulation of moral tendencies, emotional, tradition and 
belief and traditional values, political leaders try to acquire and defend their 
legitimacy. The use of this method to acquire and defend legitimacy needs 
sensitivity and ability to identify moral, emotional, traditional tendencies, beliefs 
and cultural values dominant in the society. The procedural method is used in the 
form of general elections to choose people's representative in the government 
bodies or throu^ referendum to pass certain public policy, through fair play or 
even manipulation and intimidation. While the material method is used through 
promises and implementation of material welfare to the society in the form of 
actually delivering the basic needs, health and education facilities, communication 
and transportation facilities, chances to get employment and good capital and 
environment to invest. '* 
2J.2.3 Crisis of Legitimacy 
Legitimate government is elected by the people, or is trustee for the people, or 
works in the interest of the people, or is a reflection of certain qualities of the people, or 
reflects what the people will become in the future.^' When such legitimate government 
faces severe stress on the Authority it claims or acknowledges and that there is strong 
possibility of its disruption and tremsformation, it faces legitimacy crisis. It refers to the 
change in the nature of the ultimate authority to which political obligation is owed.^ It is a 
breakdown in the constitutional structure and performance of government that arises out of 
84 
differences over the proper nature of authority for the system.^' It usually occurs in a 
transitional period. The changes in the society from a traditional structure to a more 
complex and modem society usually result in the crisis in the society. Besides, changes in 
the level and quality of development in the society from one level to a higher one will result 
in the similar situation. It is thus possible that the crisis takes the form of a change in the 
fundamental structure or character of a government, a change in the source from which it 
claims to derive its ultimate authority, or a change in the ideals it professes to represent. 
Basic to legitimacy crisis is a change in the way in which governmental authority is 
conceived or itself acts. 
The basic cause of the legitimacy crisis is the fact that the development syndrome 
always produces a widening of perception on the part of ever larger number of people and 
therefore an increase in sensitivities about the possibilities of alternative ways of doing 
things in ail phases of life.^ ^ Lucian W. Pye has suggested that there are four principal 
causes or sources of legitimacy crises in the development process. The four principals 
suggested by Pye are: 
...first, there is the breakdown of governmental institutions that occurs because of 
conflicting or inadequate bases for claiming authority in the society. Second, 
governmental structures may disintegrate because there is excessive and un-
institutionalized competition for power. Third, national leaders and the 
governmental divisions of authority may collapse because the justifications for 
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their ideological or pragmatic claims to authority have been based on 
unacceptable readings of history or faulty predictions of future development. 
Finally, and probably most basically, is dysfunctional socialization process. It 
arises because people have been inappropriately socialized and their feelings on 
authority are not functional for the efforts of the current leaders. *^  
The emergence of political party as an important agent of democracy is very 
important in understanding the process of political stability and legitimacy in a polity. The 
interaction of political parties in a polity affects the equilibrium of political stability and 
legitimacy. This network of inter-relationship through which parties interact and influence 
the political process provide different degrees of political stability and legitimacy. At the 
same time, legitimacy maintains political stability in the polity. Thus, it is in this view of 
understanding the equilibrium of political stability and legitimacy in Indonesian polity that 
the study is focusing on the development of party system as a network of inter-relationship 
through which political pdrtifcs interact and influence the political processes. 
2. 4 Framework of Analysis of the study 
A stable government Comes when a legitimate government installed receives full 
suppbrt from the people arid effectively ftinctionirtg through its actual performance to 
satisfy the basic functions of government. A balance between economic development, 
political institutionalization and political participation is another important factor to keep 
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the equilibrium of political stability in the polity intact. Together with political legitimacy, 
they constitute the basic ingredients for a stable government. 
Legitimacy of the government in a democratic polity is achieved when it receives 
the consent of the people through legal-constitutional means. The ability of the government 
to guarantee the basic rights of the people, to actually perform the basic functions of 
government and not to resort to repressive policies towards its subject guarantee the 
continuance of its legitimacy. The failure of the government to perform these functions 
erodes its moral authority that amounts to legitimacy crisis. Legitimacy crisis also occurs 
when legitimate government faces severe stress on the authority it claims or frequent 
disruptions and transformation or change in the leadership of the government. The crisis 
might also take the form of a change in the fundamental structure or character of a 
government, a change in the source from which it claims to derive its ultimate authority, or 
a change in the ideals it professes to represent. Legitimacy crisis erodes the moral authority 
of the government to rule the people, which, sometimes leads to the problem of political 
instability. This is the framework on the basis of which the question of political stability 
and legitimacy in Indonesisln society is analyzed in this study. 
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CHAPTER III 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY 
SYSTEM IN INDONESIA 
The development of party system in Indonesian political system is the focus of 
discussion in this chapter. The long process of this development is divided into six different 
periods in order to highlight the different stages of the process. These periods are: (i) the 
Pre-Independence Period; (ii) the Revolutionaiy Period; (iii) the Parliamentary Democracy 
Period; (iv) the Old Order or Guided Democracy Period; (v) the New Order or Pancasila 
Democracy Period; and (vi) the Post-Suharto Period. The inclusion of the development of 
party politics in the pre-independence period is aimed at highlighting the historical process 
of the development of party system in the subsequent periods of independent Indonesia. 
Besides, it will also attempt to provide a picture of the roots of ideological clashes of 
different political parties in Indonesia. 
3.1 The Pre-Independence Period 
The development of political parties in Indonesia can be traced back to the pre-
independence period. Group political activities in this period were mostly ethno-nationalist 
which focused more on cultural and educational fields rather than political governance. The 
formation of Tiong Hoa Hwee Koart (the Chinese Community) in 1900' and the Budi 
Utomo in 1908^ became the landmark of political movement in Indonesia. The Tiong Hoa 
Hwee Koan was a reactionary movement established by the Chinese community against the 
policy of the colonial government that gave an equal status to the Japanese people with the 
Dutch while discriminating the Chinese. The main demand of this movement was an equal 
recognition for the Chinese community in the society. At the same time, the Budi Utomo 
was focusing on the cultural movement of the Javanese community, especially the 
emancipation of the Javanese priyayi (traditional elite in the Javanese society). These 
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parties cannot be described as political parties in the modem perspective according to 
which a political party is an organization formed for acquiring public office through general 
election. However, their arrival had inspired the later organizations to focus themselves on 
the fate of Indonesia as an independent nation. 
With the formation of the Syarikat Islam (SI) by HOS Tjokroamintoto and the 
Indische Partij by Ernest Francois Eugene Douwes Dekker in around 1912 began the era of 
political organizations in Indonesia during the colonial period. Using Islam as its ideology, 
the SI focused on the economic improvement of the Islamic trading community. Even 
though the organization remained exclusive in nature, but its appeal of economic 
improvement for the local people had attracted other groups of different ideological 
affiliations like the Marxist as well as the Nationalist, to join the SI. Contrary to the SI, 
which did not declare itself as a political party, the founder of the Indische Partij declared 
the Indische Partij as a political party and formally asked the recognition from the 
government. The Indische Partij was a more open political grouping as compared to the SI 
in which it put greater emphasis on Indonesia as a whole and not a certain group in the 
society, opening its membership to all Indonesians regardless of their creed, sex or color. It 
was a nationalist organization, which put the liberation of Indonesia on its main political 
agenda. However, the strict prohibition and controlled political movement by the colonial 
government during this period resulted in the refusal of the Government to recognize the 
Indishce Partij as a political party. The formation and the declaration of the Indishce Partij 
as a political party were seen as a rebellion towards the Government. Thus, it failed to 
develop as an umbrella for political movements during this period and forced the party to 
dissolve after only six months into existence. 
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The formation of the Volskraad or Dewan Rakyat, a people's representative body 
controlled by the Dutch colonial government, in 1916 inspired the Budi Utomo and the 
Syarikat Islam to declare themselves as political parties. Other political parties like the 
Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party, Parkindo), the Partai Katholik 
(Catholic Party) and the Partai Sosial Demokratik Indonesia (Social-Democratic Party of 
Indonesia, ISDV) surfaced on the Indonesian political scene in the 1920s. The heterogenic 
factions In the Syarikat Islam forced the party to split into two ideologically opposite 
political parties: the Syarikat Islam Hijau (Si-Green) and the Syarikat Islam Merah (Si-
Red). The Si-Red was later known as the Partai Komunis Indonesia (the Communist Party 
of Indonesia, PKI). This split in 1923 became the starting point of the future political 
adversary between the Communist and the Muslim groups in Indonesian politics.^ At the 
same time, with the growing popularity of the PKI, the Si-Green was further split into 
Penyedar of Islamic-nationalist group and Komite Kebenaran Partai Syarikat Islam 
Indonesia (Committee of the Truth for the Association of the Islamic Party of Indonesia) of 
Islamic hardliner. Except for the PKI, other parties coming off from the SI could not play 
any significant role in the political process during this period and subsequently waned out. 
The adoption of a militant policy of non-co-operation with the colonial government 
by the PKI shown in the failed revolt against the colonial government in 1926 had resulted 
in its disbandment in 1927. Thousands of its members and the PKI leaders were arrested, 
imprisoned and even being exiled in Boven Digul. Some of the PKI leaders like Muso and 
Aidit fled to the Communist countries like the USSR or China to seek for political asylum. 
The disappearance of the PKI from the political stage prompted the establishment of the 
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Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, PNI) by Sukarno and other young 
leaders in 1927. The personal charisma and his oratory ability against the policy of the 
colonial government had boosted the popularity of the PNI. Besides, the arrival of the PNI 
was in a perfect situation in which the influence of political parties likes the SI or other 
political groupings in the independence movement had started to recede. The nationalist 
approach adopted by the PNI soon attracted different groups to join its cause. Its 
cooperation with the SI to form a Federation of Nationalist Politics in Indonesia (PPPKI) to 
become the common platform for the nationalist movement against the colonial 
government cemented the agenda of these parties in the effort to achieve Indonesian 
independence. But the self-help and non-co-operation policy adopted by the PNI resulted in 
the arrest and imprisonment of its leaders like Sukarno by the colonial government. In 1931 
the leaderships of the PNI decided to dissolve the party thus also ending the PPPKI .^  
The dissolution of the PNI and the imprisonment of Sukarno prompted the 
establishment of the Partai Indonesia (Indonesian Party) by Mr. Sartono, an ex-leader of 
the PNI, in April 1931 and different other political groupings in the 1930s like the Partai 
Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (PNI Baru), the Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Gerindo), the 
Partai Persatuan Indonesia (Parpindo), the Partai Rakyat Indonesia (PRI) as well as the 
Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra). The strict regulations from, and a close watch by, the 
colonial government did not discourage the Indonesian leaders like Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, 
Tan Malaka or Natsir to form political organizations as a platform to voice their concern 
over the fate of the nation. Religion (Islam, Christianity, Catholicism), Socialism, Marxism, 
Communism, Nationalism as well as other ideologies rooted from the local traditions of 
Javanese culture, Marhaenism, Hinduism as well as Buddhism dominated the political 
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struggle during the 1920s and 1930s in Indonesia. These Ideologies manifested into 
political parties were in a constant struggle with each other. If the 1920s was dominated by 
the ideological struggle between Communism and Islam as shown in the split in the SI, the 
1930s witnessed the opposition between Islam and the Secular Nationalist group in which 
they differed on the constitutional basis of an independent Indonesia. However, these 
ideological differences did not dilute the goal of these leaders of an independent Indonesia. 
Thus even though a cooperative policy with the colonial government would be more 
advantageous to the development of their parties, but the choice of a non-cooperative policy 
was adopted to show their solidarity and united agenda of achieving Indonesian 
independence. It was this nationalist agenda and the policy of non-cooperation adopted by 
these parties that led into their dissolution during the arrival of the Japanese forces in 
Indonesia in 1942. No political party survived the repressive and controlling policy 
implemented by the Japanese occupation force in Indonesia. 
The short Japanese occupation of Indonesia started in 1942 had ended the lifeline of 
these political parties. The Japanese government replaced the political parties with the 
Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Center of People's Power, Putera) in 1943, an organization 
established by the Japanese government as a preliminary step toward the realization of their 
promise of self-government for Indonesian people. But the domination of the nationalist 
leaders like Sukarno. Muhammad Hatta, Ki Hajar Dewantoro and K.H. Mas Mansyur in 
this organization in which they implicitly propagated the independence of Indonesia 
without the assistance from the Japanese government had resulted in its dissolution. Jawa 
Hokokai (People's Obedience Group) was established in its place. Persons regarded to be 
close to the Japanese government dominated this organization hence the activity of the 
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Jawa Hokokai could be intensively monitored by the Japanese government. At the same 
time, the Muslim community was also given a chance to group themselves in the form of 
Masyumi, a federation of Muslim organizations consisting of the Nahdlatul Ulama 
(Association of Ulema, NU), the Muhammadiyah and other Muslim groups. However, 
nearing the end of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia in 1945, all these organizations 
were dissolved and disbanded by the Japanese government thereby there was an absence of 
political parties in Indonesia at the time of the declaration of Indonesian independence on 
17 August 1945. It should be noted, however, that even though there was an absence of any 
political parties at this time but the seeds for its growth and development in an independent 
Indonesia were still alive as has been shown in the subsequent process of party politics in 
Indonesia. 
3.2 The Revolutionary Period (1945 -1949) 
Having successfully proclaimed the Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945 
during the power vacuum in Indonesia due to the Japanese defeat in the World War II, the 
Indonesian leaders decided to adopt a Presidential system of government for the 
ftjnctioning of the decision-making process in the new Republic. A Constitution designed 
for the functioning of a Presidential government knovm as the 1945 Constitution was 
promulgated to provide the constitutional basis for the new government. But in the absence 
of any elections, the PPKl appointed the Indonesian President and Vice-President for the 
first time and the functions of the Parliament were exercised by the President with the 
assistance from the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central National Committee of 
Indonesia, KNIP) whose members were nominated by the President and Vice-President 
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elect^ The PPKI formally appointed Sukarno as the President of the Republic of Indonesia 
with Muhammad Hatta as his Vice-President. At the same time, the KNIP took over some 
of the MPR's responsibility in the drawing of the Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (the 
broad guidelines of the State's policy, GBHN) vsdiile at the same time the Badan Pekerja 
Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Working Body of the Central National Committee of 
Indonesia, BP-KNIP) was responsible for the daily legislative power. On 31 August 1945, 
the first Indonesian cabinet led by President Sukarno was formed.^  
In the absence of any political parties in the new Republic due to their dissolution 
and disbandment during the Japanese occupation in Indonesia, a State party called the 
Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) was to be established by the 
Government as an umbrella for the various national forces in Indonesia to support the 
nation-building process. It was a decision taken by the Government as a necessary measure 
under the revolutionary situation at the time. However, realizing the negative consequence 
of a single party system in a democratic polity the implementation of the decision to adopt a 
single party was withheld by the Indonesian Government. It was on 3 November 1945 that 
the Government decided to issue a Govenunent Act allowing the people to form and create 
any political organizations on the basis of their beliefs, philosophies and ideologies. This 
Government Act resulted in the emergence of different new political organizations as well 
as the re-emergence of the old political parties established during the colonial period 
thereby formalising the practice of a multi party system in Indonesia. At the same time, this 
Government Act made the realization of the idea of the Partai Nasional Indonesia 
(Indonesian National Party) in this period impracticable. 
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The adoption of a multi party system in Indonesia following the issuance of this 
Government Act, a different Government Act was issued on 14 November 1945 to convert 
the Presidential system into a Parliamentary system of government without amending the 
1945 Constitution.' The decision to quietly shelve the Republic's presidential constitution 
was a part of an effort to achieve recognition from the Allies that the independent Republic 
of Indonesia was not merely a puppet state that the Japanese government intended to 
established. As a result, the Presidential cabinet of Sukarno resigned and Sjahrir, the most 
prominent of the small group of nationalist leaders who had refused to cooperate with the 
Japanese occupation force, formed his first cabinet where he became the prime minister 
while the council of ministers was responsible to the KNIP in the absence of MPR/DPR. 
Sukarno, still held the position as the President of Indonesia, was shunted into more 
ceremonial duties. From then on until 27 December 1949, a parliamentary system of 
government was functioning on the basis of a Presidential Constitution of the 1945 
Constitution where a prime minister was head of executive while the president merely acted 
as head of state. 
The police actions by the Dutch forces on 17 July 1947 and 19 December 1948 
severed the functioning of the government. The Dutch occupation of the provisional capital 
Yogyakarta on 19 December 1948 and the subsequent arrest of president Sukarno, vice-
president Hatta and other cabinet members by the Dutch forced the formation of an 
Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia by Mr. Syafruddin Prawiranegara. 
However, the guerrilla war in the countryside led by General Sudirman, the leader of 
Indonesian National Army formed on 5 October 1945 based on Japanese trained Pembela 
Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland, PETA),^ began to weigh down the Dutch military 
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machine and forced them to release and restore the Presidait and the Vice President to 
Yogyakarta on July 10 1949. Diplomatic pressure from the international community, 
including an American threat to withhold the Marshall Plan aid for the Netherlands,'" also 
played a significant role in pressuring the Dutch government to restart the negotiation 
process with the Indonesian leaderdiip on 23 August 1949 which resulted in the formal 
transfer of power and the recognition of the independent sovereignty of the Republic of 
Indonesia. This formal recognition was the first step towards full independence as the 
recognition came with a condition that the Republic of Indonesia would merely remain a 
constituent member of a federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia along with 
fifteen much smaller states created across the archipelago under the Dutch auspices. The 
members of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia were the Republic of Indonesia 
(17 August 1945), the East Indonesia State (1946), the Pasundan State, the East Java State 
(16 November 1948), the Madura State (23 January 1948), the East Sumatera State (24 
March 1948) and the South Sumatera State. Besides, several other new states like the West 
Kalimantan State, the East Kalimantan, the Big Dayak, the Banjar, the Southeast 
Kalimantan, the Bangka, the Belitung, the Riau and the Central Java were on the process of 
their formation. This federal Republic was in turn to a part of the Netherlands - Indonesian 
Union under the Dutch crown." However, the new federal Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia proved to be short-lived. On 17 August 1950 the government of the Republic of 
Indonesia, the most powerful of these constituent member states, decided to revert back 
into a Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). 
For the most part, the dissolution of the federalism proceeded peacefully without any 
opposition from the constituent states.'^ The adoption of the 1950 Provisional Constitution 
was the distinct feature of the Republic as compared to the one declared on 17 August 1945 
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which had the 1945 Constitution as the national guide. While the 1945 Constitution was 
clearly designed for a presidential government, the adoption of the 1950 Provisional 
Constitution in the Republic signified the formalization of a parliamentary system of 
government in Indonesia.'^ 
The declaration of Indonesian independence in August 1945 had opened up a new 
horizon for the party politics in Indonesia. The decision taken by the Indonesian 
Government to withhold the adoption of a single party system, and instead adopt a multi 
party system, opened up the chance for the various political ideologies and groupings to 
come up to play important role in the nation-building process of the newly independent 
Indonesia. Thus the opening up of the valve of political participation had resulted in the re-
birth of the various political groupings once prominence during the pre-independence 
period. Several political parties of national level, which were ideologically related to the 
old parties in the pre-independence period like the Partai Nasional Indonesia, the Masyumi 
(7 November 1945) and the Partai Sosialis (December 1945, it was the merger of the 
Partai Sosialis Indonesia of Amir Sjarifuddin and the Partai Rakyat Sosialis of Sutan 
Sjahrir), were founded. Other parties of smaller size also came into being like the Partai 
Kristen Indonesia, (10 November 1945) the Partai Katholik Indonesia, the Partai Komunis 
Indonesia (21 October 1945), the Partai Buruh Indonesia (9 November 1945) and the 
Partai Ralgat Djelata (November 1945).'"* These political parties followed different 
ideological concepts of Religion, Nationalism, Communism as well as Socialism. The 
Masyumi, the PSII, the Perti were political parties based on Islam whereas the Parkindo and 
the Partai Katholik were based on Christianity. The PNI, the PIR (Hazairin and 
Wongsonegoro), the Parindra, the PRI, the Partai Buruh (Labor Party) and the SKI were 
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political parties based on Nationalism. The PKI, the BTI and the SOBSI were of 
Communist ideology while the PSI and the GTI were Socialist parties. Other regional 
parties also came up like the G«inda - Yogyakarta, the AKUI - Madura, the PRD - West 
Java, the Gerakan Pilihan Sunda - West Java, die PIR - Nusa Tenggara Barat and the 
Gerakan Banteng in West Java.'^ The growth of these new political parties, and the revival 
of other old parties like the PSII, the PNI and the Masyumi, was under a very awkward 
circumstance of physical revolution for independence that followed the formal transfer tff 
power on 27 December 1949. 
3.3 The Parliamentary Democracy Period (1950-1959) 
The four years of the revolutionary period, 1945 - 1949, had been a very difficult 
period in the history of the Republic. The presidential system adopted in the early stage of 
Indonesian independence based on the 1945 Constitution had to be shelved in order to 
convince the international community of the democratic tradition in the Republic and its 
disengagement with the Japanese past. A more participatory politics in the form of a 
parliamentary system of government was then adopted by Indonesia, which made President 
Sukarno a ceremonial head of state without any significant executive power and the prime 
minister real executive. Though the Parliamentary system was adopted, no general elections 
were held during this period to give meaning to the adopted system.'^ During this 
revolutionary period, the Republic became the witness of different cabinets in the centre 
and various rebellions in different parts of the country. 
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With the formal recognition of the Republic by the Dutch and the adoption of the 
Provisional Constitution of 1950, the formal conversion into a parliamentary system was 
finally completed.'^ The multi-party system introduced in the revolutionary period through 
a Government Act continued to be followed in this period. It had provided the chance for at 
least 36 different political parties with their different ideological associations, and several 
independent candidates, to prepare themselves to compete in the re-scheduled general 
elections in 1955.'^ 
The 1955 general election was the first ever election held in Indonesia and was 
regarded as the most democratically administered election based on a democratic election 
laws under the Provisional Constitution of 1950. However, the success of the election did 
not guarantee the successfiil running of the government. No party came up as a single 
majority hence forcing the creation of coalition governments. Four parties came up as the 
winners in this election: the PNI (22.3%), the Masyumi (20.9%), the NU (18.4%) and the 
PKI (16.4%). The long period of fierce political campaign had taken its toll in which no 
national consensus was achieved. The coalition government formed by the winners of the 
election, the second AH cabinet based on the PNI - the Masyumi - the NU coalition while 
singling out the PKI for its ideological difference, failed to perform. The intense and 
irreconcilable differences between coalition partners, especially between the secular-
nationalist dominated PNI and the Islamic hardliners dominated Masyumi, made it 
impracticable for the government to govern effectively.'^ The successive coalition 
governments formed on the basis of different coalition partners before and after the election 
had similar result. They had come and gone during this period, averaging more or less of 
eight months in office. 
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The differences between these ideologically motivated political parties during this 
period can be explained through the following the diagram:^" 
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In the diagram above, we could find the different ideologies that shape the party system in 
Indonesia. Two big sources had influenced the development of these parties: the tradition 
and the Western influence. Five different political ideologies arose from the interaction of 
these two forces: Communism, Democratic Socialism, Islam, Radical Nationalism and 
Javanese Traditionalism. Communism was heavily represented by the PKI while the failure 
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of Democratic Socialism to position itself as a powerful political force in Indonesian 
politics except the domination of the PSI before the 1955 elections, its influence was found 
in the PNI and the Masyumi. Islam as a political ideology was represented in the form of 
two big names: the Masyumi and its breakaway party of NU. While the Masyumi 
represented a more Islamic political approach, the NU, the more conservative of the two, 
chose to be relatively secular in its political approach. The PNI was a blend of Radical 
Nationalism, Communism, Javanese Traditionalism and Democratic Socialism. The 
ambition of Sukarno to create an Indonesian version of socialism in the form of 
Marhaenism resulted in the formation of the PNI. The Javanese Traditionalism however, 
failed to create political domination in Indonesian party politics in this period but the 
existence of the PNI and the PKI had somehow represented this ideology. Thus, through 
the diagram above, it was found that most of the political parties in this period had direct 
political influence with each other except for the Communism and Islam in which they 
were two different poles though it somehow was distantly connected through Javanese 
Traditionalism. 
The fact that these ideologies were closely intertwined with each other, one would 
not disagree that there would be a cohesive and working coalition partners in Indonesian 
party politics. However, this notion of a cohesive party system and a working coalition 
partners did not exist in the history of party politics in the parliamentary government of 
Indonesia. The acute differences between these ideologies in their approach on an 
independent Indonesia during the pre-independent party politics were the reason of this 
failure. The common goal of Indonesian independence had somehow diluted these 
differences but once the nation achieved its independence the true ambition of these 
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political groupings emerged and dominated the power struggle in the young Republic. 
Thus, this period witnessed acute political rivalry between political parties. The Secular-
Nationalist groups could not work together with the Islamic groups due to their differences 
on the constitutional definition of Indonesia. And since Communism was a sworn adversary 
of Islam as shown in the history of the split in the SI during the pre-independent days, they 
were meant to be in different benches. As such, the Secular-Nationalist did not have any 
interest in taking communist party into their stride to form a coalition government. The 
party system during this period of parliamentary democracy remained extremely fractured 
and factionalised. 
3.4 The Old Order or Guided Democracy Period (I960 -1965) 
The inability of the political parties to create a stable and functioning coalition 
government at the Centre and the spread of various rebellions in different parts of the 
country had forced President Sukarno to declare national emergency with the support from 
the military.^' It virtually put the power in the hands of President Sukarno, leaving the DPR 
dysfiinctional. The Konsepsi Presiden, a political concept introduced by President Sukarno 
on 21 February 1957 which contained the idea of creating Kabinet Gotong-Royong 
(Coalition Cabinet) and Dewan Nasional (National Council), a council headed by the 
President to replace the function of the DPR in advising and recommending the government 
from a broad national perspective and to accommodate all dynamic elements in the society 
not represented through the already available institution, the DPR,^ ^ became the landmark 
of Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy). Besides, during this period, the role of the 
military was ever increasing due to their disappointment over the running of the nation by 
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their civilian counterparts. This dis^pointment was one of the reasons for the military to 
back the Presidential Decree issued in July 1959. 
The deadlock in the Konstituante (Constituent Assembly) in formulating a new 
Indonesian constitution had prompted President Sukarno to issue a Presidential Decree on 5 
July 1959, for the revival of the 1945 Constitution while disposing the Provisional 
Constitution of 1950. The Decree also formalized the demise of the parliamentary 
democracy in Indonesia and the beginning of the Guided Democracy formulated by 
President Sukarno. With the re-promulgation of the 1945 Constitution, President Sukarno 
regained his full executive power over the government and not merely became the nominal 
head of state as was prescribed under the 1950 Provisional Constitution. A Presidential 
cabinet headed by President Sukarno was formed with a number of uniformed men as 
members of the cabinet and at the same time, the civilian cabinet members were requested 
to dissociate their party affiliations and high civil servants were forbidden from joining 
parties.^^ A Presidential Legislation Number 7/1959 on special requirements for 
establishment and simplification of political parties was issued by the Government which 
was followed by another Presidential Legislation Number 13/1960 on recognition, control 
and dissolution of political parties.^ '* The issuance of these legislations was a step further in 
the process of discharging the fragmented multi party system for the smooth functioning of 
the Guided Democracy where the emphasis was on the leadership and musyawarah mufakat 
(agreement through deliberation), not on basis of the majority rule. The presidential 
legislation annulled the Government Act issued in November 1945 on the freedom of 
establishing political organizations. Only 10 political parties left in Indonesia as the result 
of this new regulation: the PNI, the NU, the PKI, the Partai Katholik, the Partai Indonesia, 
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the Partai Murba, the PSII - Arudji, the IPKI, the Parkindo and the Perti. Other parties, the 
PSII - Abikusno, the PRN - Bebasa, the Partai Rakyat Indonesia and the PRN - Djody, 
failed to qualify as national parties. At the same time, the Government outlawed the 
Masyumi and the PSI for the alleged involvement of some party leaders in the 
PRRI/Permesta rebellion in Sumatra in 1958 through Presidential Decisions No. 200 and 
201. 
Having successfully reduced the number of political parties from more than 27 
political parties into 10 legally recognized political parties, the Government decided to 
introduce a National Front through another Presidential Legislation No. 14/1959 as the 
backbone for the functioning of the Guided Democracy.^ ^ It was an organization formed by 
the Government as a representative body for all political groupings in the society headed 
directly by the President. While the Dewan Nasional was established as a representative 
body for the functional groups, later it was known as Golongan Karya, the National Front 
was meant for the representative of both the functional groups as well as the political 
parties. The functioning of Guided Democracy with a limited number of political parties 
fused into a single platform in the form of a National Front had virtually made Indonesia 
exercised a disguised authoritarian one-party system.^ ^ 
The imposition of the Guided Democracy by President Sukarno in which political 
leadership was the main focus of this system failed to answer to the problem of political 
instability during the parliamentary democracy period. With the extraordinary power in his 
hands, President Sukarno acted beyond the expectation of the popular belief Sukarno, a 
man who had been hailed as the true leader of Indonesia failed to deliver the expectations. 
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His conception of a democracy with a leadership had gone wrong in which the democratic 
principles had been neglected and leadership, a dictatorial leadership, dominated 
Indonesian politics during this period. Political parties, which enjoyed full freedom in 
determining the course of political process in Indonesia during the parliamentary 
democracy period, lost their privileged to exercise this process under the Guided 
Democracy of President Sukarno. The domination of President Sukarno was so strong that 
once powerful political parties like the PNI, the Masyumi, the PSI or the NU could not do 
much to influence the decision making process. However, one exception has to be retained 
here that during this period, the PKl rapidly grew into the most powerful political party 
under the auspicious blessing of President Sukarno. The PKI used the National Front to 
mobilize supports and organize itself as the most popular political party of the day."^ At the 
same time. President Sukarno cut himself out of his long association with the Nationalist 
PNI and was leaning more towards the Communist PKJ. Besides, the military, especially 
the Army, rose into the centre stage of power politics due to its displeasure over the 
functioning of political process run by their civilian counterparts. The middle way concept 
introduced by General A.H. Nasution became the justification of the Army's increasing 
socio-political role in Indonesian politics.^^ Thus, besides the emergence of a disguised 
single party system in the form of the PKI's domination in the National Front, the Army's 
political grip over Indonesian politics was ever increasing. It created two opposing poles in 
which President Sukarno stood at the centre. The mastery of a balancing act by President 
Sukarno over the two opposite forces of the PKI and the Army dominated the political 
stage during Guided Democracy period. His failure to keep this balance had led into his 
departure in a bloody coup in late September 1965. The aftermath of the coup saw the 
repositioning of the military in the centre stage of national politics. 
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3.5 The New Order or Pancasila Democracy Period (1966 -1998) 
Most of the Indonesians enthusiastically welcome the arrival of Guided Democracy 
in the hope that the new system would eventually bring about some improvements to their 
lives after their miserable experience with the liberal democracy. However, the high 
expectation put on President Sukarno and his Guided Democracy proved to be in vain since 
neither President Sukarno nor his Guided Democracy was able to turn the table around. 
Even though President Sukarno was partially successftil in creating a stable political order 
in the period in the sense of the absence of any change of government by forcing the 
diverse political elements under his control and removing those who opposed him, but the 
ideological fragmentation and economic life remained in a bad condition. Besides, the ever-
growing bitter rivalry between the Army and the PKI worsened the situation. And it was in 
this complicated situation that in September 30, 1965 a movement known as G/30S/PK1 
made a surprised and dangerous action for the nation where some members of the military 
associated closely with the PKI kidnapped and killed seven Army generals suspected of 
advocating the creation of the Council of Generals (Dewan Jenderal), as oppose to National 
Front, in the hope of controlling the country. However, this deliberate coup attempt was 
easily out manoeuvred by the Army under the command of Major General Suharto, head of 
the KOSTRAD (Army's Strategic Reserve Command). The failure of the G/30S/PKI 
movement and the successful counter act launched by the Army to restore law and order 
became the landmark of what was later known as the New Order, as oppose to the Old 
Order under Sukarno. 
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The official banning of the PKI, arrest of the leftist ministers and the installation of 
an altogether new anti-communist cabinet by General Suharto made the Army the victor in 
the power struggle that followed the failed coup and further inserting the role of the 
military in politics.^' In a special MPR(S) meeting in March 1967 General Suharto was 
appointed as the acting president, relieving President Sukarno of his political responsibility 
as the Head of Executive. At the same time, Sukarno was forbidden to engage in any 
political activities thereby virtually curtailing his control over the government. The ageing 
Sukarno died on 21 June 1970 under house arrest while General Suharto continued to hold 
on to the office of President for the next three decades under the banner of the New Order 
and its Pancasila Democracy. 
Having assumed ftiU control over the government and making himself the President 
of Indonesia, General Suharto and his New Order had to overcome three different key 
problems: (i) to strengthen his own position in the political system; (ii) to decide on a 
political format for the New Order; and above all, (iii) to rehabilitate the economy, an issue 
that would legitimate or break his regime.^ ° The first problem was solved very quickly 
when in another MPR(S) session in March 1968, he was elected as a full president. This 
constitutional backing from the MPR(S) was not enough and had to be followed by 
acquiring the loyalty from the Indonesian military. To do this, General Suharto had to clean 
up the military from all Leftist or Sukamoist leaning officers. With the power and position 
he had acquired, it did not take much time for General Suharto to successfully acquiring the 
support from the military thus giving him immense political support to continue his 
political agenda. 
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Having successfully completed the steps in asserting his position in the new 
political system, General Suharto embarked on resolving the second problem only realizing 
that an extra effort was necessary to press the new political format. The inability of the 
previous systems to provide improvements to the Indonesian people forced the New Order 
to offer its own concept of democracy that worked and that was capable of fulfilling its core 
objectives: a stable political order, socio-economic change and progress and an enhanced 
national unity.^' The political conflicts stemmed out of extreme polarization of political 
ideologies in the earlier periods forced the new regime to try to tighten its control over 
these diverse political forces by introducing a new system dubbed as Pancasila democracy 
based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. It was hoped that the new system offered 
by General Suharto would woric in preventing political polarization, disunity and conflict in 
Indonesia and finally would deliver the objectives of the New Order. The Pancasila 
Democracy to be created would be a democracy that is limited and that works. 
Realizing the importance of political parties in playing a role as the facilitator in the 
acceptance of the polity by the people and by referring to the MPR(S) guidelines of 1966 
which included the holding of elections and a "simplification" of the party system, the 
New Order found its way in securing more legitimacy and a democracy that worked while 
avoiding extreme political polarization, disunity and conflict. In his book. The Army and 
Politics in Indonesia, Harold Crouch argued: 
... the government could operate more smoothly with the support of the party 
leaders, whose participation in Jakarta politics, it was hoped, would persuade 
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their supporters in the regions that their interests were not being neglected. By 
ensuring that the main political groups felt represented within the system, the 
government hoped to avoid the possible consequences of the alienation of 
important sections of the national community.^ ^ 
While a one- or no-party system was regarded to be undemocratic, and a multiparty system 
was demonstrably polarizing the Indonesian party politics, the only choice left was to set up 
a two-party system consisting of a government party and a loyal opposition. The think tank 
of the New Order had floated this idea but the government rejected this radical change of a 
two party system.^ '* One primary reason of this rejection by the government was to avoid 
the possible head-on clash between the military and the political parties. Thus the 
Government finally decided that the electoral and party systems were to remain similar to 
the one in the Guided Democracy period of a limited party system. At the same time, the 
functional groups would work side by side with the political parties as stipulated in the 
1945 Constitution while taking strong measures in keeping out the party leaders from 
indulging in adversarial politics that would threaten the political legacy of the New Order. 
In view of the importance of political parties in securing legitimacy of the 
government, the Government decided that the functional groups, now known as the 
GOLKAR, to become the government 'party'.^^ Besides, in order to appease the Muslim 
community for their role in defeating the communist power the government decided to 
revive the Masyumi in the form of the Parmusi while taking a very close look on its 
leadership by not allowing the possibility of any traditional Masyumi leaders to hold any 
high party command. The Murba Party banned by President Sukarno was also resurrected. 
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The new policy proved to be very effective for the new government that when in the long 
delayed elections in 1971, the GOLKAR, along with nine political parties, the Partai 
Katholik, the PSII, the NU, the Parmusi, the Parkindo, the IPKI, the PNI, the Perti and the 
Murba, participated and subsequently won the elections with a massive number of 62.80 % 
of the total votes, partly, but not only, because of government interference in the 
nomination process of party candidates and intimidation tactics.^^ Yet, the NU, appealing to 
a clearly defined Muslim electorate, was not only able to maintain its following but even 
slightly to increase it, securing 18.68 % from 18.4% in the 1955 general elections. 
Meanwhile, the PNI became the biggest loser in this election, securing only 6.93 % from 
22.3% in the 1955 elections.^^ The Parmusi, the new face of the Masyumi but lacking of its 
traditional Masyumi leaderships, also lost miserably in this election with 5.4 % from 20.9% 
in the 1955 elections. The loss of these political parties against the GOLKAR indicated the 
diminishing role of political parties in the New Order politics and the beginning of the 
dominating role of the GOLKAR in Indonesian politics. 
With the massive win in the elections and the possible danger in sight that in the 
future elections the secular parties might be wiped out altogether leaving GOLKAR to face 
the Muslim parties in a two-way contest thus creating an automatic two-party system,^ * the 
government decided in 1973 to implement the 1966 MPR(S) stipulation to "simplify the 
party system". It urged the four Muslim parties (the Parmusi, the NU, the PSII and the 
Perti) to merge into a single party called the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Development 
Unity Party, PPP), while the three secular parties (the PNI, the IPKI and the Murba) and the 
two Christian parties (the Parkindo and the Partai Katholik) formed the Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI). Thus even before the introduction of the 
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Political Law number 3/1995 on GOLKAR and political parties, the New Order 
government had succeeded in limiting the number of political parties into two, the PPP and 
the PDI, and one service group, the GOLKAR. This successftil party fusion was the 
landmark of the New Order's quest of a limited and controlled party system. 
The political legitimacy achieved by the New Order through general elections (1971 
and 1977) further cemented their aims to create a new political system for Indonesia. 
Having successfully simplified the party system through the process of party fusion, the 
Government introduced a political law number 3/1975 on political parties and GOLKAR in 
the guise of accommodating the political participation of the masses. But instead of giving 
more freedom to the masses to participate in the political process, this law was full of 
discriminatory characteristics towards political parties while giving much favour to 
GOLKAR. The floating mass, the excessive power of the President over political parties, 
different status given to GOLKAR vis-d-vis the PPP and the PDI, the limitation on the 
rights of individuals to join political parties and the impossibility of any party formation in 
the future were the key characteristics of this political law. It gave a very limited room for 
the parties to act as agent of democracy. Besides, this political law formalized the 
regulations thus making it virtually impossible for the parties to win in the election. 
One room that was left open in the political law of 1975 was, however, that the 
political parties were given a freedom to adopt any political ideology except Communism. 
The PDI and the GOLKAR chose Nationalism as its core ideology while on the other hand, 
having different Islamic political parties as its constituent members and as an effort to gain 
the support from the Muslim community, the PPP chose Islam as the party ideology. It was 
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only after the Malari incident and the Tanjung Priok affairs in 1984 that the government 
decided to tighten its control over political ideologies. The New Order government that had 
launched itself in 1966 as an administration of non-political managers now began seeking 
to shape Indonesian society to match its own ideological vision. Having successfully 
presented the Pancasila as a frameworic for holding the country together and protecting the 
political status quo from the pressures of the extremes of militant Islam and Communism in 
the last few years,"*" the Government decided to implement the MPR's legislation in 1978 
through a Political Law number 3/1985 that required all political parties and all mass 
organizations to adopt the state ideology, the Pancasila, as their sole ideological 
foundation, to reflect this in their party symbols, and to open their membership to all 
Indonesian citizens irrespective of their religion.'" The PPP, the only political party that 
chose Islam as its ideology and which had acted as the only real opposition to the 
government, affected the most by this Government ruling. With its party ideology and 
symbols neutralized, its role as an opposition to the government was circumscribed. This 
Government ruling further resulted in the homogenisation of the political ideology in 
Indonesian party politics in the form of the Pancasila democracy. Thus, the PPP 
membership, as well as that of other parties, was thrown open to any Indonesian. 
The key difference between the 1975 law and the 1985 political law was that the 
political parties, and all mass organizations, had lost their privilege to adopt any ideology 
they liked and were forced to submit themselves to the will of the government by adopting 
the Pancasila as the asas tunggal, the sole ideology. Because opposing the adoption of the 
Pancasila as the ideology meant the dissolution of the parties and the organizations. The 
law indicated the end of ideological pluralism in Indonesian politics leading into a possible 
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one party domination in a homogenous political environment, an ideological hegemonic 
party system. Raj Vasil wrote in his book Governing Indonesia that the New Order, 
through its party restructuring programme and other actions related to political parties, was 
able to secure certain critical purposes as in the following: 
a) Its was able to severely limit the role, status and influence of political parties in 
politics and the polity; 
b) It was able to secure the disbandment of political parties that had been driven mostly 
by the divisive and damaging forces of ideology, religion or regionalism; 
c) It was able to dispense with the multiplicity of political parties and, for the future, to 
limit their number to a maximum of three - the GOLKAR, PPP and PDl; 
d) It was able to ensure that political parties were led only by persons who were willing 
to cooperate with the government, administer their parties based upon the norms and 
priorities of the New Order and not attempt to involve themselves in mass political 
actions; and 
e) It was able to make political parties depend substantially on government largesse for 
their financial resources/^ 
The departure of Sukarno and the demise of the PKl for its alleged involvement in 
the failed coup in 1965 followed by the emergence of the Army as the victor of the power 
struggle during the Guided Democracy period brought Indonesia into a military dominated 
politics. The ascendance of General Suharto into the highest political office in the country 
marked the beginning of the New Order era in which development became the key word. 
The increasing role of the military, especially the Army, through the GOLKAR in the day-
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to-day socio-political life in the Republic and the limited role of political parties in the 
decision making process added to the bleak picture of party politics after its vibrant life in 
the parliamentary democracy period. Following the concept of democracy with a leadership 
introduced by President Sukarno in the form of Guided Democracy, the New Order with its 
Pancasila democracy was the perfected form of this concept. Whereas President Sukarno 
allowed the ideological pluralism, the General forced the ideological homogeneity in 
Indonesia in the form of the Pancasila in order to avoid the experience of acute ideological 
adversaries in the previous period. It was this decision to further limit the number of the 
political parties into two, the PPP and the PDI, with one service group, the GOLKAR, 
dominated by the Army that the New Order regime succeeded in curbing the freedom of 
political participation and the creation of political stability in Indonesia for more than three 
decades. 
The New Order, besides relying heavily on economic performance, political 
repression, managed political participation and ideological control in order to sustain its 
growth while keeping the regime's legitimacy and stability, also rallied behind the 
successful leadership of General Suharto.*" It was only in the 1990s, almost three decades 
of its successful control over Indonesian politics, that the sign of a regime fatigue came into 
sight. With the growing number of the young educated middle class started to question the 
repressive nature of the regime over their political rights as well as the ageing leadership, a 
wave of change became inevitable. The growing discontent among the middle class group 
in the early 1990s, which led into the formation of two 'outlawed' political parties, Partai 
Rakyat Demokratik (People's Democratic Party, PRD) and Partai Uni Demokrasi (Uni 
Democratic Party, PUDI) was a poof of the weakening control of the regime over its polity. 
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The economic crisis in the late 1990s became the turning point of the situation. Economic 
development, which was the regime's foremost important source of legitimacy eroded 
quickly. Domestic unrest and sustaining public opposition towards the regime continued to 
escalate thus creating an unavoidable domino effect into multidimensional crises. Various 
safety measures had been taken by the regime to preserve its continuance in power but to 
no avail. Thus, failing to keep hold on the regime he had nurtured for over three decades, 
General Suharto finally bowed to the popular pressure by relinquishing his presidency in 
1998 thereby paving the way to the building of a new Indonesia. With his resignation on 21 
May 1998, the New Order regime, which was started in 1966 finally came to an end in 
1998 after more than three decades of domination of Indonesian politics. 
3.6 The Post-Suharto Period (1999 - Present) 
According to the Constitution, if the President fails to continue his stay in office due 
to physical problem or other circumstances, the Vice-President should take over the 
position, assuming the role of head of executive.*^ B.J. Habibie was the Vice-President 
when General Suharto stepped down from the presidency thus making him automatically 
the president of Indonesia. The change of guard in the regime, however, did not reduce the 
high public demand for reformasi (political and economic reform) in the form of a clean 
and democratic government based on the 1945 Constitution that would deliver economic 
improvement and welfare to the Indonesian people. Under this enormous public pressure. 
President B.J. Habibie was expected to deliver more changes in the government as well as 
political institution and participation. The result was the dramatic re-politicisation of 
Indonesia through greater freedom of speech and assembly, a thing of a dream for the past 
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three decades or more. New legislation allowing the formation of new political parties, 
promise of early general elections, alterations to the composition of the parliament as well 
as limiting the role of the military in the Indonesian politics were some important 
development in the new Indonesia beyond Suharto. 
Freedom of speech and assembly enjoyed by the people after a very long period 
under repressive regime proved to be euphoric. With a new legislation on party formation 
and a scheduled early general election in sight, a legal basis was prepared for the people to 
form any political organization they like to express their political aspirations. In a very 
short period, after having only three political organizations for more than two decades, over 
100 political parties had come up throughout the country. The formation of these political 
parties showed the emotional outburst, a political euphoria, of the people after being 
controlled under a very strict rule of a military regime. Since the Pancasila was no longer 
made to be the sole party ideology anymore, parties with different ideological affiliations 
came up and created a pattern similar to the party politics in the era of parliamentary 
democracy in the 1950s. Socialism, Nationalism, Marhaenism (Indonesian version of 
Socialism invented by Sukarno) and Islam dominated the party ideology. Communism, 
however, remained kept under the closet. Limited party system, and a possible domination 
of d hegemonic party during the later period of the New Order, was a thing of the past when 
these various parties surfaced. Thus forcing the government to adopt a multiparty system in 
Indonesia to accommodate these various aspirations. 
The desirability of a multiparty system in the new Indonesia was very much in line 
with the norms of representative democracy where political parties become the agents. 
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Ideological pluralism in the h^erogeneous society like Indonesia became the important 
phenomenon necessary to be accommodated. The 1999 general elections witnessed 48 
different political parties competed against each other in the second most democratically 
administered election, the first to be the 1955 general elections where a number of political 
parties as well as individuals participated. The multicolour of Indonesia was represented in 
this general election where the result showed some similarity with the result of the 1955 
general elections in which the Nationalist parties dominated the political stage while the 
Religious parties came close from behind. The only difference was the absence of the 
Communist party as another dominant player in Indonesian politics due to its disbandment 
in 1966. Two Nationalist parties, the PDI-P and the GOLKAR, secured big wins with 
33.76% and 22.46% respectively, while three Religious leaning parties, the PKB, the PPP 
and the PAN, came not very far behind securing 12.62%, 10.72% and 7.12% respectively. 
Two smaller Muslim parties, the PBB and the Partai Keadilan (Justice Party, PK), and 
other fourteen parties shared the remaining of the votes.''^  However, the absence of a clear 
majority in this election contributed to the speculation in the run up of the presidential 
election. 
The general elections in Indonesia elected members of the DPR that automatically 
became the member of the MPR, the supreme political body in Indonesian politics 
responsible to elect the President, establish the broad direction of policy and change the 
constitution.*' Beside consisting the members of the DPR (500-member), the membership 
of the MPR (700-member) also came from the Armed Forces (38-member). the regional 
representatives (135-member) and the appointed group representatives (65-member, 
proposed by organizations representing religions, economic groups, ethnic minorities. 
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veterans, women and others). In contrast to the MPR during tiie Suharto regime in which 
half the members were directly appointed by the President, the new MPR was a much more 
representative body/* Thus, althou^ the PDI-P secured more than 33% of the total votes 
in the elections but lacking clear majority in the House, 185 seats, the door for the highest 
political office in Indonesian politics was still widely open foe any candidate. And it was 
after some lobbying, negotiations, promises and double crosses, Abdurrahman Wahid 
(popularly known as Gus Dur), whose party, the PKB, secured only 12 % of the votes and 
51 seats in the Parliament, came from behind to gather the support of the Poros Tengah 
(Central Axis of Muslim Parties) and the GOLKAR, to ce^ture the presidency, leaving 
Megawati Sukarnoputri of the PDI-P and her supporters disappointed. 
The possibility of a similar scenario in the future election of the Indonesian 
president had prompted the idea of a direct presidential election. The proposed idea would 
direct parties participated in the parliamentary election to propose their presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates in a direct presidential election to be held after the 
parliamentary election. This idea was formalized in the amendment of the 1945 
Constitution where it is stipulated that the president and the vice-president would be elected 
through a direct presidential election while at the same time, limiting the term of a president 
into two terms in the office in order to avoid similar experience of Sukarno and Suharto 
presidency where they had been elected as the President as long as they received the 
support from the House. Multiparty system and direct presidential election are two most 
important changes in the post-Suharto period as long as party politics in Indonesia is 
concerned. The Indonesian people are given choices to express their political participation 
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through av^lable political institutions in a new democratic environment in Indonesia based 
on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. 
The long period of political oppression had finally over when General Suharto 
stepped out of his presidential office amidst loud protest and popular pressure fr-om his 
people. The wave of change finally knocked on the door and a new Indonesia with a vibrant 
democratic life is spread ahead. Bowing to the popular pressure and as an effort to acquire 
legitimacy from the people, B.J. Habibie who replaced General Suharto as the Indonesian 
President, decided to open up the political valve for more freedom of participation by 
allowing the people to associate themselves into various political parties and organizations. 
The spirit of democracy has been brought back to life, reminiscence to the early experience 
of the Indonesian people with democracy. The multi-party system once experienced by the 
Republic in its early days has been re-introduced in an effort to revive the democratic 
principles. Besides, a directly elected head of executive will give more Intimacy to the 
government. These two features of a multi-party system with a directly dected head of 
executive become the most important development in the Indonesian party politics. 
The introduction of a multi-party system in the post-Suharto period witnessed the 
revival of the political ideologies that long have been dormant during the three decades of 
the New Order rule in Indonesia. The following diagram explains this pattern of political 
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The above diagram explains the slight change that occurred in the current interactions of 
different political ideologies in the post-Suharto Indonesia as compared to the one occurred 
during the parliamentary period. The most striking difference was the absence of 
Communism and the emergence of Developmental ism as the political ideology in 
Indonesian party politics. Besides, whereas in the parliamentary Indonesia in the 1950s the 
political ideology in Indonesia was the melting pot between the tradition and the western 
influence, it is the exposure to the development in the international community that brought 
globalism as the common source of inspiration for these ideologies to flourish. 
The development of party system in Indonesia has not been uniformed and smooth. 
There took place several changes in the party system throughout the history of the 
Republic. The struggle between political ideologies during the Dutch colonial period in the 
1900s was disrupted by the short period of the Japanese occupation in 1942 - 1945. The 
absence of any political parties at the time of the proclamation of Indonesian independence 
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in 1945 due to the limitation of political movemoit and organization during the Japanese 
period resulted in mix responses from the Indonesian political elites. Sukarno responded 
with an idea of a single, revolutionary party system while the majority power in the new 
Republic preferred a more democratic flavour through a multi party system. At the end, the 
majority power in the new Republic won this struggle in which a multi party system was 
adopted in order to provide wider chances for political participation for the people in the 
decision making process. Besides, the idea of a single party system was in contrast with the 
spirit of democracy as stipulated in the Constitution, which guaranteed the freedom of 
political participation and assembly. Thus, the new chapter of a vibrant party politics in the 
history of an independent Indonesia began. Various political parties with their different 
political ideologies were revived. Religion, Nationalism, Communism as well as Socialism, 
which dominated the political movement in the 1920s and 1930s, re-appeared to play an 
active role in the struggle of power during the early years of an independent Indonesia. 
The adoption of a multi party system in a parliamentary democracy Indonesia did 
not yield into a realization of a stable, legitimate and performing government. On the 
contrary, Indonesia witnessed the frequent changes of government at the Centre. TTie 
absence of a single major party to form a government and the failure of political parties to 
form a woricing coalition government due to their ideological adversaries became the major 
factor of this continuous problem of political instability. The democratically administered 
19SS elections failed to deliver a responsible government at the Centre and on the contrary, 
it further widened the political gap between these political parties. The elections resulted in 
a weak government as well as weak opposition. The failure to create a stable, legitimate 
and performing government at the Centre resulted in the disappointment in the regions 
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where various rebellions erupted and further disrupted the equilibrium of stability. At the 
same time, the military, especially the Army, felt totally disgusted with the behaviour of 
their civilian counterparts in managing the Republic. The elevation of President Sukarno as 
the head of state in a parliamentary democracy contributed to his disappointment over the 
system for his inability to control the functioning of the government. This complicated 
situation brought President Sukarno to make a drastic decision by declaring a national 
emergency in 1957 thus giving him the power to run the government with the fiill support 
fi-om the military. 
The declaration of national emergency in 1957 followed by the issuance of a 
Presidential Decree in 1959 brought an end to the parliamentary politics and the beginning 
of an era of domination of certain personal figures in Indonesian politics. During the 1959 -
1965 period, Indonesia witnessed the domination of President Sukarno whereas from the 
1966 to 1998 General Suharto dominated the Indonesian politics. The issuance of the 
Presidential Decree in 1959 mariced the beginning of the Guided Democracy period, a 
political concept introduced by President Sukarno to assert his personal ambitions in the 
national politics. With the military fully supporting him, he implemented his Konsepsi 
Presiden in which a democracy with a leadership was practiced while at the same time a 
different political game for political parties was played. Whereas the previous period 
witnessed the domination of political party m a multi-party system, the Guided Democracy 
under President Sukarno practiced a limited party system. Only ten political parties were 
recognized while the remaining political parties existed during the Parliamentary period 
were either to be outlawed or failed to qualify from the strict screening by the Government. 
Apart fi-om the limitation in the number of political parties during this period, one 
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important development was the establishment of a National Front, a national body 
established by the government to accommodate the representatives of the various political 
elements as well as the functional groups in the society. And it was through the effective 
use of the National Front that the PKI, having enjoyed the blessing of President Sukarno, 
successfully organized its party structure and thus dominated the party politics during this 
period. Thus, the idea of a democracy with a leadership, which was initially meant to create 
a working democracy in Indonesian plural society, was trapped in the domination of the 
PKI in the national politics, making the limited party system into a disguised one party 
system. At the same time, the Army was constantly demanding a greater socio-political role 
in the national politics hence making it the sole opposing power to the PKI. This situation 
had created an atmosphere of a constant power struggle between the PKI and the Army. 
Meanwhile, President Sukarno was forced to play the balancing act to keep the stability in 
the government. 
The increasing leniency of President Sukarno over the PKI proved to be a liability 
for his leadership. His failure to keep the balance resulted in the army take-over after the 
failed coup by sections in the military associated with the PKI on 30 September 1965. 
However, Sukarno's departure did not bring to an end the idea of a democracy with a 
leadership. Although Sukarno failed to deliver his Konsepsi Presiden, his successor. 
General Suharto, was successfully perfecting the model and thus he enjoyed a long period 
in the office, 1966-1998. 
One of the key failures in the implementation of President Sukarno's Konsepsi 
during the Guided Democracy period was his inability to prevent the persisting ideological 
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conflict in the National Front. His idea of a NASAKOM (a blend of Nationalism, 
Communism and Religion) as the ideological foundation of the regime failed to take off. 
Thus, reali^ng the importance of an ideology cap^Ie of uniting the diverse political 
organizations in Indonesia, General Suharto decided to turn into the Pancasila as the sole 
ideological source for all political organizations. It was the success of this implementation 
of the national ideology and the strict control of the military over the functioning of the 
political process that General Suharto was able to control the functioning of the political 
system his regime had created. Besides, further limitation of political parties into two, the 
PPP and the PDI, with one service group, the GOLKAR, prevented the possible return of 
the political parties in dominating the national politics. The New Order under General 
Suharto created a perfected version of the Guided Democracy. The creation of an 
ideological hegemonic party in the form of a service group, the GOLKAR, cemented the 
control of the regime over the political process in the country. Besides, the increasing 
political legitimacy achieved by this regime through economic development further 
prolonged the lifeline of this New Order regime. 
The economic crisis in the late 1990s and the increasing demands for wider political 
participation fi-om the increasing number of the middle class group proved to a liability to 
the New Order's reign over Indonesian politics. Besides, the reluctant ^proval from the 
military over General Suharto's choice of a civilian vice-president in the sixth term as 
Indonesian president was an important factor to consider in relation to the departure of the 
New Order regime. Thus with key sources of regime's legitimacy slowly eroding, the 
beginning of a new political order gathered a momentum. The domination of the GOLKAR 
as an ideological hegemonic party system during the three decades of the New Order was 
130 
finally over and an experimentation of a multi-party system in a democratic Indonesia 
began. The 1999 general elections gave an ample explanation to the nature of party politics 
in the post-Suharto Indonesia. With the opening of the political valve, various political 
groupings that long been oppressed by the New Order regime have re-emerged and re-
dominated the political process in Indonesia. 
The changing pattern of party system in Indonesia shows the delicate process of this 
nation in arriving at a democratic society. From an idea of a single party to a multi party 
dominated politics in the early days of the parliamentary democracy of the Republic to a 
single party authoritarian and an ideological hegemonic party during the long reign of a 
civilian and a military regimes from 1959 to 1998, and then a return to a multi party system 
in the post-Suharto period have shown the various stages of party politics in Indonesia. The 
important role of political parties in shaping the future course of the nation is unparallel if 
Indonesia determined to achieve a democratic society. The experience of opposing rivalry 
between political ideologies in the Republic as have been shown during the parliamentary 
democracy period should not be perceived as the factor that would lead into the breakdown 
of the nation but as a process to achieve maturity and political stability and legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PARTY SYSTEM: POLITICAL STABILITY 
AND LEGITIMACY IN INDONESIA 
Party system in a democratic polity plays a significant role in the process of creating 
political stability and legitimacy. The difierent demands and supports of the people are 
aggregated and channelized to the government through political parties in which they are 
processed to become decisions and actions. The balance between the demands and the 
supports and the decisions and the actions will give stability to the government Besides, 
legitimacy of the government becomes the pre-condition of political stability. Thus party 
system and political stability and legitimacy relates with each other. 
The historical development of party systems in Indonesia has been discussed in the 
previous chapter. Different party systems were adopted in the different periods of 
Indonesian history. The description of party politics in the pre-independence days gave a 
better understanding to the subsequent political processes of party politics in an 
independent Indonesia. The various political groupings and ideologies emerged during the 
1920s and the 1930s later dominated the party politics in an independent Indonesia. The 
influence of these groupings and ideologies in Indonesian party politics continued to persist 
even after the long period of repressive policy fix)m President Sukarno and President 
Suharto. Consequently, party politics influenced the process of answering the problem of 
political instability and legitimacy crisis in the Republic. Different party systems adopted 
throughout the histoty of Indonesian politics gave different results to this question. Thus in 
this chapter, the different party systems that emerged and adopted by the govenunent in the 
history of an independent Indonesia will be analyzed and discussed to understand its 
relation with political stability and legitimacy and to farther reconstruct the Indonesian 
party system in order to arrive at a stable, performing, democratic and legitimate 
government. 
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The analysis and discussion on the relationship between party systems and political 
stability and legitimacy in Indonesia are divided into several periods. Five divisions are 
proposed in this chapter, starting with the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945 
until the departure of President Suharto in 1998. The divisions of these periods are: (i) the 
Revolutionary Period; (ii) the Pariiamentaiy Democracy Period; (iii) the Old Order or 
Guided Democracy Period; (iv) the New Order or Pancasila Democracy Period; and, (v) 
the Post-Suharto Period. 
4.1 The Revolutionary Period (1945 - 1949) 
When the nationalist leaders declared Indonesian independence in the wake of a 
power vacuum situation on 17 August 1945, a clear picture of a party system that would 
produce a stable, legitimate and functioning government in an independent Indonesia had 
not been agreed altogether. The Constitution according to which the new government \\^is 
to function was also drafted in a hurried process. The PPKI established by the Japanese 
government for prepeiringthe process of transfer of power into the hands of the Indonesians 
failed to prepare a comprehensive Constitution in time and rushed to complete the draft of 
the Constitution which later to be declared as the 1945 Constitution a day after the 
proclamation of Indonesian independence. Thus, the 1945 Constitution was lacking in any 
detailed provisions and consisted mostly of broad principles established in line with the 
Western liberal democracy modelled on a presidential system of government 
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The presidential cabinet adopted by the Republic based on the 1945 Constitution 
gave executive power to the president.' The appointment of Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta 
as the Indonesian President and Vice-President respectively by the PPKI conJSrmed the 
adoption of the presidential system of government. Their appointment for the highest job in 
the Republic resulted in the domination of two different personalities in Indonesian the 
politics. While Sukarno, a Javanese, represented the visionary leader of the Republic, 
Muhammad Hatta, a skilful manner, came to represent the Outer Islands. KNIP, an 
emeigency body established by PPKI in the absence of the MPR and the DPR became the 
supporting body to the President. Appointment of its members was the prerogative of the 
president and vice-president thus the formalization of the first presidential cabinet under the 
leadership of President Sukarno. However, the political tension amongst the political elites 
in the new Republic was at its high. The struggle for power that followed the formation of 
the Republic was the phenomenon of the day. Charismatic leaders with different ideologies 
such as Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Tan Malaka, Amir Sjariludin and others tried to dominate 
the political scene. Thus, the newly established KNIP was not spared fiom this struggle of 
political domination. While Sukarno and Hatta, two nationalist leaders, succeeded to 
occupy the post of President and Vice-President, the socialist groups under the leadership 
of Sjahrir succeeded in dominating the KNIP. With two different political groupings 
dominating the decision making body, the struggle for political control did not end. On the 
contrary, it started to expand thus causing political instability and legitimacy crisis in 
Indonesia. 
The political instability and legitimacy crisis that emerged as the result of the power 
struggle among the Indonesian leadership continued to expand v^en the Dutch, who still 
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eageriy wanted to re-assert its colonial domination in Indonesia after the Japanese defeat, 
questioned the legitimacy of President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta as the legitimate 
rulers of Indonesia. Because, although Sukarno and Hatta were recognized by most 
Indonesians as the only legitimate leaders but their previous afSliation and cooperation 
with the Japanese government during the brief period of the Japanese occupation raised the 
debate on the independency of Indonesia as a truly independent nation and not a mere 
puppet of the Japanese government. Besides, the absence of any political parties during tfiis 
period due to their dissolution by the Japanese government raised some doubt of any 
democratic practice in the nation. The idea proposed by President Sukarno of establishing a 
single, revolutionary party as a medium of nation building process did not erase this doubt 
Thus, with the legitimacy of Sukarno's presidency being questioned and a single party was 
perceived as a dilution from the democratic principles as stipulated by the Indonesian 
Constitution, the Government issued a Government Act on 3 November 1945 to allow the 
Indonesian people to fomi any political organizations with whatever ideology they 
preferred. Soon, the old and new political parties emerged and started to play their roles in 
the political process in the Republic. The fractured history of party politics in ihs pK-
independence period was revived in independent Indonesia. This Government Act opened 
the door for the establishment of a muki-party system in Indonesia and at the same time, 
the early resignation of a Presidential Cabinet led by Sukarno. Because, with the adoption 
of a multi-party system the government also decided to convert the presidential system into 
a pariiamentary system of government through another Government Act issued on 14 
November 1945 thus creating the chance for other national leaders to lead the nation. The 
adoption of the parliamentary system made the Council of Ministers answerable to the 
Parliament, the KNIP, and not to the President. Even though the change from a presidential 
140 
system to a parliamentaiy system of government was without any amendment to the 
Presidential Constitution, this decision was taken as a tactical emergency move by the 
Indonesian leaders to win over Ae support of the international community on Indonesia's 
commitment towards democracy and a strategic move towards achieving full independence 
for the Republic. The adoption of a multi-party system followed by the change in the 
system of government witnessed the emergence of the dominating role of political parties 
in the political process. An active role of the political parties is very necessary for the 
effective functioning of a parliamentary system. The emergence of a majority party in the 
Parliament as well as strong opposition guarantees the stability of a government. On the 
other hand, the absence of any majority party in the Parliament might result into coalition 
politics where political parties make an alliance to form a majority power in the Parliament 
to form a government. The difficult nature of a coalition politics often resulted in the 
instability of government due to the failure of the political parties to create a stable and 
working coalition. At the same time, the absence of any strong opposition in the parliament 
creates the imbalance in the equilibrium. 
On 14 November 1945, Sjahrir, the most prominent of the small group of nationalist 
leaders who had refused to cooperate with the Japanese, succeeded in establishing himself 
into the position of Prime Minister to lead the first parliamentary cabinet of a minority 
government based on his essentially social-democratic Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) 
hence creating a 'legitimate' government for the process of further negotiation with the 
Dutch government to achieve fiill recognition for Indonesia as an independent state.^  His 
energy, intellect and commitment to modernity made him the ideal person to attempt this 
move to persuade the Western world that Indonesia could and should run its own af&irs. 
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However, the growing opposition fix)m forces deteimined to oppose the Dutch by whatever 
means necessary gathered around Tan Malaka, a veteran Trotskyite v\4iose Persatuan 
Perdjuangan (Unity of Struggle Front) n^idly attracting a huge following, forced Sjahrir to 
tender his resignation in February 1946. But the inability of the diverse elements in the 
Persatuan Perdjuangan to form a new cabinet made President Sukarno to invite Sjahrir to 
form another cabinet based on a wider parliamentary support. However, instead of starting 
the process of negotiation with the Dutch, the first action of the second Sjahrir cabinet was 
to eliminate the opposition by arresting Tan Malaka and the leadership of the Persatuan 
Perdjuangan and jailing them without trial. In retaliation, elements of the Third Regular 
Army Division arrested the Prime Minister in late June 1946. Thus, fearing the matter 
would spill out of hands, the President stepped in to solve the problem by arresting the 
conspirators while troops loyal to the PSI fiieed Sjahrir, who then formed his third and more 
representative cabinet in October 1946.^  
By November 1946, Sjahrir concluded the so-called Linggarjati Agreement with the 
Dutch in which the latter recognized the republic's de facto authority over Java and 
Sumatera. But what first could have been taken as a diplomatic victory soon turned out to 
be an illusion when on 27 May 1947 the Dutch issued an ultimatum demanding its 
recognition as the de jure authority over the wiiole Indonesia until the formation of the 
United States of Indonesia in January 1949. PM Sjahrir was prepared to accept these terms 
but members of his own party, led by Minister of Defense Amir Sjarifuddin, refused to 
endorse his policies thus forcing his resignation on 27 June 1947 just to be succeeded by 
Amir Sjarifiiddin who himself was eventually prepared to offer even further concessions to 
the Dutch govemment. But the police action launched by the Dutch forces in the following 
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months nullified the agreement Under pressure fiom the UN, the Dutch government agreed 
to a cease-fire in August 1947 followed by the signing of another agreement between Ae 
two governments. However, having signed the agreement Amir Sjarifiiddin found himself 
deserted by his coalition partners that on 23 Januaiy 1948 tendered his resignation to the 
President. With no parliamentaiy leader capable ofestablishing a new coalition government 
that would take up the political responsibility under the existing circumstances. President 
Sukarno appointed his Vice-President, Muhammad Hatta, to form a "business cabinet" 
whose tasks were to reform the economic and administrative structures of the rump 
republic, and particulariy to support the reform of the bloated defense apparatus. But before 
any reform could be started, the young Republic erupted in a violence when on 13 
September 1948, under the leadership of Amir Sjarifiiddin vsiio now declared himself to be 
a Communist for a long time, troops about to be discharged under General Nasution's 
military reform plan and loyal to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) seized the city of 
Solo in Central Java, vydiile the leader of the PKI, Musso, in nearby Madiun, East Java, 
called for the overthrow of President Sukarno and Hatta cabinet However, by the end of 
the month loyalist troops had recaptured all the strongholds of the rebels. 
The years of struggle for independence seemed to be over by this time but on 17 
December 1948 the Dutch issued another uhimatum demanding their terms of a special 
veto powers in the creation of the United States of Indonesia to be accepted. Muhammad 
Hatta had no choice but to accept these demands but requested that guidelines to be laid 
down. However, before the cabinet could formulate a reply, the Dutch forces attacked the 
provisional capital, Jogjakarta on 19 December 1948 and C{q)tured President Sukarno, Vice-
President Hatta, Sjahrir and all cabinet ministers present in Jogjakarta. This left the 
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Republic with no civilian government. Indonesian Aimy under the leadership of the ailing 
General Sudirman, however, refused to accept the situation and determined to maintain 
control of the countiyside. They launched guerrilla warfere against the Dutch. The 
celebrated attack followed by a six-hour occupation of the Jo^akarta city by the Indonesian 
Army in March 1949 had distorted the claim by the Dutch government over the non-
existence of the Indonesian Republic. This attack also opened up more intemational 
pressure on the Dutch government to quickly resolve the problem in Indonesia. 
It was by mid 1949 that the Dutch government realized the fiitility of the military 
solution to the conflict and at the same time, the Republican Army had also created a 
militaiy government in liberated areas. This development in the Republic proved to be 
fruitfiil: the intemational opinion had decidedly turned against the Dutch government thus 
leaving it with no other choice but to release and restore President Sukarno and Vice-
President Hatta to Jogjakarta and to begin another round of negotiations at what was called 
the Round Table Conference which this time led to a formal transfer of sovereignty to the 
Republic in the last days of December 1949. The conclusions of the Conference agreed to 
recognize the new republic as the United States of Indonesia, a federal concept for 
Indonesia, with President Sukarno as figurehead leader and Vice-President Hatta as leader 
of a "business" cabinet in a pariiamentary system of government. 
The problem of political instability and legitimacy in Indonesia during this 
revolutionary period was started vsdth the appointment of Sukarno and Hatta as the 
President and Vice-President of the newly independent Republic. The power struggle 
between the political elites over the system of govemment and the mounting pressure fix)m 
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the Dutch became two crucial fectors that contributed to this problem. While the Dutch 
government accused the new leaderships of Indonesia to be illegitimate for their alleged 
cooperation with the Jq)anese government, the political elites, especially the socialist 
groups, questioned the possibility of an authoritarian rule under Sukamo - Hatta. On the 
other hand, Sukamo - Hatta owed their legitimacy as the Indonesian leader fiiom the 
masses for their unquestioning devotion to the nation. Besides, their charismatic 
personalities became the added source of their political legitimacy in Indonesia. The 
incident in eariy 1946 in the KNIP showed this unquestioning legitimacy of their 
leadership. The refusal of the Woridng Committee of the KNIP to accept the Presidential 
Decree on the reformation of the membership in the KNIP prompted the resignation threat 
fix)m Sukamo - Hatta. Facing the possible breakdown in the govemment with this threat, 
the Working Committee of the KNIP reverted back their decision and obliged to reform its 
membership into a more representative body. 
The legitimacy of Sukamo - Hatta as the leaders in Indonesia alone, however, could 
not save the Republic from the instability crisis. The revolutionary govemment was lacking 
of political stability. The Pariiamentaiy system of goverrmient adopted in the eariy days of 
the Republic following the introduction of a multi-party system witnessed series of cabinet 
reshuffles, attempted coups and a Communist revolt. The issuance of a Govemment Act on 
freedom of formation of political organizations opened up of the channel for political 
participation. However, this decision was not followed by the development of political 
institutionalisation. The imbalance between political participation and political 
institutionalisation during this revolutionary period contributed to the political instability 
crisis. Besides, extemal factor in the form of military actions from the Dutch jforces also 
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contributed to the instability in the government. The Cabinets were only feeble coalitions 
felling to secure a base for sufRcient support. 
The inability of the party system in assimilating the new social forces produced by 
the revolution and the low level of balance between political participation and 
institutionalisation had severely obstructed the equilibrium of political stability as well as 
the legitimacy of government. The high level of political legitimacy of the President in a 
pariiamentary system of government could not produce political stability in the government 
in which several changes of Cabinets occurred during this period. The high level of 
political legitimacy in the form of the acceptance of the people over the leadership of 
Sukarno - Hatta with a relatively low level of political stability became the phenomenon of 
the revolutionary period. 
The complicated process of revolution for independence includes incidents as 
follows: the power vacuum created by the Japanese defeat; the proclamation of 
independence by Sukarno and Hatta and their subsequent jqjpointment by the PPKI as the 
President and Vice-President of the new Indonesian Republic respectively; the landing of 
Dutch forces intent on re-claiming the former possessions; armed conflicts and diplomatic 
maneuvering lasting for four years; political changes within the Republic during the same 
time; the 'police actions' by the Dutch forces; UN intervention and pressure from the US; 
and lastly the transfer of sovereignty at the Round Table Conference at The Hague. The 
qualitative transformation fix)m power vacuum to birth of the Republic was undertaken in a 
relatively quick sequence where the lack of necessary ^paratus for the functioning of a 
govenmient had contributed to the problem of political instability and legitimacy crisis. 
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4 J, The Pariiamentary Democracy Period (1950 -1959) 
The agreed concept of federal order for Indonesia in the Round Table Conference 
was not to last for long when in August 1950 President Sukarno decided to return to a 
unitary state ^ i^lile retaining the parliamentary system of government, vesting the decision-
making power primarily to the Parliament and the Cabinet with reservation of some 
important powers to the president.^ A new set of a Provisional Constitution was carefully 
drawn and introduced in 1950 for a parliamentary government to function, while dropping 
the Constitution drafted for the United States Republic of Indonesia. At the same time, the 
Constituent Assembly was woiking on the fonnulation of a new Constitution for the 
Republic. However, the new arrangement gave no difference result that for the next five 
years the main feature of Indonesian politics was dominated by political instability and 
legitimacy crisis vv^ere constant change of cabinets and government coalitions occurred. 
The political instability and legitimacy crisis during this period was started after the 
resignation of Hatta's Cabinet with the establishment of a coalition cabinet led by Natsir in 
September 1950 with the support from his progressive Muslim party, the Masyumi, the 
Christian parties and the PSI. The primary tasks of this Cabinet were restoring public peace 
and order and resolving the economic problems. But being very active in economic policy, 
this cabinet was politically vulnerable that a confrontation with President Sukarno on West 
Irian issue brought down this Cabinet after only six months in office. Natsir's departure 
opened up the door for the formation of a cabinet by another Ma^ywm/ politician, Sukiman 
Wiijosandjojo, in April 1951 excluding the PSI but including the Indonesian National Party 
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(PNI). Politically, the new Cabinet enjoyed President Sukarno's personal support but 
conspicuously lacked the understanding with the Army leaders. It was the foreign policy 
which brought the Cabinet's demise. By Februaiy the following year the Sukiman Cabinet 
had resigned due to the issue of the signing of Mutual Security Agreement with the United 
States. Another coalition government led by a PNI politician, Wilopo, with the support 
fiom the Masyumi and the PSI, replaced Sukiman's cabinet. However, the political enemies 
of Wilopo, mostly from his own party, worked toward his downfall immediately after the 
formation of his Cabinet by using the defence policy. The result was the permission from 
the cabinet for the military leaders to submit a petition to the President on 17 October 1952 
to dissolve the incumbent appointed parliament and schedule elections for a new 
parliament. Refusal of the petition by the President resulted in an open mutiny in three of 
the army's seven divisions against the headquarters. Wilopo decided to sack Nasution, who 
was then the Army Chief of Staff after the death of General Sudirman in 1950, in early 
1953 in order to stay in the office but this decision did not save his Cabinet that facing a 
motion of no confidence he was certain to lose, Wilopo resigned on 2 July 1953. Ali 
Sastroamidjojo, another PNI politician, took charge to form different coalition government 
based on the PNI, the conservative Muslim party, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), minor 
nationalist and leftist parties, and the Communists, who had promised parliamentary 
support and were represented in the cabinet indirectly through the Communist Peasant 
Front. But, again, the defence policy had taken another toll on the life of a Cabinet when 
the Army refused to accept the decision by the Government for appointing a relatively 
junior oflBcer as the new Army Chief of StaflF. Disenchanted with All's defence policy and 
his general highhandedness in Cabinet deliberation, the coalition partners pulled out of the 
Government thus forcing Ali to resign as Prime Minister on 24 July 1955.^ 
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In the absence of President Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta appointed a Masyumi 
politician, Buriianuddin Harahap, as Indonesian Prime Minister v^o then formed a 
coalition Cabinet based on his own party with the support from the NU and the PSI. The 
immediate task of this new Cabinet was to hold the long delayed Parliamentary elections 
scheduled for 29 September 1955 and, in December, the elections for a Constituent 
Assembly charged with working out a new constitution. 
The frequent changes of Cabinets in the Indonesian Pariiament for the past five 
years after the formal transfer of power in December 1949 had contributed to the instability 
of government and the scheduled elections was aimed at the creation of a more stable and 
legitimate govemment. The fragile coalition politics that had been dominating the national 
politics needed to be strengthened, or to be avoided if possible, through this election. But 
the resuh of the election told different stoiy when the total number of the votes was split 
between several major parties with no single party secured majority in the Pariiament. The 
hope of creating a more stable and legitimate govemment came to a surprise result v\4ien 27 
out of 36 contestants got one seat or more in the Parliament. The result was a split mandate 
distributed among four national parties: the PNI, Masyumi, NU and PKI which secured 
22.3 %, 20.9 %, 18.4 % and 16.4 % respectively. The following table shows the complete 
resuh of this election. ^ 
The Results of tiie Indonesian Parliamentary Election of 1955 
Parties 
PNI 
Number of Votes 
8,434,653 
Percentage of Votes 
22.3 
Number of Seats 
57 
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Masyumi 
NU 
PKI 
psn 
Paiicindo 
P. Katholik 
PSI 
IP-KI 
Perti 
18 other parties 
Total 
7,903,886 
6,955,141 
6,176,913 
1,091,160 
1,003,325 
770,740 
753,191 
541,306 
483,014 
-
-
20.9 
18.4 
16.4 
2.9 
2.6 
2.0 
2.0 
1.4 
13 
100.0 
57 
45 
39 
8 
8 
6 
5 
4 
4 
24 
257 
The results of the elections for the constituent assembly were not markedly different and it 
meant that the coalition politics still received enou^ electoral backing in ofBce.^  
The successlul administration of the elections, however, failed to hold together the 
coalition Cabinet led by Burhanuddin Harahap. The NU decided to pull out of the existing 
coalition Cabinet to enable new coalition negotiations on the basis of the election results. 
The exit of the NU fix>m tiie coalition forced the resignation of Buiiianuddin Haranqj as 
Prime Minister along with his Cabinet in March 1956. Apart fix)m successfully 
administering the elections in 19SS, another notable contribution of the Buihanuddin 
cabinet was its effort to mend the civil-military relationship severed by the previous 
government through the re-appointment of Nasution, a senior figure in the militaiy, as the 
Army Chief of Staff. But the invitation extended to Ali vv^o had had a difficult record with 
the Army by President Sukarno to form the new government based on the coalition of the 
PNI, the Masyumi and the NU on 20 March 1956 had left many Army officers 
disillusioned.^ The hope of mending the civil-militaiy relation had backfired tiiat Nasution's 
re-appointment by the previous Buihanuddin Harahap's government meant tiie resumption 
of his effort to professionalize the Army and particularly to break the warlord-like powers 
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of military commanders outside Java thus intensifying the conflict between Java and the 
Outer Islands. The result was several non-violent revolts by regional Army commanders in 
several parts of the country like in West Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi as a show of 
their disenchantment towards the Cabinet as well as to the Army Chief of Staff who was 
seen to be collaborating with the Cabinet. The situation was aggravated with the corruption 
scandals and the acceleration of ethnic conflict between the Javanese and people fix)m the 
Outer Islands who saw the export-consuming Java was milking the export-producing Outer 
Islands in which their wealth had been disproportionately used for the benefit of Java and 
not for improving the condition in the Outer Islands thus accelerating the decreasing 
credibility of the second Ali cabinet.' Thus, feced with revolts everywhere outside Java, 
hostile coalition partners incensed by the resignation of Hatta, a native of Sumatra, fiiom the 
vice-presidency as a protest against the increasingly anti-liberal utterances of President 
Sukarno and the discriminatoiy policy of the cabinet vis-a-vis the Outer Islands and the 
mounting criticism from the President on the political system that had brought this 
Govenmient into power, Ali, after declaring a state of war and siege, handed in his 
resignation to President Sukarno on 14 March 1957. 
The resignation of the second Ali Cabinet was nothing extraordinary. But there 
were two things that diflerentiated it from the previous Cabinets: it was the first and only 
Indonesian Cabinet ever to be assembled on the basis of the result of the fi«e and 
democratic elections and, second, that the division in the society was so grave that no 
coalition could be formed in its wake.'" The already existing political adversary between 
political groups, especially between the PNI and Masyumi, deepened even further with the 
long period and fierce election campaign. Hence the failure of any political party to secure 
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majority votes in the elections &n;ed the formation of a coalition cabinet in the already 
ideologically divided nation. The lack of nttfional consensus brought down the second Ali 
cabinet and the impracticability of establishing another working coalition government The 
result was the appointment of Djuanda, a Sundanese politician with no party affiliation, to 
form a business cabinet that was to govem through a martial law with direct support fix)m 
the President and the Army headquarters. The most important task of the Djuanda Cabinet 
was to bring the regional unrest under control. But instead of bringing the House in order, 
new regional rebellions came up like the PRRI/Permesta in Sumatra supported by several 
Masyumi and PSI leaderships and the Darul Islam movement in West Java, Aceh and South 
Sulawesi. The inability of the Government to suppress these rebellions had resulted in the 
increasing militaiy role through its 'middle way' concept proposed by Nasution that the 
military should not assume political power but should play a political role as one of the 
forces in deciding the fete of the nation. Taking on the opportunity provided by the 
situation. President Sukarno, with the military backing, issued a Presidential Decree on 5 
July 1959 thus ending the Djuanda Cabinet and the Pariiamentaiy government. The Decree 
meant the re-promulgation of the Presidential Constitution of 1945 thus providing the best 
possible chance for President Sukarno to materialize his idea of sustainable government in 
Indonesia through what he called a "Guided Democracy", a democracy with a leadership. 
The transfer of power in 1949 also marked the new beginning of a party politics in 
Indonesian parliament. With the adoption of a parliamentary constitution in the form of a 
Provisional Constitution of 1950, the Constitutional flaw found in the previous period was 
corrected. The adoption of this Provisional Constitution of 1950 reflected the conviction of 
the Indonesians on their commitment to the representative form of government and 
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naturally embraced such concepts as a parliamentaiy system based on popular sovereignty 
and universal suffiage, freedom of association, and freedom of speech. As such these 
elements were recognized, if not practiced, during the revolutionary period, but the 1950 
Provisional Constitution explicitly provided for a parliamentary cabinet, limiting the role of 
president and vice-president to an almost symbolic one. This Provisional Constitution 
certainly provided a democratic framework for the fimctioning of pariiamentary cabinet in 
the spirit of a multiparty system. But this Constitutional change did not bring any difference 
to the problem of political instability and legitimacy crisis in the government. Coalition 
politics still dominated the political scene during this period. If the Socialist group 
dominated the revolutionaiy period, this period of parliamentary politics was dominated by 
the power struggle between the Secular-Nationalist group and the Muslim group with the 
Communist PKI loomed large as the dark horse. The absence of general elections in the 
first five years of this parliamentary democracy period also contributed to this problem. 
Ideological differences between these groups, however, deepened even further when 
parliamentary elections was finally held in 1955. The two-year long period of election 
campaign was the major cause for the deepening of this political divide. The elections 
failed to produce a working government due to the absence of any majority power in the 
pariiament The high level of political participation in this multi-party system where more 
than 35 political parties and individuals competed in the elections with a relatively low 
level of political institutionalization foiled to contribute any political stability to the 
government. The fractured mandate in this elections resulted in a weak govenmient and 
weak opposition. At the same time, the extra-psuiiamentary forces in the form of the 
military, the President and the regional conflicts became several other factors that led into 
the continuity of the problem. The following table explained the difiicult coalition politics 
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that resulted in the instability and legitimacy crisis in tiie wake of parliamentaiy cabinet 
based on the 1950 Provisional Constitution. 
Parliamentary Cabinets from 1950 to 1959" 
No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Cabinets 
(Before Elections) 
Natsir - Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono 
IX (PM: Natsir) 
Sukiman - Suwirjo 
(PM: Sukiman) 
Wilopo - Prawoto 
(PM: Wilopo) 
Ali - Wongsonegoro 
(PM: AH) 
Burhanuddin 
Harahap - Djanu 
Ismail 
(PM: Burhanuddin 
Harahap) 
(After Elections) 
Ali - Roem 
(PM: Ali) 
Djuanda 
(PM: Djuanda) 
Coalition 
Partners 
Masyumi, PSI, non-
party 
Masyumi,?\i\ 
PNI, Masyumi, PSI 
PNI, PIR (small 
nationalist parties) 
Masyumi and some 
smallo- p^ies 
PNI,Majry«m/,NU 
Non-party, PNI, 
NU 
Duration 
6/9/'50 to 
21/3/'51 
(6.5 mnth) 
26/4/'51 
to 
23/2/'52 
(10 mnth) 
30/3/'52 
to2/6/'53 
(1 year & 
2 mnth) 
31/7/'53 
to 
24/7/'55 
(2 years) 
ll/8/'55 
to 3/3/'56 
(7 mnth) 
20/3/'56 
to 3/3/'57 
(I year) 
8/4/57 to 
5/7/59 (2 
years & 3 
mnth) 
Reasons of tlie Fail 
Differences with the President 
on West Irian matter 
Disagreements on 'Mutual 
Security Act' with the US 
The infamous 17 October 1952 
military incident 
The appointment of a relatively 
junior officer as the Army Chief 
of Staff, neglecting tiie objection 
raised by the military hierarchy 
A perceived possible change in 
the parliamentary composition 
based on the result of 1955 
electk>n made NU pulled out of 
coalition thus leading to its fall 
The ambition of civilian 
politicians to control the military 
badkfired, rebellions in various 
parts of the country, pressure 
from the President to dispose the 
system to be replaced by guided 
democracy, and the military 
ascendanQT in the national 
politics, corruption scandals 
Due to the Presidential Decree 
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The first five cabinets were fonned before the Pariiamcntaiy election in 1955 v^le 
the second Ali cabinet was the only parliamentaiy cabinet ever established through general 
election. The coalition government enjoyed relatively fiir greater stability of its position in 
the Parliament as compared to the last five cabinets. It also could claim the legitimacy as a 
democratic government represented through a democratically administered general 
election. But the inability of the coalition to face the challenges fix)m the extra-
pariiamentaiy powers, particularly the Army, the President and various communal political 
forces awakened through the elections had contributed to its down&ll and the subsequent 
demise of the parliamentary democracy. The Djuanda cabinet was an interim cabinet of a 
non-party basis installed by President Sukarno before the introduction of Guided 
Democracy in 1959. Thus with tfie fell of the second Ali cabinet in March 1957, 
Pariiamentaiy Democracy had already been ended in reality. 
Two different pattern of cabinets arose fit)m their style of government: one was the 
kind of problem-solving by the Natsir and Wilopo cabinets and the other that by the two 
Ali cabinets with the Sukiman and Harahap cabinets placed somewhere in between. The 
first pattern placed policy priority on the strengthening of law and order, improving 
administrative machineiy (both civil and military), solving the economic problems, 
particularly production increases and gradual nationalization of the economy, and 
establishing rules for the parliamentary democracy. On the other hand, the preference of 
resources through deficit financing rather than production increase, undisciplined expansion 
of administrative machinety left unchecked, corrupt practices and spoilsmanship were all 
salient features of the second cabinet pattern; it placed utmost importance on the safety of 
the regime. The first pattern depended predominantly on economic and administrative 
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performance for legitimacy with nothing done on its own to boost legitimacy as such. Thus 
once the Korean War boom was over, the declined in effectiveness of the first pattern due 
to its lack of sufficient reserve support on the emotional level started to take its toll. 
October 17 AfBiir with its aftermath was a fetal blow to this pattern and the general 
elections adding another. The second pattern showed the dependency towards nationalist 
ideology for its legitimacy. It was due to the excessive attachment to its position of power 
that it went beyond its means of distribution, which ultimately led into the loss of 
legitimacy through political corruptions. The Provisional Constitution of 1950 designed 
particularly for a parliamentary system feiled to provide a strong legal support because of 
the ambiguity left on the power of the presidency thus helping President Sukarno to expand 
his influences as a strong extra-parliamentaiy force in the actual working of government. 
The multiparty system adopted to support the system also feiled to produce a stable 
coalition government The absence of a national consensus due to the deep ideological 
adversary among the parties aggravated the situation. The parliamentary elections in 1955 
feiled to produce a single majority power and led into a fiactured mandate that fer fix)m 
reducing political instability. It, on the contrary, substantially increased political instability 
due to the weak government and weak opposition. The fierce and long period of election 
campaign which mostly contained of an appeal to the communal ties had resulted in the 
deepening of regional, cultural and religious differences and cleavages instead of a national 
consensus making the government depended on continual jostling and bargaining between 
the parties thus lacking political stability and legitimacy. In the eyes of the peoples and 
their leaders in the regions, there was little left of the moral authority of the government to 
rule them.'^ None of those vs^o held the position during the period enjoyed a level of public 
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support and respect as well as political pre-eminent necessaiy for them to be able to assert 
themselves and maintain political stability and legitimacy. 
The parliamentary democracy period witnessed the most vibrant practice of party 
politics in Indonesia. Power struggle between different political groupings and ideologies 
dominated the national politics. However, this high level of political participation was 
lacking of political institutionalization in which the imbalance between these two Actors 
created the crisis of political instability as well as legitimacy crisis. The multi-party system 
had opened up the wider chances for the people to participate in the decision making 
process but the lack of govenmient's ability to provide better political institutionalization 
had backfired in which Sequent changes of government, 5 different governments in a 
period of 5 years, dominated the period. Even the parliamentaiy elections failed to produce 
a stable government Instead, it deepened the ideological cleavage in the ideologically torn 
party politics. The multi-party system which was hoped to provide chances for the people 
to participate in the decision making process was unable to provide the necessary passage 
of transforming the demands and supports into decisions and actions. The fiactured 
mandate resulted in the formation of weak government as well as weak opposition thereby 
resulting in the instability crisis. The political stability in this period was at a relatively low 
level while at the same time, the government was facing the crisis of political legitunacy. 
43 The Old Order or Guided Democracy Period (1959 -1965) 
The fundamental contradiction between the political system and the socio-economic 
reality made the un-adapted Western liberal democracy failed to work effectively to 
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provide a stable political order and effective government. It also &iled to maintain and 
enhance Indonesian unity and bring together the diverse ethnic and class components of the 
Indonesian population into a united nation. It >vas not that the Western democracy itself 
was intrinsically wrong and defective, but that much of the then Indonesian reality was not 
in harmony with the system. At the same time, the party system had created an excessive 
and uimianageable political pluralism. The ideological adversary among political parties 
was so grave that after the &ilure of the second Ali cabinet formed on the basis of the 
winners of the election excluding the PKl, no coalition Cabinet could be formed after its 
dissolution. The hostility of political ideologies reflected in these parties which deepened 
even fiirther through the long period of fierce election campaign made it difScult to achieve 
a national consensus. The result was rebellions in different parts of the countiy and the 
emei:gence of dominating extra-pariiamentaiy forces in the national politics. Disappointed 
with the ftmctioning of Pariiamentaty Cabinets, President Sukarno, with the support fix)m 
the military, introduced his concept of democracy with a leadership called Guided 
Democracy. It was in this concept of democracy with a leadership that Indonesia 
experienced fiirther involvement of the military in the national politics through its middle 
way concept and the diminishing role of political parties. The introduction of the system 
was marked by the re-promulgation of the 1945 Constitution through a Presidential Decree 
in 1959 where the executive powers lay at the hands of the president. 
The change of executive powers into the hands of the President also resulted in the 
transformation of die pattern of party politics. The proposed system of a presidential 
cabinet put the political parties into a secondary role. The failure in the natural reduction on 
the number of political parties through general election in 1955 had inspired President 
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Sukarno to simplify the party system through Presidential Legislation. This decision put the 
political parties under government's control and minimized their role in the decision 
making process as compared to the role they played in the pervious period. With the 
introduction of Guided E)emocracy wiiere a National Front was established as a 
representative body for the representatives of political parties. National Council was also 
formed to accommodate the representatives of the fimctional groups as well as the military 
in the decision making process. With the establishment of these controlled bodies the 
dominating role of political parties in the Indonesian politics slowly diminished. However, 
the diminishing role of political parties became the blessing in disguise for the Army and 
the Communist group, the PKI, as also for the President. It opened up the chance for greater 
role of the Army in the national politics. Because although alienated by the early socialist 
cabinets and the conduct of parliamentaiy politics between 1952 and 1956, Army leaders 
have maintained its tolerance to the parliamentary democracy as long as pariiamentarians 
were able and willing to put together government coalitions. Only when parliament ceased 
to function did they seek to involve themselves in the processes of decision making, not as 
usurpers of all power but as one of the forces determining the fate of the nation. President 
Sukarno provided this chance for the army to involve more on the decision making process 
by providing military representatives some seats in the National Council. 
The struggle of power between these forces dominated the political process in the 
Guided Democracy period. The reduction in the number and the diminishing role of 
political parties, except for tiie PKI, wiiich was heavily fevoured by the President as his 
source of support against the growing power of the Army, had changed their pattern of 
interaction. Multiparty phenomenon in the parliamentary politics was slowly transformed 
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into a disguised authoritarian one-party system of Guided Democracy. This change was 
expected to create more stable and legitimate government in the absence of ideological 
adversaries and extreme number of political parties. However, the strong and stable 
government, which was expected at the beginning of Guided Democracy, had deteriorated 
into impotency and corruption. The neglect of domestic affairs by putting heavy emphasis 
on diplomacy, conservatism in all domestic policies in which the regime was seeking to 
maintain the status quo and the indoctrination of state ideology were important reasons for 
the feilure of the short lived Guided Democracy. The National Front established by the 
President as a political body for the representatives of political parties was heavily 
dominated by the PKl. At the same time, there was growing rivalry between the 
Communist group and the Army. The legitimacy of the government that was based on the 
charisma of President Sukarno was incapable of institutionalizing the rule of succession 
thus when the question of succession came up, it aggravated internal strife among the 
competitors, the Army and the PKI. The culmination of this power struggle occurred when 
a certain group in the militaty associated to the PKI launched a military coup in late 
September 1965. The Army, however, easily eliminated this coup attempt. The slipping 
balancing act by the President resulted in the assertion of the Army's influence in the 
national politics, thus erasing the influence of the Communist group and put President 
Sukarno himself into sideline. 
In all these situations, the national economy became the victim that suffered the 
most. While the political groups struggled for their survival in the national politics, the 
economy was mostly neglected. The concept of Guided Democracy introduced by President 
Sukarno was accompanied by a guided economic policy, which put the national economy at 
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the foremost concern of the State. But the perpetual power struggle between major powers 
in the national politics resulted in the negligence of the national economic policy hence 
producing a neglected and broken national economy with high inflation, minus economic 
growth as well as high percentage of unemployment. 
The inability of the system of government in the previous period to perform had 
prompted the transformation of the pattern of party politics as well as the political process 
in Indonesia. The ever-increasing power of the extra-parliamentaiy forces finally succeeded 
in controlling, and even transforming the parliamentaiy system, into a different pattem of 
politics in wiiich the domination of a charismatic figiue in the form of President Sukarno 
overshadowed the political role played by political parties. The system of Guided 
Democracy transformed executive powers fit>m the Parliament to the hands of the 
President. It provided President Sukarno with immense political power thus allowing him 
to control the power struggle between different forces in the Republic. The struggle for 
domination over the political process in the national politics between the Communist group 
in the National Front and the Indonesian Army in the National Council resulted in the crisis 
of legitimacy in the government. The personal charisma that became the source of President 
Sukarno's political legitimacy eroded quickly over his leniency towards the Communist 
group after their alleged involvement in the failed and bloody coup of 30 September 1965. 
The relatively low level of political participation as well as political institutionalization had 
resulted in the crises. The transformation fiom a multi-party system into an authoritarian 
single party system in the form of the domination of the Communist group in the National 
Front &iled to create political stability and legitimacy. Although this period witnessed no 
change of govenmient at the Centre as compared to the several changes of government in 
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the previous periods, but the continuing struggle of power in the national politics had led 
into the crisis of political instability as well as legitimacy crisis. The coup in September Ae 
incident in September 1965 scripted the final departure of this regime thus ending the 
Guided Democracy and the birth of the New Order. In its short rule, the Guided Democracy 
regime was successful to maintain a relative stability through a controlled political 
participation. But the increasing pressure for wider political participation in contrast with 
the lack of political institutionalization had resulted in its breakdown. The moral authority 
of the leadership of the Guided Democracy regime was also diminishing thus attributing to 
its downfall. 
4.4 The New Order or PancasUa Democracy Period (1966 - 1998) 
The relative political stability in which no change of government occurred in the 
period of 1960 - 1965 was a contribution of President Sukarno's ability to merge and 
manipulate the diverse ideological forces into one body of National Front besides the 
formal limitation in the number of political parties. With the President having the support 
fix)m the National Council, a relatively stable government was functioning. But the slipping 
balance of power between the President, the military and the Communist group resulted in 
the political instability and legitimacy crisis in the wake of a failed coup in late 1965. The 
emergence of the Army as the sole remaining power that survived the power struggle in the 
Guided Democracy period led to the creation of a new system of interaction of political 
parties. General Suharto, a relatively unknown personality in Ae Army who at the time held 
the post of Commander of Kostrad, rose to the top of the military order for his successfiil 
operation against the Communist coup. His ability to manipulate the Muslim sentiment 
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against the PKI ^^ile securing necessaiy executive power fiwm the President through 
Supersemar as well as full support fix)m the Army were important keys for his success to 
eliminate the Communist influences in the process of establishing a new political system to 
rebuild the political pattern as well as in rehabilitating the ailing national economy. His 
ascendance into the highest political o£Sce in Indonesia mariced the domination of the 
military, especially the Army, in the national politics. In order to foi^ e a stable government, 
the regime under the leadership of General Suharto created a system that would suit to the 
need of the regime labeled as the New Order. Learning from the mistakes from the previous 
regime, the New Order determined to bring changes to Indonesia. 
The end of Sukarno and the imminent emergence of military dictatorship insight did 
not bother much in the mind of the political elites. The self-inflicted impotence of the 
parties carried over into Guided Democracy and the New Order proved to be too costly for 
the functioning of political parties as agents of democracy. The golden opportunity 
available for the political parties to play important role in the political processes in the 
formative stages of the New Order, 1967 - 1969 had been lost. The rejection of the 
proposal of a two party system by the West Java Army leadership and its allies as an 
alternative for the liberal, pariiamentaiy democracy, which was perceived to be the source 
of instability with its unimpressive track record curtailed the hope of political parties to act 
as agents of democracy in the post-Sukarno Indonesia. It was only the Paikindo, a relatively 
small Christian party, that realized that this might be the last opportunity for a long time to 
come to create a truly democratic order, and offered to merge itself into such an order. 
However, all other national parties declined to do so only to find themselves a few years 
later in a three-"party" system in wiiich the traditional parties command some influence 
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only by virtue of the musyawarah-type of parliamentaiy debate, without which they would 
jointly be outvoted on eveiy single issue. The acute ideological rivalry in the previous 
periods were not to be repeated in vdiich General Suharto had proposed a new system of 
government known as the Pancasila Democracy. The flaw of the Guided Democracy 
system under President Sukarno was eliminated by seeking refiige under the State's 
philosophy, the Pancasila, thereby reducing the possibility of an ideological rivalry among 
the people. Thus if during Guided Democracy the PKI dominated the political process 
through the effective use of tiie National Front, the Amiy with its New Order used the 
GOLKAR as its civilian hand wdiile fiirther limiting the number of political parties. The 
introduction of a Political Law number 3 on political parties and GOLKAR in 1975 
deepened the control of the regime over party politics and political participation. The single 
party authoritarian during the President Sukarno period was transfonned into a limited 
party system. The government forced the merger of the existing nine political parties into 
two diflferent groups, the PPP and PDI, whereas the functional groups which dominated the 
National Council in the Guided Democracy were christened into one service group called 
the GOLKAR hence the creation of a limited party system with two political parties and 
one service group operated in the polity. The political law issued by the New Order regime 
resulted in the creation of a floating mass in which it enabled the regime to control the 
functioning of the decision making process. With the GOLKAR winning every elections 
held by the regime, a possible domination of a single political power, the Army through the 
GOLKAR, became imminent. Besides, these elections also served as the legal source of 
legitimacy for the regime. The limited party system introduced by the regime slowly 
became a dominant party system where the GOLKAR became the hegemonic party while 
the PPP and the PDI were merely the supporting parties, the weak opposition. Another 
164 
Political Law number 3 introduced in 1985 v^ diere the adoption of the Pancasila as the sole 
organizational ideology perfected the model of an ideological hegemonic party system of 
the New Order regime. The imposition of the Pancasila as the sole guiding philosophy for 
all political groups became the ready-made condition for the process of creating a stable 
government. This ideological hegemonic party in tfie form of the GOLKAR controlled the 
political process and the fimctioning of the government policies. 
The development mantra as another source of legitimacy for the New Order worked 
quite well all the way fix)m the beginning. Its success in reducing the high inflation rate, the 
opening of more and more employment opportunities, improvement of education facilities 
and other development woiks had helped to sustain a steady and stable government. 
However, the limitation of political participation felt by the increasing number of the 
middle class group as a result of the improving economic condition had boomeranged the 
government. The rampant practice of corruptions, cronyism and nepotism added to the 
worsening of the situation. The disbandment of both PUDI (Partai Uni Demokrasi 
Indonesia, Uni Democratic Indonesia Party) and PRD {Partai Rakyat Demokratik, 
Democratic People's Party) by the government in the late 1990s seen as 'rebel parties' 
formed by democratic activists indicated the highhandedness of the government and their 
authoritarianism. The severe economic crisis in the late 1997 contributed to the culmination 
of the mounting disappointment among the people. The massive popular pressure built up 
among the people finally forced the government to resign having successfully occupied the 
office for more than tfiree decades. The strict control over people's participation through 
the limitation of political parties and ideological indoctrination had finally &iled to keep 
the regime in office. The imbalance in the surge of political participation as a result of 
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modernization process and the lack of political institutionalization had resulted in the crisis 
of political stability and legitimacy. 
The eventuality of the power struggle between President Sukarno, the Army and the 
Communist group during Guided Democracy period had left the Army as the sole winner. 
Determined to create a stable and legitimate government, the New Order under the 
leadership of General Suharto manipulated all necessary powers and supports to materialize 
this effort. Learning from the mistakes in the previous regime, the New Order leadership 
further limited the number of political parties and homogenized the political ideologies. 
The Pancasila was adopted as the sole political ideology for all political organizations thus 
leaving other ideologies away from national politics. Besides, development became the 
keyword for the New Order leadership to achieve this goal. This strategic approach taken 
by the New Order leadership paid oflF when it succeeded in improving the national 
economy, increasing the literacy rate in the population as well as successfully administering 
regular parliamentary elections. These successes eventually brought some degree of 
legitimacy to the regime as well as some degree of stability to the government. However, 
the increasing political awareness of the population in the tightiy controlled political 
activities during this period as well as the deteriorating economy in the late 1997 provided 
the perfect combination to the eventual break up of the political stability and legitimacy of 
the regime. The relative stability and legitimacy enjoyed by the regime for more than three 
decades after its establishment in 1966 through controlled political participation and steady 
growth of national economy failed to sustain the continuity of the regime. The imbalance 
between political participation and political institutionalization contributed to its fall. The 
ideological hegemonic party system in the form of the GOLKAR's domination in the 
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national politics could not provide the necessaiy channels for the increasing demand of 
political participation. This situation combined with the ageing leader, rampant practice of 
corruption, cronyism and nepotism led to the eventual break up of the regime and the 
emetgence of the problem of political instability and legitimacy crisis. 
4^ The Post-Suharto Period (1999 - Present) 
The end of the ideological hegemonic party system of the New Order under the 
popular pressure for wider political participation prompted the government to re-introduce 
the multiparty system. The political instability and legitimacy crisis in the government after 
the departure of the New Order regime made the reconstruction of political structure the 
most priority of the transitional government of President B.J. Habibie. The already non-
ftmctioning political structure was reformed to improve the channels for political 
participation. The new administration introduced the multiparty system to allow greater 
political participation for the Indonesian people, thereby ensuring the possibility of arriving 
at the creation of a stable and legitimate government. 
The revival of political parties with its different ideologies in the post-Suharto 
Indonesia witnessed the similar scenario of party politics as occurred in the early years of 
the Republic. The amendment of the 1945 Constitution and the introduction of new election 
law provided necessary legal constitutional frameworic for the ftmctioning of the system. 
However, the 1999 general election &iled to produce the expected result of a majority party 
in the Parliament. A fiactured mandate was the outcome of this election thereby resulting in 
the continuance of political instability. The Nationalist-Secular parties (the PDI-P, the 
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GOLKAR) dominated the center stage of the national politics followed closely by the 
Nationalist-Religious parties of Islamic ideology (the PKB, the PPP, the PAN, the PBB). 
This split mandate led to the formation of a coalition government, a political pattern similar 
to the parliamentaiy cabinet in the 1950s. An imminent crisis of political instability, 
however, became clear \^^en Abdurrahman Wahid, whose party, the PKB, only secured 
minority seats in the parliament, witii some calculated support of the shaky coalition of the 
Poros Tengah (Central Axis of the Muslim parties) and the GOLKAR, was elected by the 
MPR as the next Indonesian President, defeating the favorite, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
whose party, the PDI-P, secured the most number of the total votes in the election. Lacking 
of majority support and a seemingly erratic style of leadership disappointed his coalition 
partners and led into his early exit from the office, barely two years after his election fh)m a 
normal five years of a Presidential tenure. Megawati Sukarnoputri, his Vice-President, was 
elected by the MPR as his replacement. The relatively better source of support for 
Megawati Sukarnoputri as compared to Abdurrahman Wahid's became the important key 
for the working of her coalition cabinet in which it helped her to complete the remaining 
three years in office. 
The departure of the New Order regime under tremendous popular pressure for 
greater opportunities of political participation contributed to the introduction of an 
altogether different pattern of political process. The repressive and controlled policy of the 
New Order was quickly transformed into an open and more democratic system of 
government. Representative democracy was revived in the post-Suharto Indonesia. A new 
pattern of party politics was practiced in wdiich diflferent political groupings with different 
ideologies re-emeiged and started to play more meaningful roles in the decision making 
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process. Party politics of the pariiamentaiy democracy period in the 1950s started to 
dominate the political process in search of an answer to the problem of political stability 
and legitimacy in the post-Suharto Indonesia. 
The successful transformation of party politics in the post-Suharto Indonesia, 
however, felled to provide a stable and legitimate government at the Centre. The indirect 
election of the executive proved to be another source to the problem of political instability. 
The introduction of a direct presidential election is expected to be an important key to the 
creation of more legitimacy and stability in the government. The directly elected executive 
as well as the members of parliaments achieves more political legitimacy as compared to 
the one indirectly elected or appointed office bearers. They are more accountable to the 
electorates. Thus with possibly greater legitimacy in the executive through direct 
presidential election as well as a balance between political participation and 
institutionalization in a representative politics political stability in the post-Suharto 
Indonesia seems obtainable. The following table describes the different degrees of political 
stability and legitimacy as well as the various party systems adopted in Indonesia fix)m 
independence till present. 
Party Systems and Political Stability and Legitimacy in Indonesia 
(1945-2002) 
Period 
Revolutionary 
Period 
(1945-1949) 
Parliamentaiy 
Period 
Party System 
Extreme 
Pluralism 
Extreme 
Pluralism 
Poitiail 
Participation 
High 
High 
Potitica! 
Institutionalization 
Low 
Low 
Political 
StabiUty 
Low 
Low 
Political 
Legitimacy 
Low 
Medium to 
Low 
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(1950-1957) 
Guided 
Democracy 
(1959-1965) 
The New 
Order Period 
(1966-1998) 
Post-Suharto 
Period 
(1999-date) 
Single-Party 
Authoritarian 
Hegemonic 
Party System 
Extreme 
Pluralism 
Low 
Low to High 
High 
Low 
Low 
Low to Medium 
Medium 
to Low 
Medium 
to Low 
Low 
Medium to 
Low 
Medium to 
Low 
Low to 
Medium 
Throughout the history of party politics in Indonesia since its independence in 1945, 
different regimes in different periods have adopted different types of party systems in the 
hope of achieving political stability and legitimacy. The result is, however, relatively 
similar to each other. From an ideological adversary dominated multi-party system in the 
early days of the Republic (1945 - 1959), to the Conununist dominated single party 
authoritarian of President Sukarno period (1960 -1965), the military dominated ideological 
hegemonic party of General Suharto (1966 - 1998) and back to the extreme pluralism of 
the post-Suharto period (1999 - present), the answer to the problem of political stability 
and legitimacy in a democratic fiamework remained elusive. If the introduction of extreme 
pluralism in the early days of the Republic guaranteed wider political participation but 
resulted in the formation of weak governments and weak opposition thus resulting in the 
political instability, the domination of the PKI during the Guided Democracy period and the 
GOLKAR in the New Order witnessed some degree of political stability with limited 
degree of political participation. The legitimacy of these political orders in which political 
stability was maintained, however, fiiiled to withstand the waves of change. The slipping 
balance between the Army and the PKI in the Guided Democracy period rapidly eroded the 
legitimacy of President Sukamo thus leading into the end of the Guided Democracy. 
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Similariy, the erosion in the economic development, which was the practical basis of 
political legitimacy for the New Order, in the form of a severe economic crisis in the late 
1997 proved to be fetal for the safety and the continuity of the regime in which it finally 
bowed out of office after more than Aree decades running the government. The domination 
of the GOLKAR as an ideological hegemonic party felled to keep the balance of 
equilibrium during the New Order period. 
The re-introduction of an extreme pluralism in the post-Suharto Indonesia along 
with the implementation of a direct presidential election is seen as the process of arriving at 
the answer to the problem. However, fitictured mandate that led to the failure of 
transforming the legitimacy into a stable polity in the 1950s remains to be the phenomenon 
of party politics in this post-Suharto period as shown on the result of the elections held in 
the post-Suharto period in which noo party emerged as the majority power in the House. 
The political map of the 1950s re-emerged in this post-Suharto party politics where 
different political ideologies dominated the process of party politics. However, with the 
direct presidential election is in practice fitjm the 2004 elections the level of political 
legitimacy of the executive is relatively high. This legitimacy is expected to be transformed 
into some degree of political stability in the polity. An understanding coalition of like-
minded political parties based on common minimum programs will help the transformation 
process of this legitimacy into a stable and performing government. However, the high 
level of politicd legitimacy of the executive with a possible domination of his/her party or 
coalition partners in the House does not rule out the possibility of an authoritarian regime in 
the post-Suharto Indonesia. An absence of strong opposition as a check and a balancing 
force to the dominating power of the executive supports this proposition. The feilure of an 
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extreme pluralism to provide the balance of equilibrium as has been shovm in the history of 
Indonesian party politics will lead this young democratic Republic to the instability crisis, 
or worse, an authoritarian regime. Thus to avoid this possible situation, a suitable party 
system that leads to the establishment of a stable and legitimate polity is necessary, failing 
of \^^ich the question of political stability and legitimacy in Indonesian polity remains 
problematic. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout our lives we are members of dififerent groups or associations, from 
families, neighboriioods, clubs and work-units to nations and states. In all such 
associations, fix>m the smallest to the largest, decisions have to be taken for the association 
as a \^diole: about the goals to be pursued, about the rules to be followed, about the 
distribution of responsibilities and benefits between members. These decisions can be 
called collective decisions and democracy belongs to this sphere of collective decision-
making. All its members should have equal rights to take part in decision-making. As such, 
democracy entails the twin principles of popular control over collective decision-making 
and equality of rights in the exercise of that control. A democratic state exists when the 
government is accountable to the people and is established through competitive electoral 
process. However in practice the two principles of popular control and equality are not 
realized to the extent that the woik of democratization is continuous. This becomes more 
difficult as the direct participation in present time is not possible. 
Because of the impracticability of the direct democracy, the concept of 
representative democracy was introduced to function on behalf of the populace as a 
decision-making mechanism. Since an individual in a society can only exercise little public 
influence, his/her association with others would give greater such impact. Political parties 
are indispensable in democracy. They serve as a link between the populace and the 
representatives of the populace. They perform a number of different functions like: for the 
electorate, they help simplify the electoral choice by offering broad policy positions and 
programmes between which to choose; for governments, they provide a reasonably stable 
following of political supporters to enable them to achieve their programmes once elected; 
and for the more politically conunitted members in the society, they provide an opportunity 
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for involvement in public afiairs, a means of political education and a channel for 
influencing public policy. A feir and free electoral system guarantees the success of the 
political parties to perform these functions. Political parties thus constitute a pivotal 
mechanism through which popular concerns are made effective in government. 
The pattern of interaction between political parties in a democratic polity helps the 
political process in producing a stable and legitimate government. The type of party system 
affects the decision making process in such a polity. In a single party system, the political 
leadership tends to dominate social forces thus in the absence of competition between the 
elements in the polity leads into an authoritarian system. In a multiparty system, the social 
forces dominate the political parties where the heterogeneity offerees leads to the difficulty 
in arriving at a national consensus. A moderate pluralism provides the necessary channels 
to accommodate the conflicting interests in a heterogeneous society while at the same time 
effectively fiinctions as a mechanism to arrive at a national consensus. A two-party system 
maintains a more equitable balance between social forces and political parties thus the 
possibility of arriving at political stability is greater as compared to the moderate pluralism 
or the multi party system. The moral acceptance of the subject to the authority of the rulers 
is very important for the justification of their right to rule. And therefore, in order to create 
political stability and change in the society, rulers or regimes need to have legitimacy, the 
moral right to rule, failing of which crisis of legitimacy and stability is the consequence. 
The problem of political stability and legitimacy that emerged after the departure of 
General Suharto and his New Order regime which was the main focus of this research 
could be traced back in the history of the party system in Indonesia. The pattern of 
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interaction of political parties has varied throughout the history of Indonesia in different 
periods producing relatively varied results. The desirability of a multiparty system in 
Indonesia could be traced back to the history of party formation during the colonial period 
when parties of different ideologies emerged to voice their concem over the fate of their 
community in particular and Indonesia as a nation in general. Regionalism, Ethnicity, 
Religion as well as Nationalism emerged as the bonding force of these groupings. 
Suppressions and restrictions imposed by the colonial masters did not deter the 
determination of the leadership of these groups to continue their efforts in achieving 
Indonesian independence. But when independence actually came, no political grouping was 
able to withstand the controlling and repressive policy of the colonial master in which it 
created the problem of stability and legitimacy in the newly formed government in 
Indonesia. Besides, the absence of political institutionalization and its inability to absorb 
the increasing political participation and conflicting interests created the political instability 
and legitimacy crisis. Moreover, the recurring threats from the Dutch forces during the 
revolutionary period had added to more political instability. The four years of revolutionary 
period became the witness of frequent changes of cabinets in the wake of parliamentary 
government exercised. 
The absence of any election, the growing power of the extra-pariiamentary forces in 
the form of President Sukarno and the Army and the absence of any national leadership 
capable of forming sustainable government continued to dominate the political process in 
the following years after the revolutionary period. It was tfius perpetuating the political 
instability. The multi party system adopted during this period in which a number of 
political parties with their ideologically different affiliation existed had further deteriorated 
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the situation due to their inability to formulate a national consensus. When finally the long 
awaited general election was administered in the hope of producing a stable, legitimate and 
performing government, the nation was disappointed with the fact that the result of this 
election was a fiactured mandate where no political party emerged as a commanding power 
in the House thus resulting in the formation of weak coalition government as well as weak 
opposition. Although the election succeeded in producing legitimate government but it 
failed to produce a strong and stable government because of the ideological rivalry between 
the parties that constituted the coalition government. The multiparty system failed to 
produce a national consensus and instead it deepened the ideological, regional and ethnic 
rivalry in the form of a non-working coalition government and revolts in several regions. 
Seeing the danger of disintegration, the President with the support of the military, two 
powerful extra-pailiamentaiy forces, imposed a change in the party system to accommodate 
their urge to dominate the national politics by establishing a National Front that functioned 
as a single party system for the working of the political process. 
The change from a multi party system into a single party system produced a 
relatively stable government in the sense that no change of cabinet occurred in the period. 
The government tightly controlled the political process. At the same time, the legitimacy of 
this regime was extracted from the personal charisma of the President. However, this 
stability and legitimacy was proved to be only virtual phenomenon when the continuous 
power struggle between the Communist groups and the Indonesian Army to dominate the 
national politics exploded into a bloody attempted coup in wliich the Army quickly stepped 
in to eliminate it. The severe ideological rivalry and the deteriorating economy as well as 
the limited charmels for political participation contributed to this crisis. The emergence of 
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the Army with its iron-hand approach towards the functioning of the political process had 
introduced Indonesia to the experimentation of an ideological hegemonic party system. 
With the domination of the GOLKAR as the government party and the imposition of the 
Pancasila as the national ideology along with the improving economic situation, a stable 
regime controlled Indonesia. The lack of the regime's legitimacy was nurtured by focusing 
the attention to improving national development. Besides, regular general elections were 
successfully administered to add to the legal legitimacy of the regime. However, the 
improving economic situation in contrast with the limited opportunities for political 
participation as well as the lack of political institutionalization had created political 
instability crisis in the regime. The growing demand from the middle class group for a 
wider political participation and the establishment of a more accommodative political 
institutionalization had put the military regime under a strong public pressure. The rampant 
practice of corruption, cronyism and nepotism as well as the declining economic growth in 
the later years of the regime contributed to the worsening of the situation. With the 
declining source of political legitimacy, the ideological hegemonic party system failed to 
sustain the functioning of the decision-making process and finally the ageing regime 
disintegrated thereby paving the way for a chance to reform and to restructure the political 
system. 
The political euphoria of the post-Suharto Indonesia was translated into the 
establishment of various political parties with different ideological aflBliations. To 
accommodate the situation, a multi party system was adopted and a general election was 
scheduled to create a national consensus thus producing a stable, legitimate and ftinctioning 
government. But instead it resulted into a fractured mandate. As such, coalition government 
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was expected to function in the midst of a constant struggle for political domination 
between various political groups. The relatively weak political institutionalization, bad 
economic situation as well as strong surge for political participation did not help the 
creation of a stable government. Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency failed to produce 
stability in the government and instead it increased political instability. The legitimacy of 
his Cabinet was also soon deteriorating because of his seemingly erratic leadership, which 
cost him his presidency. Megawati's presidency that came up as a replacement of the failed 
coalition cabinet by President Abdurrahman Wahid enjoyed a relatively stable support and 
greater legitimacy. Thus, although the government was slow in tackling the economic 
problems as well as delaying, or rather failing, to deliver its election promises the cabinet 
continued to enjoy a relative stability until its term was over. Its status as a replacement 
cabinet meant that its term was the continuance of the previous cabinet of President 
Abdurrahman Wahid's thus it had a shorter term tiian the normal five years. Besides, since 
election was scheduled to be on time in 2004, political parties were busy with the 
preparation to win the election thus there their concern over the functioning of Megawati's 
cabinet as compared to the one of Abdurrahman Wahid's was scarce. 
Summing up the conclusion of the study, different party systems produced 
relatively diflFerent degree of political stability and legitimacy of government in Indonesian 
polity. The multi-party system with a relatively low level of political institutionalization in 
contrast with a high level of political participation during parliamentary democracy period 
had resulted in instability and legitimacy crisis in Indonesia. Although the 1955 general 
elections produced a legitimate government, but the conflicting interests and ideological 
differences between political parties led to the failure of this legitimacy to be transformed 
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into a stable polity. The relatively low level of political participation and institutionalization 
during Guided Democracy period contributed to the stability to the governing system as 
compared to the previous period. The charismatic personality of President Sukarno and the 
functioning of a single authoritarian party system became the other factors contributed to 
the situation. But the deteriorating economic condition and the slipping balance of power 
between the President, the PKI and the Army brought instability and legitimacy crisis to the 
regime. The hegemonic party system and strict control of the military over the decision-
making process in the New Order Indonesia created a stable presidential cabinet. But the 
low level of political institutionalization in contrast with the increasing level of political 
participation as well as the decreasing economic situation in the later decade of the New 
Order resulted in the instability and legitimacy crisis. The post-Suharto Indonesia witnessed 
an increasing degree of political participation with a relatively low level of political 
institutionalization and a weak economic situation. These factors contributed to a relatively 
low level of stability. However, the introduction of a direct presidential election in the 2004 
general election is likely to give different result. The possibility of the executive achieving 
more legitimacy through this electoral system leads to the possibility of the transformation 
of this political legitimacy into some degree of political stability. Nevertheless, unless the 
pattern of party politics is changed, the possibility of creating a working coalition between 
like-minded political parties on the basis of common minimum programs will be diflficult to 
achieve thus reducing the chance of arriving at sustainable political stability and legitimacy 
in Indonesian polity. 
Thus the hypothesis proposed in the beginning of this research that a moderate 
pluralism will provide an answer to the problem of political stability and legitimacy in 
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Indonesia is answered. During the course of this research it has been observed that 
different party systems experienced by Indonesia have not been able to give stability and 
legitimacy to the successive governments. Even though a multi party system is suitable to 
accommodate the different aspirations as well as different ideologies in a heterogeneous 
society like Indonesia but the relatively low level of political institutionalization with a high 
level of political participation led to instability and legitimacy crisis as fractured mandates 
were the phenomenon during the multi party system, which thereby resulted in instability 
crisis. One party system with strong govemment control over the functioning of the 
political processes is seen as an authoritarian system, which is contraiy to the principles of 
representative democracy that guarantees the basic rights and freedom of the populace. At 
the same time, the heterogenic nature that prevails in the Indonesian society makes the 
practice of a two-party system relatively difficult to realize because this system of party 
politics functions properly in a relatively homogeneous society. Other factor like the 
importance of the role of the opposition in the effective and succesfull functioning of a 
democratic frameworic is very significant. Thus to accommodate the heterogeneity of 
aspirations in a young democratic society like Indonesia, a moderate pluralism of party 
politics is regarded as the most suitable type of party system to be evolved in the post-
Suharto Indonesia. A referrence to tfie results of the 1955, the 1999 and the 2004 general 
elections in which several national parties with different ideological affiliations shared the 
majority of the total votes cast in the elections can be invoked in support of this 
proposition. 
In 1955 there were the Nationalist-Secular party, the Religious-Nationalist party and 
the Communist party (the PNI, the Masyumi and the NU and the PKI respectively) that 
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dominated the elections. In 1999 a similar scenario occurred in which Nationalist-Secular 
party, Development-oricnted-Secular party and Religious-Nationalist party with the 
absence of Communist party (the PDI-P, the GOLKAR, the PPP, the PKB. the PAN 
respectively) won the election. In the recently concluded general elections in 2004, a 
similar pattern was there where the GOLKAR, the PDI-P, the PPP, the Partai Demokrat 
(Democrat Party), the PKB, the PKS {Partai Keadilan Sejahlera, Justice and Welfare 
Party) and the PAN dominated the election results. These elections were held in a multi 
party system in which no single political party emerged as a majority power in the 
parliament. The political legitimacy achieved through these elections failed to be 
transformed into a stable polity where there were frequent changes of government. The 
weakness of the political parties to arrive at a national consensus due to their conflicting 
ideologies resultied in the formation of a weak coalition cabinet and a weak opposition thus 
contributing to the instability crisis. 
The increasing level of political participation in the post-Suharto Indonesia where 
political institutionalization was established to keep the balance in the polity is necessary to 
be accommodated through a suitable party system to create the possibility of arriving at a 
stable polity. Fractured mandate produced by a multi party system must be avoided since it 
leads to the formation of a weak coalition government as well as a weak opposition. It is in 
this scenario that a moderate pluralism is proposed to provide a more suitable system of 
party politics to accommodate die contrasting interests and ideologies in a democratic 
Indonesia. A moderate pluralism provides a working mechanism to arrive at stable polity as 
compared to a multi party system. Because with the party system that operates on basis of a 
limited number of political parties in which ideological differences between these parties 
183 
arc slight and vAten there is a general inclination to form coalitions political stability 
becomes an obtainable target. Besides, fractured mandate, which is the phenomenon in a 
multi party system can be avoided through a moderate pluralism thus the possibility to 
create a strong and stable government as well as the establishment of strong oppisition as a 
check and balance to the government is greater than through a multiparty sytem. 
The direct presidential election introduced in the post-Suharto Indonesia added to 
the necessary level of political legitimacy to the govemment. The amendment of the 1945 
Constitution and the strengthening of the national ideology added to the legal-constitutional 
frameworic for the functioning of a representative democracy in a moderate pluralism. The 
high degree of political legitimacy achieved by the executive through a direct electoral 
system, and more so, a possible domination of his/her party in the parliament, might result 
in authoritarianism in the absence of a strong opposition. The dominations of President 
Sukarno and General Suharto in the Indonesian politics for more than three decades proved 
this proposition. With limited national parties operating in the polity moderate pluralism 
helps in the formation of strong govemment as well as a responsible opposition. It thus 
serves as the best possible solution to the problem of political instability and legitimacy 
crisis in a heterogeneous society like Indonesia. The fact that three to four ideologically 
different political groupings emerged as the major parties during the democratically 
administered elections in Indonesia where multi party system was practiced further 
supported the proposal of the possibility of evolving a moderate pluralism in the post-
Suharto Indonesia. The dominatk)n of the Nationalist-Secular party, the Religious-
Nationalist party and the Communist party during the 1955 elections and the Nationalist-
Secular party, Devek)pment-Oriented-Secular party and Religious-Nationalist party in the 
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post-Suharto party politics fits to the idea of a moderate pluralism. With the evolution of a 
moderate pluralism fractured mandate could be avoided and more so, there is greater 
possibility of creating strong opposition to act as a balance to die strong, democratically 
elected government. At the same time the role of the political elites to realize this 
proposition is very important in which their consesus to creating a stable Indonesia will 
strenghten the functioning of this type of party system. However, even though a moderate 
pluralism helps in arriving at a stable and legitimate polity, the possibility of the 
functioning of a two-party system in the distance fiiture cannot be ruled out. The capability 
of a two-party system to maintain a more equitable balance between social forces and 
political parties in a representative democracy provides a greater opportunity of arriving at 
a stable polity. A relatively stronger government with a strong opposition as a check and 
balance to the government is more achievable in a two-party system scenario. Moreover, a 
two-party system is likely to produce more effective chance for a competitive party politics 
in a democratic polity. 
A possible scenario of a two party system would be the alliance, and the possibility 
of a natural merger, between the PDI-P, the GOLKAR, the Partai Demokrat (Democrat 
Party) and other smaller parties of similar ideological tendency to form a coalition of a 
Nationalist-Secular Front and at the same time, the PPP, the PKS, the PKB, the PAN and 
other smaller parties of similar ideological tendecy form an alliance of a Religious-
Nationalist parties in tiie form of a Progressive-Nationalist Front thus creating the situation 
of a two-party system in Indonesia. In a modernizing society like Indonesia in which 
modernization tends to create instability in the polity, a multi-party system with the high 
level of political participation and institutionalization only results in fractured mandate dius 
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resulting in a weak government and a weak opposition. Besides, in a multiparty system, 
strong parties are normally more coherent, more complexly organized but less flexible and 
less autonomous than are strong parties in a moderate pluralism or in a two-party system. 
Moreover, a two-party system is capable of assimilating rural masses into the political 
system and thus produces the bridge between rural and urban areas, which is key to 
political stability in modernizing societies. This second scenario, however, is difficult to 
realize if the histoty of party politics in Indonesia is observed. 
The proposition of a moderate pluralism as the solution to the process of creating a 
stable polity in Indonesia is possible to be evolved when there is a national consensus 
among the party elites in the necessity of creating stability in the Indonesian polity. A 
natural process of party coalitions in the form of pre-poll or post-poll alliances on the basis 
of common minimum programs as well as their ideological affiliations will further 
accommodate the political processes. The heterogeneity of interests in Indonesia will be 
effectively accommodated through this moderate pluralism and at the same time there is 
greater possibility of creating strong government as well as strong opposition thus creating 
a balance of equilibrium in a democratic polity. Thus even though a two-party system can 
provide a more equitable balance between social forces and political parties in a democratic 
polity as compared to other types of party systems but the heterogenic nature of interests 
that prevails in the Indonesian society will be more effectively and successfully 
accommodated through a moderate pluralism. 
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ANNEXURE - 1 
Jakarta Charter 
Whereas Independence is the natural right of every nation, colonialism must be 
abolished in this worid because it is not in conformity with humanity and Justice. 
And the struggle of the movement for the independence of Indonesia has now 
reached the hour of rejoicing by leading the People of Indonesia safe and sound to the 
gateway of the Independence of an Indonesian State which is free, united, sovereign, just 
and prosperous. 
Thanks to the blessing of God Almighty and impelled by the noble desire to lead 
their own free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence. 
Following this, in order to set up a government of the State of Indonesia which shall 
protect the whole of the Indonesian people and their entire native land of Indonesia, and in 
order to advance the general welfare, to develop the intellectual life of the nation and to 
contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon independence, 
abiding peace and social justice, the structure of Indonesia's National Independence shall 
be formulated in a Constitution of the Indonesian State which shall have the structural state 
form of a Republic of Indonesia with sovereignty of the People, and which shall be based 
upon: Belief in the Supreme God with the condition that the Islamic sharia to be strictly 
followed by the Muslims, just and civilised Humanity, the unity of Indonesia, and 
democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
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deliberation amongst representatives, meanwhile creating a condition of social justice for 
the whole of the People of Indonesia. 
Jakarta, 22 Juni 1945 
Ir. Sukarno 
Drs. Muhammad Hatta 
Mr. A.A. Maramis 
Abikusno Tjokrosujoso 
Abdulkahar Muzakir 
H. Agus Salim 
Mr. Achmad Subardjo 
Wachid Hasyim 
Mr. Muhammad Yamin 
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ANNEXURE - II 
PANCASILA 
1. Belief in One and Supreme God 
2. Just and civilized Humanity 
3. Unity of Indonesia 
4. Democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberation amongst representatives 
5. Social justice for the whole of the People of Indonesia 
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ANNEXURE - III 
The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 
The Opening to the Constitution 
Whereas Independence is the natural right of every nation, colonialism must be 
abolished in this world because it is not in conformity with humanity and Justice. 
And the struggle of the movement for the independence of Indonesia has now 
reached the hour of rejoicing by leading the People of Indonesia safe and sound to the 
gateway of the Independence of an Indonesian State which is free, united, sovereign, just 
and prosperous. 
Thanks to the blessing of God Almighty and impelled by the noble desire to lead 
their own free national life, the people of Indonesia hereby declare their independence. 
Following this, in order to set up a government of the State of Indonesia which shall 
protect the whole of the Indonesian people and their entire native land of Indonesia, and in 
order to advance the general welfare, to develop the intellectual life of the nation and to 
contribute in implementing an order in the world which is based upon independence, 
abiding peace and social justice, the structure of Indonesia's National Independence shall 
be formulated in a Constitution of the Indonesian State which shall have the structural state 
form of a Republic of Indonesia with sovereignty of the People, and which shall be based 
upon: Belief in the One, Supreme God, just and civilised Humanity, the unity of Indonesia, 
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and democracy which is guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberation amongst representatives, meanwhile creating a condition of social justice for 
the whole of the People of Indonesia. 
The Constitution 
Chapter I. Form and Sovereiguty 
Article 
1. The State of Indonesia shall be a unitary state which has the form of a Republic. 
2. Sovereignty shall be in the hands of the People and shall be exercised in full by the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat. 
Chapter 11. The Majelis Permusyawaratan ftak^at 
Article 2 
1. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall consist of members of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat aug^iented by delegates from the regional territories and the 
groups in accordance with regulations prescribed by statute. 
2. The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall sit at least once in five years in the 
capital of the State. 
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3. All decisions of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall be determined by 
majority vote. 
Article 3 
The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat shall determine the Constitution and the broad lines 
of the policy of the State. 
Chapter III. The Powers of Government of the State 
Article 4 
1. The President of the Republic of Indonesia shall hold the power of government in 
accordance with the Constitution. 
2. In exercising his duties, the President shall be assisted by a Vice-President 
Article 5 
1. The President shall hold the power to make statutes in agreement with the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat. 
2. The President shall determine the government Regulations necessary to implement 
statutes. 
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Article 6 
1. The President shall be a native-bom Indonesian. 
2. The President and Vice-President shall be elected by the Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat by majority vote. 
Article 7 
The President and Vice-President shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be 
eligible for re-election. 
Article 8 
Should the President die, cease from executing or be unable to execute his duties during his 
term of office, his office shall be taken by the Vice-President until the expiry of that term. 
Article 9 
Before assuming the duties of office, the President and Vice-President shall take an oath 
according to the requirements of religion, or shall make a solemn promise, before the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, as follows: 
Oath of the President (Vice-President) 
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"I swear before God that, to the best of my ability, I will fulfil as justly as possible 
the duties of the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia; that 1 will hold 
faithfully to the Constitution and conscientiously implement all statutes and regulations, 
and that I will devote myself to the service of Country and Nation". 
Promise of the President (Vice-President) 
"1 solemnly promise that, to the best of my ability, 1 will fulfil as justly as possible 
the duties of the President (Vice-President) of the Republic of Indonesia; that 1 will hold 
faithfully to the Constitution and conscientiously implement all statutes and regulations, 
and that I will devote myself to the service of Country and Nation". 
Article 10 
The President shall hold the highest authority over the Army, the Navy and Air Force. 
Article 11 
The President, with the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, declares war, makes 
peace smd concludes treaties with other states. 
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Article 12 
The President declares the state of emergency. The conditions governing, and the 
consequences of, the state of emergency shall be prescribed by statute. 
Article 13 
1. The President appoints diplomatic representatives and consuls. 
2. The President receives the diplomatic representatives of other states. 
Article 14 
The President grants grace, amnesties, abolitions and restoration of rights. 
Article 15 
The President grants titles, decorations and other marks of honour. 
Chapter IV. The Supreme Advisory Council 
Article 16 
1. The structure of the Supreme Advisory Council shall be prescribed by statute. 
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2. This council shall submit replies to issues raised by the President and shall have the 
right to submit proposals to the Government. 
Chapter V. The Ministers of the State 
Article 17 
1. The President shall be assisted by ministers of the State. 
2. These Ministers shall be appointed and dismissed by the President. 
3. These Ministers shall lead the Government Departments. 
Chapter VI. Local Government 
Article 18 
The division of the area of Indonesia into large and small regional territories, together with 
the structure of their administrations shall be prescribed by statute, with regard for and in 
observance of the principle of deliberation in the governmental system of the State, and the 
traditional rights in the regional territories which have a special character. 
Chapter VII. The Dewan Perwakilan Ral^ ^at (The Legislative Body) 
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Article 19 
1. (1) The structure of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall be prescribed by statute. 
2. (2) The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall sit at least once a year. 
Article 20 
1. (1) Every statute shall require the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
2. (2) Should a draft law not obtain the agreement of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 
that draft may not be submitted again during the same session of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat. 
Article 21 
1. Members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat shall have the right to submit draft laws. 
2. Should those drafts, although agreed by the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, not be 
ratified by the President, those drafts may not be submitted again during the same 
session of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
Article 22 
1. Should exigency compel, the President shall have the right to determine 
Government Regulations in lieu of statutes. 
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2. Those Government Regulations must obtain the agreement of the Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat in its next session. Should that agreement not be obtained, the 
Government Regulation shall be revoked. 
Chapter VII. Finance 
Article 23 
1. The estimates of revenue and expenditure shall be fixed each year by statute. Should 
the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat not agree to the estimates proposed by the 
Government, the Government shall work to the estimates of the previous year. 
2. All kinds of taxes for the needs of the State shall be based upon statutes. 
3. All kinds of values of the currency shall be prescribed by statute. 
4. Further matters of the finances of the state shall be regulated by statute. 
5. In order to investigate the accountability for state finances, a Body for the 
investigation of finance shall be set up, the regulations for which shall be set up, the 
regulations for which shall be precised by statute. 
The result of that investigation shall be made known to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. 
Chapter IX. The Judicial Powers 
Article 24 
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1. The judicial powers siiall be exercised by a Supreme Court and other courts of law 
in accordance with statute. 
2. The structure and powers of those courts of law shall be regulated by statute. 
Article 25 
The conditions for becoming a judge and for being dismissed shall be prescribed by statute. 
Chapter X. Citizens 
Article 26 
1. Citizens shall be persons who are native-bom Indonesians and persons of other 
nationality who are legalised by statute as being citizens. 
2. Conditions with regard to citizenship shall be prescribed by statute. 
Article 27 
1. Without any exception, all citizens shall have equal position in Law and 
Government and shall be obliged to uphold that Law and Government. 
2. Every citizen shall have the right to work, and to a living, befitting for human 
beings. 
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Article 28 
Freedom of association and assembly, of ejq)ressing thoughts and of issuing writing and the 
like, shall be prescribe by statute. 
Chapter XL Religion 
Article 29 
1. The State shall be based upon Belied in the One, Supreme God. 
2. The State shall guarantee freedom to every resident to adhere to his respective 
religion and to perform his religious duties in conformity with that religion and that 
faith. 
Chapter XII. Defence 
Article 30 
1. Every citizen shall have the right and the duty to participate in the defence effort of 
the State. 
2. Conditions concerning defence shall be regulated by statute. 
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Chapter XIII. Education 
Article 31 
1. Every citizen shall have the right to obtain an education. 
2. The Government shall establish and contract a national educational system which 
shall be regulated by the statute. 
Article 32 
The government shall advance the national culture of Indonesia. 
Chapter XIV. Social Weil-Being 
Article 34 
1. The economy shall be organised as a common endeavour based upon the principle 
of the family system. 
2. Branches of production which are important for the State and which affect the life 
of most people shall be controlled by the State. 
3. Land and water and the natural riches contained therein shall be controlled by the 
State and shall be made use of for the people. 
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Article 34 
The poor and destitute children, shall be cared for by the State. 
Chapter XV. Flag and Language 
Article 35 
The Flag of the Indonesian State shall be the Honoured Red and White. 
Article 36 
The language of the State shall be the Indonesian language. 
Chapter XVI. Alternations to the Constitution 
Articles? 
1. In order to alter the Constitution, at least two-thirds of the total members of the 
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat must be in attendance. 
2. A decision shall be taken with the agreement of at least two-thirds of the total 
number of members who are in attendance. 
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Transitional Provisions 
Clause I 
The Preparatory Committee for Indonesia's Independence shall regulate and execute tiie 
transfer of government to the Indonesian Government. 
Clause II 
All existing institutions and regulations of the State shall continue to function so long as 
new ones have not been set up in conformity with this Constitution. 
Clause III 
The President and Vice-President shall be elected for the first time by the Preparatory 
Committee for Indonesia's Independence. 
Clause IV 
Before the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat and the 
Supreme Advisory Council have been set up in conformity with this Constitution, all their 
powers shall be exercised by the President with the assistance of a National Committee. 
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Additional Provisions 
1. Within six months after the end of the Greater East Asia War, the President of 
Indonesia shall regulate and implement all things which are stipulated in this 
Constitution. 
2. Within six months after the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat has been set up, the 
Majelis shall sit in order to determine the Constitution. 
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ANNEXURE-IV 
Government Act 
In relation with the suggestion from the Working Body of the Central National 
Committee of Indonesia to the Govemment, to provide opportunity as wide as possible to 
the people to create political parties, with the restriction, that the parties should be meant 
for strengthening our struggle to defend our independence and to guarantee the security in 
the society, the Govemment asserts its position taken a few times back that: 
1. The Govemment is interested in the emergence of political parties, because with the 
existence of political parties it would be possible to lead the different ideologies in 
the society into a regulated way of political participation. 
2. The Govemment hopes that the political parties should have been arranged, before 
the commencement of the election of the members of the People's Representative 
Bodies in the month of January 1946. 
Jakarta, 3 November 1945 
Vice-President, 
Muhammad Hatta 
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ANNEXURE-V 
Presidential Decree 5* July 1959 
Whereas, with the support of the majority of the people of Indonesia, and impelled 
by our own conviction, we are forced to follow the one and only way of saving the State of 
the Proclamation, 
Whereas we are convinced that the Djakarta Charter dated 22"*^  July 1945 gave 
inspiration to the 1945 Constitutio and constitutes one link in a single chain with that 
Constitution; 
Therefore, on the grounds mentioned above. 
We, President of the Republic of Indonesia, Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces, Decree the dissoluiton of the Constituent Assembly. Decree that the 1945 
Constitution be in force again for the whole of the Indonesian People and the entire native 
land of Indonesia as from the date of this Decree, and that the Provisional Constitution be 
no longer in force. 
The setting up of the Provisional Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat which shall be 
composed of the members of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat augmented by delegates form 
the regional territories and from the groups, as well as the setting up of the Provisional 
Supreme Advisory Council, will be executed in the shortest possible time. 
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Decreed at Djakarta on 5"* July 1959 
In the name of the People of Indonesia 
President of the Republic of Indonesia, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. 
SUKARNO 
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ANNEXURE- VI 
List of Political Parties in the 1955 Elections 
o Partai Nasional Indonesia (National Party of Indonesia, PNI) 
o Masyumi (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) 
o Nahdatul Ulama (Association of Ulama, NU) 
o Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia, PKI) 
o Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Association Party, PSII) 
o Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party, Parkindo) 
o Partai Katholik (Cathol ic Party) 
o Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Socialist Party of Indonesia, PSI) 
o Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Islamic Education Movement, Perti) 
o Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League for Upholding Indonesian 
Independence, IPKI) 
o Partai Rakyat Nasional (National People's Party, PRN) 
o Partai Buruh (Labour Party) 
o Gerakan Pendukung Panca Sila (Movement to Defend Panca Si la, GPPS) 
o Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People Party, PRl) 
o Persatuan Pegawai Polisi Republik Indonesia (Police Employee's Association, 
PPPRI) 
o Partai Murba (Proletarian Party) 
o Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Consultative Body on 
Indonesian Citizenship, Baperki) 
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o Persatuan Indonesia Raya -Wongsonegoro (Greater Indonesian Union-
Wongsonegoro, PIR - Wongsonegoro) 
o Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Proletarian People's Union, Permai) 
o Persatuan Indonesia Raya - Hazairin (Greater Indonesian Union-Hazairin, PIR -
Hazairin) 
o Partai Politik Tharikah Indonesia (Indonesian Tharikah Political Party, PPTI) 
o Partai Republik Indonesia Merdeka (Independent Indonesian Republic Party, 
PRIM) 
o Angkatan Comunis Muda (Young Generation Communists, Acoma) 
o Gerakan Indonesia Muda - Yogyakarta (Indonesian Youth Movement -
Yogyakarta, Gerinda - Yogyakarta) 
o Partai Persatuan Dayak - Kalimantan Barat (Dayak Unity Party - West 
Kalimantan, PPD - Kalimantan Barat) 
o Persatuan Rakyat Desa (Union of Village People - West Java, PRD - Jawa Barat) 
o AKUI-Madura 
o Gerakan Pilihan Sunda - Jawa Barat (Sundanese Election Movement - West Java, 
GPS-Jawa Barat) 
o Partai Tani Indonesia -Jawa Barat (Indonesian Peasants' Party - West Java, PTl -
Jawa Barat) 
o Gerakan Banleng ~ Jawa Barat (Buffalo Movement - West Java) 
o Persatuan Indonesia Raya - Nusatenggara Barat - Lombok (Greater Indonesian 
Union - West Nusatenggara - Lombok, PIR - Nusatenggara Barat - Lombok) 
o R.Soedjono Prawirisoedarso (Independent Candidate) 
o L.M.Idrus Effendi (Independent Candidate) 
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ANNEXURE - VII 
List of Political Parties in 1999 Elections 
o Partai Indonesia Bam (New Indonesia Party, PIB) 
o Partai Kristen Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Christian National Party, PKNI) 
o Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, PNI) 
o Partai Aliansi Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Alliance Party, PADI) 
o Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Awakening Party, 
PKMI) 
o Partai Umat Islam (Muslim Party, PUI) 
o Partai Kebangkitan Umat (People's Awakening Party, PKU) 
o Partai Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi Party, PMB) 
o Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (Unity Development Party, PPP) 
o Partai Syarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Association Party, PSII) 
o Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle, 
PDI-P) 
o Partai Abul Yatama (Abul Yatama Party, PAY) 
o Partai Kebangsaan Merdeka (National Independent Party, PKM) 
o Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (Love Nation Democratic Party, PDKB) 
o Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN) 
o Partai Rakyat Demokratik (People's Democratic Party, PRD) 
o Partai Syarekat Islam Indonesia 1905 (Indonesian Islamic Association Party 1905, 
PSII 1905) 
o Partai Katholik Demokrat (Catholic Democratic Party, PKD) 
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o Partai Pilihan Rakyat (People's Choice Party, PPR) 
o Partai Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People Party, PRI) 
o Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi (Indonesian Islamic Masyumi Political 
Party, PPIIM) 
o Partai Bulan Bintang (Star Crescent Party, PBB) 
o Partai Solidaritas Pekerja (Workers Solidarity Party, PSP) 
o Partai Keadilan (Justice Party, PK) 
o Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (NahdIatuI Ulama Party, PNU) 
o Partai Nasional Indonesia Front Marhaenis (Indonesian National Marhaenist Front 
Party, PNl Front Marhaenis) 
o Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Association of Supporters of 
Indonesian Independence Party, Partai IPKI) 
o Partai Republik (Republic Party, PR) 
o Partai Islam Demokrat (Islamic Democratic Party, PID) 
o Partai Nasional Indonesia Massa Marhaen (Indonesian National Party for Marhaen 
Masses, PNI Massa Marhaen) 
o Partai Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (All People's Deliberation Party, PMRB) 
o Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (National Democratic Party, PDI) 
o Partai Golkar (Golkar Party, PG) 
o Partai Persatuan (Unity Party, PP) 
o Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, PKB) 
o Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (Uni Democratic Indonesia Party, PUDI) 
o Partai Buruh Nasional (National Labours Party, PBN) 
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o Partai Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Gotong Royong (Family Deliberation Mutual 
Help Party, Partai MKGR) 
o Partai Daulat Rakyat (People's Independent Party, PDR) 
o Partai Cinta Damai (Love Peace Party, PCD) 
o Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan (Justice and Unity Party, PKP) 
o Partai Solidaritas Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (Solidarity of All Indonesian Workers 
Party, PSPSl) 
o Partai Nasional Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian National People Party, PNBI) 
o Partai Bhineka Tunggal Ika {Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Party, PBTI) 
o Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Uni National Solidarity 
Party, Partai SUNl) 
o Partai Nasional Demokrat (National Democratic Party, PND) 
o Partai Umat Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party, PUMI) 
o Partai Pekerja Indonesia (Indonesian Workers Party, PPI) 
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